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I. INTRODUCTION

P

ersonal jurisdiction doctrine plays a major role in many civil
disputes in the United States.1 When the defendant resides in,
is incorporated or headquartered in (in the case of a
corporation or other business), or is otherwise found in the particular
state where suit is brought, personal jurisdiction generally is found to
exist and is unproblematic. Major personal jurisdiction issues usually
arise when a plaintiff sues the defendant in a state other than the one
in which the defendant is located.2
In many cases involving parties located in different states, where
a suit takes place is as extensively litigated an issue as the underlying
dispute that led to the litigation in the first place.3 In the last seventy
1

Personal jurisdiction concerns the authority of a particular court to adjudicate the
rights of a particular party. Personal jurisdiction is generally an issue only with
regard to a defendant, because a plaintiff submits to the jurisdiction of a given
court by filing suit there. In contrast, subject-matter jurisdiction concerns a court’s
competency to litigate a particular type of suit (e.g. a contract dispute under state
law, as opposed to a federal civil rights claim or a dispute over child custody), and
cannot be determined by the desires or actions of either party to submit to that
particular court.
2
The typical personal jurisdiction dispute arises where parties from two different
states have a dispute and the plaintiff sues in his or her own state. For example,
suppose that an Illinois resident buys a computer from a seller located in
California by visiting the seller’s website. The seller ships the computer to the
buyer in Illinois who finds that the computer frequently crashes and does not
perform as promised. If the buyer were to sue in California, there would almost
surely be no personal jurisdiction dispute. But if the buyer were to sue in Illinois –
a likely scenario – then the defendant might argue that it was not subject to the
personal jurisdiction of Illinois’ courts. In some cases, as will be discussed below,
a plaintiff sues in a court that is neither its nor the defendant’s home state. See
discussion infra Part II.
3
Under current doctrine, the issue of whether a court in a given state—including a
federal court located there—has personal jurisdiction over a given defendant is
both a statutory and constitutional matter. All states have long-arm statutes that
state the extent to which its courts may exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state
defendants. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that generally federal
courts should follow the long-arm rules of the states in which they are located,
although there are some federal rules and statutes that allow more extensive
jurisdiction in these cases. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k). Whatever a state or federal
jurisdictional statute provides, however, is also evaluated as a constitutional
matter, primarily under the Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution,
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years, most personal jurisdiction disputes have been litigated under
the famous minimum contacts standard first articulated in
International Shoe v. Washington.4 There is little dispute about what
the Court said in that case. But the Supreme Court’s inability to
cogently explain and consistently apply the standard annunciated in
International Shoe has confounded litigants and lower courts alike.
Predicting whether a particular state court has jurisdiction can be
frustrating. Parties and courts are hard pressed to know whether
jurisdiction in a particular forum will be upheld.
The problem is not that personal jurisdiction has not been given
sufficient attention; it is that it has gotten too much attention.
Although I recognize the irony of writing an article about a topic
while decrying the focus on that topic, my hope is that this article
might nonetheless ultimately make personal jurisdiction doctrine
simpler, more predictable, and therefore less important.
Within the more than fifty jurisdictions in the United States,
where a suit takes place really should not matter very much. Modern
travel and communication makes suits throughout the country
relatively easy for most parties. Federal and various state judicial
systems are more alike than different. And, even though substantive
law may vary from state to state, modern conflict of law approaches
allow the application of appropriate substantive law irrespective of
the location of litigation.
The reason that personal jurisdiction has become so important is
that modern case law made it so. The Court’s jurisprudential
approach, which focuses on due process, state lines, and minimum
contacts, assumes that personal jurisdiction involves a highly
complex, constitutionally important area of law. But, it is not that
personal jurisdiction is inherently complex or important. It is only
that the Court’s unfortunate approach has made it so.
Personal jurisdiction should be, and can be, straightforward, low
drama, and simple. For defendants who are located in the United

located in the 5th and 14th Amendments, and in fact most states’ jurisdictional
statutes allow the exercise of jurisdiction to the fullest amount allowed under the
Constitution. This article’s critique focuses primarily on constitutional limits on
personal jurisdiction.
4
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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States,5 personal jurisdiction should be primarily a matter of state
policy, with minor policing by the Supreme Court and Congress.
This article argues that a state-focused approach to personal
jurisdiction is both theoretically sound and practically superior to the
current minimum contacts approach.
Section II of this article provides a critical history of personal
jurisdiction. Section III provides an organized critique of the current
landscape. With Section II having provided detail of the cases from
International Shoe through the Court’s case law in its most recent
term, Section III hones in on what is fundamentally wrong with the
current approach. Section IV delineates a new approach to personal
jurisdiction. With prior sections arguing that due process and
minimum contacts are both a practical hindrance and a theoretical
mismatch, this Section advocates for a non-constitutional approach
to personal jurisdiction grounded primarily in state legislative policy
choices. Section V evaluates the new proposal by considering how
common personal jurisdiction scenarios will play out under the
proposed approach. It demonstrates that if left primarily to state
policy makers, with minor federal constitutional and legislative
involvement, the resultant doctrine will be consistent with both
constitutional and systemic structural norms. It will also result in
fairer, more logical, and easier standards to apply than the current
minimum contacts approach.
II. CRITICAL HISTORY OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A.

International Shoe
Current personal jurisdiction doctrine traces its origins to
International Shoe Company v. Washington.6 Prior to that case,
5

Because defendants located outside of the United States can be forced to answer
for judgments only by means of comity or agreement between nations, personal
jurisdiction over those defendants requires a separate analysis outside the scope of
this article. The Supreme Court has essentially applied the analysis that it uses for
domestic defendants to defendants located abroad, with some added frills. For that
reason, this article analyzes several Supreme Court cases involving international
defendants, but only to aid in formulating a sound doctrine for purely domestic
purposes.
6
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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personal jurisdiction doctrine was rooted in a territorial theory as
expressed in the famous case, Pennoyer v. Neff.7 Put simply,
Pennoyer held that, with a few narrow exceptions, personal
jurisdiction existed only if a defendant or the defendant’s property
could be found and served with process or in the case of property,
attached in the forum state.8 This cramped view of jurisdiction
conflicted with the realities of modern commerce and mobility.9 For
that reason, in the years following Pennoyer, courts created various
fictions to allow the exercise of jurisdiction in cases involving
conflicts between plaintiffs and out-of-state defendants.10
International Shoe sought to create a theory of jurisdiction that
dispensed with these fictions.
The facts of International Shoe case are well known. In short,
Washington State brought suit in its own courts to recover taxes
owed based on the sales-related activities of a Missouri-based
corporation in Washington.11 The Court concluded that Washington
had personal jurisdiction.12 In doing so, it delineated the famous
minimum contacts test. Under this test, whether a court has personal
jurisdiction requires that the defendant “have certain minimum
contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of suit does
not violate notions of fair play and substantial justice.”13 The Court
also emphasized that the source and limitation of a court’s
jurisdictional authority was the Due Process Clause.14
The Court provided little guidance on the nature and extent of
contacts necessary to satisfy jurisdictional requirements. Rather, it
painted with broad strokes and created two categories of jurisdiction:
one in which the dispute arose from the defendant’s contacts, and
7

95 U.S. 714 (1877); see also Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of
Personal Jurisdiction, 68 MO. L. REV. 753, 754 (2003) (“American constitutional
law of personal jurisdiction largely began in 1877 with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Pennoyer v. Neff.”).
8
Id. at 720. If the defendant was found in the forum state then jurisdiction was
deemed in personem; if an out-of-state defendant’s property was attached,
jurisdiction was deemed in rem. Id.
9
See McFarland, supra note 7, at 755.
10
Id.
11
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 312.
12
Id. at 321.
13
Id. at 320 (internal quotation marks omitted).
14
Id. at 319.
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another in which the contacts were unrelated to the dispute.15 The
former category required less in terms of quantity and/or extent of
contacts than the latter.16 In essence, however, the test was circular.
Personal jurisdiction depended upon satisfying due process criteria.
The Court’s test for whether these criteria were satisfied turned upon
contacts sufficient to satisfy substantial justice and fair play, which
is essentially a synonym for due process.
International Shoe thus melded personal jurisdiction, due
process, and territoriality, but replaced the defendant’s presence as
the keystone of the territoriality—the central point of Pennoyer—
with minimum contacts.17 Although the International Shoe Court
15

Id. at 320.
The Court then delineated four scenarios in which jurisdiction might or might
not be found. See id. at 317–18; see also Carol Rice Andrews, The Personal
Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked in the National Debate about “Class Action
Fairness,” 58 SMU L. REV. 1313, 1337–39 (2005) (“To illustrate and give
meaning to the new test, the Court in International Shoe collected many of its
prior decisions and grouped them into four categories.”). Specifically, jurisdiction
would be found when a defendant had “continuous and systematic contacts [that]
also give rise to the liabilities sued upon[.]” See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317. In
addition, certain singular acts “because of their nature and quality and the
circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to render the
corporation liable to suit.” Id. at 318. Conversely, for suits not arising from a
defendant’s forum contacts, “the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his
conduct of a single or isolated item of activities in a state in the corporation’s
behalf are not enough to subject it to suit.” Id. at 317. But, in some cases a
defendant has “continuous corporate operations within a state . . . so substantial
and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of actions arising from
dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” Id. at 318. Eventually, the terms
“specific jurisdiction” and “general jurisdiction” came to be used to refer to suits
arising from defendants’ contacts and those not so arising, respectively. See
Helicopteros Nacionales v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984) (citing Von Mehren
& Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1121, 1144–64 (1966) as the original source of the terms “specific jurisdiction”
and “general jurisdiction”).
17
Cf. Glenn S. Koppel, Paper Symposium: Making Sense of Personal Jurisdiction
after Goodyear and Nicastro: The Function and Dysfunctional Role of Formalism
in Federalism: Shady Grove Versus Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905,
909–10 (2012) (“International Shoe’s two-part minimum contacts test married the
formalist minimum contacts test of ‘purposeful availment’ which requires the nonresident defendant to target his claim-related activities at the forum state, with the
functionalist ‘fairness’ assessment, which entails balancing a variety of factors,
including forum interest and party convenience.”).
16
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had criticized the defendant’s presence as begging the question, so
too did its due process-cum-minimum contacts test. The Court
presented a vague and circular concept of what contacts were
necessary, saying that the minimum required would be those
contacts necessary to satisfy “traditional notions of substantial
justice and fair play.”18 Moreover, the Court did not say whether
contacts were the primary concern as an end in themselves, or
simply to be used in service of the overarching concept of fairness.
The Court also did not explain why due process required a
geographic nexus between the forum state and the defendant.
The frequency with which the due process/minimum contacts
formula has been unquestionably repeated by the Supreme Court and
other courts might lead one to believe that due process necessarily
requires some type of geographic relationship between defendant
and state. Upon closer examination, due process actually concerns
whether the defendant had an opportunity to defend himself and
received fair treatment in whatever court adjudicated his claim,
rather than the relationship between the defendant and the
jurisdiction prior to suit. To the extent case law prior to
International Shoe held that due process required presence, the
Court’s conclusion that due process now only required minimum
contacts seems analytically suspect. The language of the Due
Process Clause had not changed, so, if under Pennoyer due process
had previously required presence, it made no sense to conclude, as in
International Shoe, that it now required only minimum contacts.
Similarly, if inherent limits to state power restrict jurisdiction to
defendants present or served within a state, economic and societal
changes alone would not justify the transformation to a minimum
contacts test if prior jurisdictional limits inhered in the nature of the
states as political entities.
B.

Shoe’s Progeny
International Shoe changed the direction of the law by setting
out broad outlines for personal jurisdiction.19 In so doing, the Court
18

Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
19
See Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Take of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 257, 268–69 (1990) (“[T]he Court has on occasion employed a paradigm-
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left open the question of exactly how courts should incorporate both
minimum contacts and notions of fairness in deciding particular
cases.20 It was left to subsequent Supreme Court decisions to tidy up
the mess into which Shoe had stepped.
Since International Shoe, the Supreme Court has decided twenty
cases in which the minimum contacts test played a major role in the
decision: Mullane, Travelers Health, Perkins, McGee, Hanson,
Shaffer, Kulko, World-Wide, Rush, Insurance Corp., Calder, Keeton,
Helicopteros, Burger King, Asahi, Burnham, J. McIntyre, Goodyear,
Walden, and Bauman. 21
This section provides a tour through International Shoe’s
progeny to the Court’s most recent term. As the discussion will
serve primarily to set the framework for critique of the current
approach, this section will emphasize those cases that strongly
demonstrate the characteristics, including the flaws, of the current
personal jurisdiction jurisprudential framework. Other cases will
only be mentioned in passing.
1. The Early Fairness/Common Sense Approach
The Supreme Court found the existence of personal jurisdiction
in the first four minimum contacts cases that it decided following
International Shoe: Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,22
Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia,23 Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co.,24 and McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co.25 In each, the Court
essentially took the position that so long as the chosen forum was an
arguably sensible place to litigate, given the connection between the
forum and the parties, as well as witnesses and evidence, that
seeking case . . . . [T]he Court does not set forth a single, narrow, drawn
standard . . . . Rather, the Court utilizes the paradigm-seeking case to invite future
courts to enter into a dialogue concerning the impact (if any) of the constitutional
events on the particular doctrinal area.”).
20
See generally Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310.
21
These cases do not include those in which personal jurisdiction was evaluated
based on forum selection clauses, which is treated as more of a contractual, rather
than a jurisdictional issue. This list also does not include class action cases.
22
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
23
339 U.S. 643 (1950).
24
342 U.S. 437 (1952).
25
355 U.S. 220 (1957).

2015

A 21ST CENTURY APPROACH TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION

73

jurisdiction would be valid. Furthermore, absent a burden upon the
defendant26 that was so great that it would deprive the defendant of a
meaningful opportunity to litigate and protect its rights, the Court
found jurisdiction proper.27
For example, in Mullane the Court held that New York courts
could exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate the property rights of out-ofstate trust beneficiaries without any regard to their forum contacts.28
In so doing, the Court focused purely on fairness and the
reasonableness of adjudication in New York. The Court, speaking
through Justice Jackson, stated that “the interest of each state in
providing means to close trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and
are administered under the supervision of its courts is so insistent
and rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt the right of its
courts to determine the interests of all claimants, resident or
nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity to
appear and be heard.”29 Adding that, “[m]any controversies have
raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause
but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded
by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case.”30 Thus, the Court focused on making sure that that the
affected parties—in this case the trust beneficiaries; while in most
other cases the defendants—would have a fair opportunity to
adjudicate their rights in the forum. Leaving no doubt that the Court
was wrenching personal jurisdiction away from its formalistic
moorings of the nineteenth century, the Court explicitly rejected
Pennoyer’s focus on categories of in personam and in rem
26

In Mullane, the affected parties were technically not defendants, but instead
numerous trust beneficiaries in a suit to settle a large trust. 339 U.S. at 307.
Settling the trust meant addressing and putting to rest any issues in trust
management during a given time period. Id. at 311. Once the trust was settled for
a given timeframe, all claims that trust beneficiaries would have against the trustee
for misfeasance or nonfeasance during that time frame would be extinguished. Id.
For this reason, the settlement of the trust impacts beneficiaries’ property rights by
means of a suit brought by someone else, here the trustee, and they are thus akin to
defendants.
27
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
28
Id. at 312–13.
29
Id. at 313 (emphasis added).
30
Id.
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jurisdiction.31 Instead, the Court held that jurisdiction was proper
because it made sense to hold the proceeding in New York, and the
parties’ rights would not be unfairly impinged so long as all affected
received sufficient notice and an opportunity to respond.32
The Court took a similar fairness/common sense approach in
Travelers Heath,33 Perkins,34 and McGee.35 Thus, the Court’s early
approach combined a presumption of jurisdiction so long as the
chosen forum did not appear arbitrary or absurd considering all the
factors involved in the litigation, and the chosen forum did not so
burden the defendant that it amounted to a denial of due process.
2. Hanson
Only a few months passed before the Court’s next jurisdictional
foray, Hanson v. Denckla,36 but the world of personal jurisdiction

31

See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 312 (“Distinctions between actions in rem and those in
personam are ancient. . . . But in any event we think that the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution do not depend on classification
for which the standards are so elusive and confused generally.”).
32
Id. at 320; see Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First
Century: The Ironic Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551, 559 n.69
(2012) (“[Justice Jackson’s analysis in Mullane] reflected the hard-nosed,
commonsense pragmatism traditionally associated with the procedural due process
inquiry.”) (citing Martin H. Redish, Personal Jurisdiction and the Global
Resolution of Mass Tort Litigation: Defining the Constitutional Boundaries, 28
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917, 936 (1995)).
33
See 339 U.S. at 646–47 (holding that a state could exert jurisdiction over an outof-state insurer who sold certificates within the state).
34
See 342 U.S. at 445 (holding that the state of Ohio had general jurisdiction over
a Philippine corporation when the president/owner of the company had moved to
Ohio during WWII and effectively ran the company from that state, stating that
“[t]he essence of the issue . . . at a constitutional level . . . [is] one of general
fairness to the corporation.”).
35
See 355 U.S. at 221–22 (holding that California could exercise jurisdiction over
a Texas insurance company who insured a man who died in California despite the
lack of formal contacts between the insurer and California, and stressing, among
other thing, state interest and location of witnesses—and noting that the defendant
insurer would not be so burdened that requiring it to defend in California would
amount to a denial of due process).
36
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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would change drastically with this decision;37 although in many
ways it was returning to the world of sovereignty and state borders
that characterized the Pennoyer era. Hanson broke with the
common sense approach that the Court had taken in its initial postShoe cases. In particular the Court disparaged McGee’s observation
that “the trend of expanding personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents. . . . [because] technological progress has increased the
flow of commerce between States. . . . [and] progress in
communication and transportation has made the defense of suit in a
foreign tribunal less burdensome.”38 Even though “[t]here [was] no
suggestion that the court failed to employ a means of notice
reasonably calculated to inform nonresident defendants of the
pending proceedings or denied them an opportunity to be heard in
defense of their interests[,]”39 due process still prohibited
adjudication in the plaintiffs’ chosen forum of Florida due to the lack
of physical contacts between the defendants and Florida.40
Famously—or infamously—the Court said:
[I]t is a mistake to assume that this trend [which
McGee had highlighted] heralds the eventual demise
of all restrictions on personal jurisdiction of state
courts. Those restrictions are more than a guarantee
of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation.
They are a consequence of territorial limitation on the
power of the respective States. However minimal the
burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant
may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the
“minimal contacts” with the State that are a
prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.41

37

See Andrews, supra note 16, at 1340 (“The most important development in the
[specific jurisdiction] line of cases was [Hanson’s] ‘purposeful availment’
factor.”).
38
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250–51.
39
Id. at 245 (footnotes omitted).
40
Id. at 251.
41
Id. (citations omitted).
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The Court’s personal jurisdiction focus was on state power and
sovereignty, with fairness reduced to secondary status.42 The
connection between due process and state sovereignty was left
unexplained.43 It had been so in International Shoe, but that
incongruity could be explained away by the possibility that Shoe’s
concern with contacts was as a proxy for fairness, not an end in itself
required by notions of sovereignty as in a Pennoyerian world.
Justice Black dissented, joined by Justices Burton and Brennan
who carried the mantle for a more permissive fairness-based
jurisdiction for most of the next thirty years.44 Justice Black
emphasized that logic dictated that the litigation take place in
Florida, and allowing that certainly was not going to interfere with
the ability of affected parties to reasonably protect their interests.45
3. The Late 1970s through 1990: After an Almost Two Decade
Break, the Court Reenters the Personal Jurisdiction Fray
Hanson proved to be a bell-weather. While the post-Shoe preHanson cases focused on fairness rather than contacts and found
jurisdiction present in a variety of circumstances, Hanson shifted the
equation following which the Court decided no personal jurisdiction
cases for almost two decades.46 Then “in a flurry of cases [eleven to
42

See id. at 254 (“[Florida] does not acquire [] jurisdiction by being . . . the most
convenient location for litigation.”); see also Freer, supra note 32, at 560 (“In
Hanson, we see no concern for the state’s interest or relative convenience of the
parties. . . . [T]he focus is narrowly on whether the defendant itself had created
sufficient ties with that state.” (emphasis added)).
43
See Patrick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism: International Shoe’s HalfBuried Legacy, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 561, 575 (1995) [hereinafter “Borchers,
Jurisdictional Pragmatism”] (“Many commentators have criticized [the] approach
[that focuses on protecting state power], and even the Court now seems to agree
that these considerations have nothing to do with personal jurisdiction. Suffice it
to say that extending the ambit of a clause that protects ‘persons’ to states has not
survived close scrutiny.” (footnotes omitted)).
44
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 256 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas authored a
separate dissent.
45
Id. at 258 (“The beneficiaries of the appointment, some of whom live outside
Florida, and the Delaware trustee were defendants. They had timely notice of the
suit and an adequate opportunity to obtain counsel and appear.”).
46
The Court did decide several cases during this time involving the enforcement
of forum selection clauses. Those cases were analyzed primarily in terms of
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be precise] . . . Hanson’s focus on defendant-initiated contact with
the forum came to dominate.”47 In the eleven cases between 1977
and 1990, the Court found jurisdiction lacking in six, by holding
“that there was no relevant contact” between the defendant and
forum state in five of these cases.48
The first two cases decided in this era were Shaffer49 and
Kuklo.50 The former dealt with the relatively esoteric subject of
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, which requires no additional discussion
here. Kuklo applied the minimum contacts test to individuals in a
domestic dispute, finding that a wife could not force her husband to
litigate a domestic dispite in a state with which his only contacts
were the fact that his minor children were living their with the wife
(their mother).51 This case is notable because thirteen years later, in
Burnham v. Superior Court,52 the Court reached the opposite result
on almost identical facts because of minor technical differences that
played an outsized role under the minimum contacts test.53
(a)

World-Wide (and Rush)

In 1980, the Court issued two minimum contacts opinions on the
same day, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,54 and Rush v.

contract law, rather than personal jurisdiction doctrine, so are not given full
treatment in this article. See, e.g., National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent,
375 U.S. 311 (1964) (approving a contractual appointment of agent in New York
State for service of process); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1
(1972) (upholding parties’ contractual agreement to litigate disputes in London);
see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (upholding a
forum selection clause contained in a passenger’s cruise ticket).
47
Freer, supra note 32, at 562.
48
Id. The exception was Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102
(1987), in which the Court split 4-4 on whether the contacts were sufficient, while
an 8-0 majority found jurisdiction lacking due to other considerations, which
entered the analysis in the early to mid 1980s as a separate component apart from
contacts. See infra part II.B.3.e.
49
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1975).
50
Kulko v. Super. Ct. Cal., 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
51
Id. at 101.
52
495 U.S. 604 (1990).
53
See discussion infra Part II.B.3.g.
54
444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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Savchuk.55 World-Wide is truly heartbreaking both for those who
care about civil procedure and those who care about human beings.
If McGee represented the high point for a fairness-based common
sense approach to jurisdiction then World-Wide, along with Hanson
twenty-two years earlier56 and J. McIntyre v. Nicastro57 thirty-one
years later, is the high point (or low point) of a jurisdictional analysis
rooted in rigid notions of sovereignty and the magic of state lines.
In 1976, Harry and Kay Robinson purchased an Audi in New
York from Seaway Volkswagen.58 A year later, while moving with
their children to a new home in Arizona, Kay was driving the Audi,
with the couple’s daughter and oldest son through Oklahoma when
tragedy struck.59 Actually, what struck the rear of the Audi was a
1971 Ford Torino driven by a drunk driver.60
Upon impact, a fire started.61 Although the impact did not cause
injury itself, it had caused all the doors to jam, making the car a fire
trap.62 All three passengers suffered severe burns, with Kay
Robinson suffering the worst.63 She suffered burns over forty-eight
percent of her body (thirty-five percent were third degree burns), had
most of her fingers amputated, and had to endure thirty-four
surgeries.64 The two children traveling with her also received
disfiguring burns requiring extensive treatment and rehabilitation.65
Because the family was receiving this extensive treatment in
Oklahoma, Harry hired a local attorney.66 This attorney ultimately
brought a claim on the Robinson’s behalf.67 Because the car turned
55

444 U.S. 320 (1980).
See discussion supra Part II.2.
57
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. 2780 (2011); see discussion infra
Part II.B.3.g.
58
See Charles W. Adams, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson – The Rest of the
Story, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1122, 1123 (1993). This article provides a fascinating
account of the facts and legal history of the case.
59
Harry and the couples’ other son were several yards in front in a rented U-Haul.
See id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 1124.
63
Id. at 1125–26.
64
See Adams, supra note 58, at 1126.
65
Id. at 1125–26.
66
Id. at 1126.
67
Id. at 1129.
56
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into a tinderbox upon impact, there was good reason to believe that
the car was defective.68
The Robinson’s filed suit in Oklahoma state court, naming the
German company, Volkswagen, its American importer, the local
New York area distributor, and the New York based dealer from
whom the Robinsons bought their car.69 The plaintiffs were
temporarily located there, and could not easily travel.70 Most of the
witnesses and physical evidence were also there.71 Moreover, the
defendants were scattered in different places, so Oklahoma seemed
as good a location as any.72 The two defendants who objected to
jurisdiction, the distributor and the car dealer, would surely not
suffer any inconvenience or burden litigating in Oklahoma.73 In fact,
there was reason to believe that based purely on fairness, that
Oklahoma was preferable.74 The Court, therefore, had to squarely
face how to reconcile the concept of contacts as an end in themselves
(as had been the focus in cases like Hanson) with the notion that
personal jurisdiction was about due process and fairness in a case
where fairness and contacts pointed in opposite directions.
Additionally, the Court had to address how to apply the minimum
contacts test in a product’s liability case.
Realizing that on the facts it could not equate contacts with
fairness, the Court tried a new tact through a 6-3 opinion authored by

68

See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 288.
Adams, supra note 58, at 1129.
70
Id.
71
See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal
Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
19, 96 (1990) [hereinafter Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law].
72
See id.
73
The German manufacturer and its American sister company did not object to
jurisdiction. See World-Wide, 44 U.S. at 288 n.3.
74
See id. (“In fact, the truly ‘convenient’ forum for all concerned was probably
Oklahoma because the bulk of the evidence, particularly the wrecked car, was in
that state. Certainly, the Supreme Court’s solution, litigating against the
manufacturer in Oklahoma and against the seller and retailer in New York, was
not ‘convenient’ by any standard.” (footnote omitted)). There were additional
tactical concerns. If these two New York defendants were included then complete
diversity—and therefore federal—jurisdiction would be lacking, since the
plaintiffs were still New York domiciliaries. Id. at 96–97. Discussion of how
diversity drives tactics is beyond the scope of this article.
69
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Justice White.75
The Whizzer76 stated that the minimum
contacts/due process approach had a dual purpose.77 In additional to
ensuring fairness to the defendant, the “Due Process Clause [also]
act[s] as an instrument of interstate federalism, [and] may sometimes
act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment. . . .
[e]ven if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience
from being forced to litigate [there] . . .”78 As such, the Court
concluded that “[t]he concept of minimum contacts . . . can be seen
to perform two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the
defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through
their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by
their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”79 The Court
thereby continued its quixotic quest to meld sovereignty and due
process.80
In terms of what this meant in practice, the Court separated the
personal jurisdiction analysis into two prongs, with one prong
corresponding to interstate federalism, and the other to fairness.81
One would expect that one prong would involve contacts and the
other on fairness. Yet the Court even botched implementing this
two-part approach. Rather than contacts, the Court said that the
“burden on the defendant [is] always a primary concern,” which then
can be considered in light of other factors.82 Despite articulating the
75

World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 287.
Prior to entering law school, Justice Byron White was an All-American running
back at the University of Colorado, where he acquired the nickname Whizzer; he
also twice led the NFL in rushing yards. See DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN
WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE
(1998).
77
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 291–92.
78
Id. at 294.
79
Id. at 291–92.
80
See Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1027, 1029 (1995) (“[Pennoyer had initially] lump[ed] together the two disparate
ideas of sovereignty and fairness, but ever since the two have coexisted uneasily in
the realm of jurisdiction.”).
81
See Andrews, supra note 16, at 1340 (“In 1980, the Court in World-Wide []
separated the minimum contacts test for specific personal jurisdiction into two
parts, each correlating to a separate function of the minimum contacts test.”).
82
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292. These factors are “the forum State’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and
76
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two prongs as fairness to the defendant and other policy concerns, in
applying its test to the facts before it, the Court focused almost
entirely on the defendants’ lack of contacts with the forum state.83
In World-Wide, the Court took a large step in the ever-changing
concept of minimum contacts as facilitator of due process/fair play.
In International Shoe it was unclear whether fair play or contacts
themselves were the jurisdictional touchstone.84 Then, as per
Hanson, contacts mattered most of all because sovereignty still
mattered.85 Now, with World-Wide, contacts and fairness both
mattered, as traditional due process considerations as well as
interstate federalism (read: sovereignty) remained important.86
effective relief . . . the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292
(citations omitted) (citing McGee, 355 U.S. at 223; Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92–93;
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211 n. 37). In the Court’s formulation, although contacts fall
into one category, and the secondary (so-called fairness factors) fall into another,
in application the Court seems to equate contacts with fairness to the defendant,
even though in practice contacts would seem to be more appropriately an
instrument for furthering the sovereignty interest. Id. In Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, the Court amended this analysis, placing fairness to the defendant
along with the other secondary fairness considerations to be considered separately
and apart from contacts. 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). See also Freer, supra note 32,
at 566 (“[T]he majority makes clear, as the Court strongly implied in Hanson, that
a court must assess contacts first. Without a relevant contact, there simply can be
no jurisdiction, even if the forum would not be unfair.” (footnotes omitted)); John
T. Parry, Symposium, Making Sense of Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear and
Nicastro: Introduction: Due Process, Borders, and the Qualities of Sovereignty –
Some Thoughts on J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
827, 834 (2012) (“Justice White’s majority opinion in World-Wide . . . accepted
the importance of the general inquiry into reasonableness, and he set out five
factors to guide that part of the inquiry, with the burden on the defendant being the
chief factor. But he also insisted that personal jurisdiction analysis require a
specific inquiry into defendant’s contacts with the forum.” (footnotes omitted)).
83
See Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The
Ironic Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 CAL. L. REV. 55 (2012) (“[T]he majority
makes clear . . . that a court must asses contacts first. Without a relevant contact,
there simply can be no jurisdiction, even if the forum would not be unfair.”
(footnotes omitted)).
84
See discussion supra pp. 68–71.
85
See discussion supra pp. 75–77.
86
See Andrews, supra note 16, at 1347 (“The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen
articulated [that] . . . a state must not exceed its sovereignty. . . . [The] Court [later]
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Although the Court drew on these two concepts, it did not explain
why it was now parsing them to create a two-part analysis.
The Court then had to face an additional issue: how to evaluate
contacts when the defendant’s product, rather than the defendant
itself, had contact with the state. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s
argument that because the car’s mobility made it foreseeable for the
car to end up in Oklahoma, that jurisdiction would be valid there.87
Rather, for jurisdiction based upon the defendant’s product, harm in
a state would require affirmative efforts by the defendant to serve the
forum state, which the Court concluded had not been shown here as
to the dealer and distributor.88
Exactly what would satisfy the Court’s standard in terms of
knowledge of the product’s destination or volume of sales in a given
state is an issue the Court still struggles with today.89 In general
terms, the Court in World-Wide concluded cryptically that
foreseeability of whether a product would end up in a given state did
not matter. Rather what mattered was whether the defendant’s
contacts (via a product or otherwise) made it foreseeable that the
defendant would be subject to jurisdiction in the forum.90 This
formulation of contacts was circular because as long as the
jurisdictional rules were announced in advance, a defendant meeting
the criteria could foresee being subject to jurisdiction.91 In short, the
clarified that this aim is a function of due process rather than an aspect of
federalism . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
87
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 295.
88
Id. at 298.
89
See discussion of J. McIntyre infra Part II.B.3.g.
90
See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297.
91
See Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism, supra note 43, at 576 (“The idea
appears to be that due process allows only for ‘foreseeable’ exercises of
jurisdiction . . . There is some surface appeal to this argument, but it is ultimately
circular. State court exercises of jurisdiction become foreseeable when they are
well-established or when the state announces its intention to exercise jurisdiction
in a long-arm statute.”). Consider the criminal procedure case United States v.
Katz, where Justice Harlan issued a concurring opinion stating that in order to
merit Fourth Amendment protection, a defendant had to have both an objective
and subjective expectation of privacy. 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Justice Harlan later retreated from the subjective prong, since it
meant that the government could thwart Fourth Amendment protections by
pervasively engaging in a practice of surveillance or simply announcing in
advance that certain expectations of privacy would not be respected, thereby
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Court continued Hanson’s focus on purposeful availment and added
to the analysis the foreseeability that defendant could anticipate
being haled into court in the forum as the key components of the
minimum contacts leg.92 Contacts, of course, were central, but the
additional fairness factors were also considered.
Justice Brennan dissented.93 As Hugo Black had done in his
Hanson dissent, which Brennan had joined, Brennan argued that
jurisdiction depended on an overall assessment of all interests
affected by the litigation as well on the burden on the defendant in
litigating in the forum, rather than upon the contacts qua contacts
between defendant and forum state.94 Contacts, while relevant,
should diminish in importance in the face of other factors.95 In
particular for Brennan, minimum contacts served as a proxy for the
burden on the defendant to litigate in the forum.96
thwarting any subjective expectation of privacy. See Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974) (“But
Mr. Justice Harlan himself [dissenting in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786
(1971)] later expressed second thoughts about this conception, and rightly so. . . .
[T]he government could diminish each person’s subjective expectation of privacy
merely by announcing half-hourly on television . . . that we were all forthwith
being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance.”).
92
See Freer, supra note 32, at 566 (“[I]n assessing contact, the court is to look to
purposeful availment and foreseeability. The former, of course, was injected by
Hanson . . . Foreseeabilty is new [with the World-Wide opinion].” (footnote
omitted)).
93
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94
Id. at 299–300 (“The Court’s opinions focus tightly on the existence of contacts
between the forum and the defendant. In so doing, they accord too little weight to
the strength of the forum State’s interest in the case and fail to explore whether
there would be any actual inconvenience to the defendant.”); id. at 300 (“The clear
focus in International Shoe was on fairness and reasonableness.”).
95
Id. (“Surely International Shoe contemplated that the significance of contacts
necessary to support jurisdiction would diminish if some other consideration
helped establish that jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable.”); see also Freer,
supra note 32, at 567 (“Interestingly, Brennan here conceded that there must be a
relevant contact. But his concept is broader than the majority’s. For Brennan,
contact may be ‘among the parties, the forum, and the litigation,’ so as to make the
forum reasonable.” (citing World-Wide Volkswagon, 444 U.S. at 312)).
96
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 300–01 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Another
consideration is the actual burden a defendant must bear in defending the suit in
the forum. Because lesser burdens reduce the unfairness to the defendant,
jurisdiction may be justified despite less significant contacts.” (citing McGee, 355
U.S. at 223)).

84

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 13, No. 2

World-Wide marked the emergence of two patterns. First, the
Court was engaging in a strained logic that insisted on the primacy
of sovereignty.97 This approach would continue to result in more
complex explanations and split decisions, often without a majority,
thereby retarding the development of a workable personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence.98 Second, personal jurisdiction disputes
started to become more tactical. In a case involving life-altering
injuries, defendants who faced no burden litigating in Oklahoma
disputed personal jurisdiction for several rounds in that forum and at
the Supreme Court, arguing that it would be improper to force
litigation in the plaintiff’s forum.99 That the defendants in this case,
as well as defendants in future cases, had the resources and ability to
litigate personal jurisdiction in the forum raises the question of how
their due process rights would be violated by alternatively requiring
them to simply litigate the merits in that court system.100
Rush,101 issued the same day as World-Wide, involved the
somewhat unusual situation in which a plaintiff sought to obtain
jurisdiction based on the citizenship of the tortfeasor’s insurer.102
Although important to that specific issue, Rush did not play a major
role in the development of personal jurisdiction doctrine.
(b)

97

Insurance Corp.

See Koppel, supra note 17, at 956 (“[T]he Court’s personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence moved further toward the formalist end of the continuum in WorldWide. ”).
98
Russell J. Weintraub, Symposium, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction
Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 536 (1995) (“[World-Wide’s focus on
federalism made] state lines . . . invisible but formidable barriers to basic
change.”); Parry, supra note 82, at 834 (“[World-Wide] created a . . . tension that
continues to structure the debate over specific personal jurisdiction doctrine.”).
99
In World-Wide, the ultimate litigation was still ongoing as of 1992, fifteen years
after the accident. Much of that time involved litigation against the defendants
that occurred after the Supreme Court found jurisdiction lacking over World-Wide
and Seeway. Even so, the personal jurisdiction issue dragged on for three years, at
which point, because no other aspects of the case had been addressed, the
remaining parties had to begin litigating the merits. See Adams, supra note 58, at
1152.
100
See discussion infra Part III.
101
440 U.S. 320.
102
Id. at 322.
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Two years after World-Wide, the Court, in Insurance Corp. of
Ireland v. Compaignes Bauxites de Guinee,103 had to confront
World-Wide’s precedent that personal jurisdiction involved concerns
of state sovereignty and federalism and not merely the due
process.104 Even before Insurance Corp., Hanson, and World-Wide,
diminished the burden on the defendant in favor of a focus on
federalism created a tension with the established personal
jurisdiction doctrine.
Insurance Corp. involved a diversity suit filed in
Pennsylvania105 by a company that operated African bauxite
mines.106 When the company experienced operating problems it
sought indemnity from its insurers, who refused to pay.107 The
plaintiff sued and argued that jurisdiction was proper in
Pennsylvania based upon the defendants’ relationship with that
state.108
When the defendants failed to respond to discovery sought in
connection with the jurisdictional dispute, the trial court imposed a
sanction whereby “for the purposes of this litigation the Excess
Insurers are subject to the in personam jurisdiction of this Court due
103

456 U.S. 694 (1982).
See Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Minimum Contacts: Asahi Metal Inds. Co.
v. Superior Court, 39 S. C. L. REV. 729, 763 (1988) (“The adoption of the
sovereignty function or branch of the minimum contacts test in World-Wide set off
a firestorm of academic protest, and the Supreme Court attempted to clarify its
view of sovereignty two years later in Insurance Corp.” (footnote omitted)).
105
Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 698.
106
Id. at 696. Although the suit took place in federal court, because the case did
not involve a federal jurisdictional statue allowing nationwide service, the Court’s
personal jurisdiction analysis was the same as it would be had the matter been in
state court. The Court followed this practice—treating jurisdiction in cases in
federal court with no governing federal personal jurisdiction statute akin to those
in state court—due to the strictures of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 340 U.S. 64
(1938). That case required federal courts to follow state law on matters of
substance absent a controlling federal statute. Moreover, the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(k) (Rule 4(f) at the time of Insurance Corp.) provided that federal
courts have the same jurisdictional reach as the courts of the state in which they
are located, with exceptions not applicable in that case. That this rule effectively
incorporates a limitation based upon state lines to cases in federal courts raises
questions that will be addressed in Part III.
107
Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 697.
108
Id. at 698.
104

86

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 13, No. 2

to the their business contacts with Pennsylvania.”109 The defendants
claimed that the trial court could not create jurisdiction by sanction if
the court lacked jurisdiction in the first place.110 Yet, because the
personal jurisdiction defense can be forfeited by not properly
asserting it or otherwise not complying with procedural
requirements,111 the court’s sanction made sense. Indeed, that is
what the Supreme Court ultimately held in Insurance Corp.112 If
personal jurisdiction was about ensuring fairness to the defendant,
then this result makes sense. Parties can waive or forfeit (by
inaction) even fundamental constitutional protections. But, if
personal jurisdiction also acted to “function [as] an instrument of
interstate federalism,”113 it is hard to understand how sovereign
power could wax or wane due to the inaction of a private party in
asserting its rights. 114
The Court had twisted itself into knots. Upholding jurisdiction
here was logical, but the sovereignty component introduced in
Hanson and World-Wide created a barrier, allowing the defendant to
waive or forfeit the claim that personal jurisdiction was lacking.115
109

Id. at 699 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 696.
111
Id. at 705.
112
See Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 704–05 (“[T]he requirement of personal jurisdiction
may be intentionally waived, or for various reasons a defendant may be estopped
from raising the issue. These characteristics portray [personal jurisdiction] for
what it is—a legal right protecting the individual. . . . The expression of legal
rights is often subject to certain procedural rules: The failure to follow those rules
may well result in a curtailment of the rights. . . . A sanction under Rule
37(b)(2)(A) consisting of a finding of personal jurisdiction has . . . the same effect
[of waiver].”).
113
See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 294. Starting with World-Wide, the Court began
using the term “interstate federalism” in personal jurisdiction cases. This odd
phrase—since federalism generally refers to the relationship between the federal
and state governments—was clearly meant as a synonym for respecting the
sovereignty of co-equal states.
114
See Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 703 n.10 (“Individual actions cannot change the
powers of sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself to powers from
which he may otherwise be protected.”).
115
See Robert J. Condlin, “Defendant Veto” or “Totality of the Circumstances”?
It’s Time for the Supreme Court to Straighten Out the Personal Jurisdiction
Standard Once Again, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 53, 87 (2004) (“[The Court’s]
concession [that the liberty interest of the defendant was the sole limitation on
personal jurisdiction] did not settle the issue, of course; in fact, it made it more
110
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Addressing, or merely ducking, this dilemma, Justice White, writing
for the Court, held that forfeiture of one’s personal jurisdiction
defense was consistent with World Wide’s concern with minimum
contacts and state boundaries, and that it was not reversing course.116
The Court stated that all it was doing was adding another way to
establish minimum contacts.117
This position is strained. If
minimum contacts themselves were central, then it would seem that
the contacts must be found by looking at the relationship between
the defendant and the forum state. The fact that the defendant did
not follow adequate procedures would not create or increase the
contacts between the defendant and the state.
Moreover, the Court emphasized that the sole source of authority
limiting personal jurisdiction was the Due Process Clause. In
language as notable as its interstate federalism parlance in WorldWide (and actually more notable due to the contrast) the Court said:
The restriction on state sovereignty power described
in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be
seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty
interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That
Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction
requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention
of federalism concerns.
Furthermore, if the
federalism concept operated as an independent
restriction on sovereign power of the court, it would
not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction
requirement. 118
Even so, the Court did not jettison the primary role of minimum
contacts in favor of a general fairness analysis – indeed the Court
said it was not changing course at all.119 By holding onto minimum
complicated, since the Court then needed to explain how sovereignty concerns
(e.g. ‘the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute’) could be part of the
individual liberty interest of litigants.”).
116
Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 702.
117
Id. at 703 n.10.
118
Id. (emphasis added).
119
See Andrews, supra note 16, at 1347 (“Although the Court in [Insurance Corp.]
clarified that [sovereignty limitations on jurisdiction are] a function of due process
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contacts, which World-Wide and Hanson said flowed from the state
sovereignty or horizontal federalism, while asserting that due
process was the sole constitutional regulator of personal jurisdiction,
the Court crossed the line from vague to illogical.120 Prior to WorldWide, the debate in the Court seemed to be between those who
believed that personal jurisdiction was primarily about due process
and fairness to the defendant,121 and those who asserted that the
primary concern was state authority.122 World-Wide tried to satisfy
both camps, putting a primary emphasis on contacts and sovereignty
while giving a walk-on part to fairness and common sense, though
not explaining how to use this new arsenal on a case-by-case basis123
Later in Insurance Corp., the Court explicitly but cryptically said
that the sole concern was due process, but that somehow the Due
Process Clause is a vehicle for state sovereignty.124 This clearly
represented a shift of the Court’s entire personal jurisdiction focus

rather than an aspect of federalism, the Court did not remove the sovereignty
component from jurisdictional analysis. The defendant has a due process right to
have states act only within the limits of their sovereignty.” (footnotes omitted)); cf.
4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067.1
(3d ed. 2014) (“Notwithstanding the Insurance Corporation of Ireland footnote, it
does not seem plausible to read territoriality and sovereignty concerns entirely out
of the minimum contacts analysis.”).
120
Some have tried to characterize the Court’s approach in Insurance Corp. as a
valid explanation of how contacts protect the defendant’s due process rights. See,
e.g., John N. Drobek, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L.
REV. 1015, 1047 (1983) (“Ireland demonstrates that minimum contacts with the
forum are necessary to protect the defendant’s own interest in freedom from an
unrelated sovereign. On the other hand, World-Wide Volkswagen asserts that
minimum contacts are necessary to preserve federalism. . . . As the Court said in
Ireland, the federalism theme in personal jurisdiction cannot be an independent
restriction on the sovereign power of a court; otherwise, waiver would not be
possible. That does not mean, however, that the federalism theme is dead.
Federalism is preserved by personal jurisdiction as a by-product of the application
of the doctrine to protect the defendant.”).
121
E.g., World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Hanson, 357 U.S.
at 256 (Black, J., dissenting); McGee, 355 U.S. at 221 (Black, J., writing for the
majority).
122
E.g., World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 287 (White, J., writing for the majority);
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 236 (Warren, J., writing for the majority).
123
See World Wide, 444 U.S. at 292–94.
124
See Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 714.
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from Hanson through World-Wide, wrapped in the majority’s protest
that nothing had changed.125
The majority’s opinion in Insurance Corp. drew a sharp rebuke
from Justice Powell.126 He saw that the Court had clearly shifted its
position and was now adopting an internally inconsistent theory.127
He stated that the Court’s theory that personal jurisdiction concerned
only due process, rather than fundamental limits on a Court’s power,
represented “a sweeping but largely unexplained revision of judicial
doctrine. . . . [which] could encompass not only the personal
jurisdiction of federal courts but ‘sovereign’ limitations on state
jurisdiction as identified in World Wide . . . .”128 Powell did not buy
the Court’s assertion that citing the Due Process Clause as the sole
limitation of a court’s personal jurisdiction reach did not
fundamentally undercut World-Wide’s statement that personal
jurisdiction served two purposes, one of which was protecting
sovereignty interests within the American federal system.129
The Court had taken another step toward complicating personal
jurisdiction analysis. It had traveled from minimum contacts to
promote fairness,130 to a focus on fairness,131 to a focus on
125

See id. at 714 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (“Before today, of course,
our cases had linked minimum contacts and fair play as jointly defining the
‘sovereign’ limits on state assertion of personal jurisdiction over unconsenting
defendants. The Court appears to abandon the rationale of these cases in a
footnote. But it does not address the implications of its action.” (citations omitted)
(second emphasis added)). But see Condlin, supra note 115, at 87 (“Admitting
that it had taken the opposite position in [World-Wide], the Court reversed course
[in its footnote in Insurance Corp.]”).
126
See Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 715 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment)
(concluding that the record contains sufficient evidence of minimum contacts to
support the exercise of jurisdiction based on the standards that Court had applied
in previous cases).
127
Id. at 715–16.
128
Id. at 710.
129
See id. at 714 (“Before today, of course, our cases had linked minimum
contacts and fair play as jointly defining the ‘sovereign’ limits on state assertion of
personal jurisdiction over unconsenting defendants. The Court appears to abandon
the rationale of these cases in a footnote.” (emphasis in original) (citing Ins. Corp.,
456 U.S. at 702–03 n.10 (majority opinion); World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292–93;
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251)) (emphasis in original) (citing Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at
702–03 n.10 (majority opinion); World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292–93; Hanson, 357
U.S. at 251).
130
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
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contacts,132 to a focus on both but with contacts being primary,133 to
saying that fairness and the defendant’s liberty interest was all that
matter, all while implicitly continuing to endorse sovereignty by
pretending that it was merely applying settled law, rather than
reworking it.134 The doctrinal web that the Court was spinning by
insisting on the inclusion of sovereignty concerns while also saying
that due process was the personal jurisdiction North Star was hard to
understand. The Court has never truly made an effort to adequately
explain the inconsistent elements of this doctrine.135
(c)

Keeton, Calder & Helicopteros

In 1983, the Supreme Court decided three personal jurisdiction
cases: Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc.,136 Calder v. Jones,137 and
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia S.A. v. Hall.138 These cases
will be discussed briefly.
Keeton and Calder, were issued on the same day. Each involved
defamation claims, the former against reporters and editors; the latter
against a magazine itself.139 In Keeton, Kathy Keeton, one of the
publishers of the magazine Penthouse, alleged that Hustler magazine
had defamed her.140 Keeton lived in New York, while Hustler141
was an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in
California.142 Yet, Keeton sued in New Hampshire, because that
131

See McGee, 355 U.S. 220; Perkins, 342 U.S. 437; Travelers, 339 U.S. 643;
Mullane, 339 U.S. 306.
132
See Hanson, 357 U.S. 235.
133
See World-Wide, 444 U.S. 286.
134
See Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. 694.
135
See Condlin, supra note 115, at 87–88 (“[T]he Court has always taken
sovereignty concerns into account in personal jurisdiction analysis . . . . and it
appears that it always will—the debate over how to justify doing this continues to
swirl. The Court will come back to this question a number of times over the years,
but never really put it to rest.” (footnote omitted)).
136
465 U.S. 770 (1984).
137
465 U.S. 783 (1984).
138
466 U.S. 408 (1984).
139
Calder, 465 U.S. at 785.
140
465 U.S. at 772.
141
An interesting take of Hustler’s history as a Cincinatti, Ohio company is
presented in the 1996 movie THE PEOPLE VS. LARRY FLINT (Sony Pictures 1996).
142
Id.
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was the only state’s whose statue of limitations had not expired at
the time of suit.143 Keeton’s only connection to New Hampshire was
the fact that Penthouse was circulated there, a fact that the Court
noted but treated as irrelevant to the personal jurisdiction analysis.144
The sole basis for Keeton’s arguing for jurisdiction in New
Hampshire was the fact that Hustler’s monthly circulation of about
fifteen thousand copies of its magazine in that state.145 Although
that was certainly a small percentage of Hustler’s national
circulation, under the single publication rule, the plaintiff could
recover for damages for defamation throughout the country in any
state having jurisdiction.146
The Supreme Court concluded that New Hampshire’s court—in
this case, the federal district court—could exercise personal
jurisdiction over Hustler because “[Hustler’s] regular circulation of
magazines in the forum state is sufficient to support an assertion of
jurisdiction in a libel action based on the contents of the
magazine.”147 Although common sense counseled against
jurisdiction in New Hampshire, which the plaintiff obviously chose
for tactical reasons, the Court nevertheless allowed the case to go
forward there merely because the technical requisites of the
minimum contacts test had been met.
In Calder, the Court held that California had personal
jurisdiction over the two National Enquirer employees, a reporter
and an editor, both of whom lived in Florida.148 The Court did not
look at the fact that the magazine had California circulation, but
rather that the party alleging injury lived and worked in

143

Id. at 773; see also id. at 778 n.10 (noting that “[u]nder traditional choice-oflaw principles, the law of the forum State governs on matters of procedure . . . and
[i]n New Hampshire, statutes of limitations are considered procedural. (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971); Gordon v. Gordon,
387 A.2d 339, 342 (N.H.1978); Barrett v. Boston & Maine R.R., 178 A.2d 291
(N.H. 1962)).
144
Keeton, 465 U.S. at 772.
145
Id.
146
See id. at 773 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(4) (1977)).
147
Keeton, 465 U.S. at 773–74.
148
Calder, 465 U.S. at 791.
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California.149 The Court thus concluded that jurisdiction was proper
because plaintiff’s claim, if proven, would mean that defendants
intended to injure the plaintiff in California, i.e., their actions would
have knowing effects in that state. Therefore, the Court had to
contrast this case with unintentional tort cases like World-Wide since
there is no evidence that the defendants purposefully availed
themselves of the forum states privileges, the standard that the Court
had emphasized in World-Wide and Hanson.150 In concluding that
the defendants had satisfied this requirement, the Court took little
account of what would seem central to a due process assessment, the
burden that might be placed on individuals having to litigate three
thousand miles from their homes.
Helicopteros was the second case ever presented to the Supreme
Court in which a plaintiff attempted to assert general, as opposed to
specific, jurisdiction i.e., where the cause of action did not arise from
the defendant’s in-state contacts.151 Because general jurisdiction
149

Id. at 789–90. The suit was brought by the actress, Shirley Jones, who was
famous for her roles in musicals, as well as for playing the mother on television’s
Partridge Family.
150
It would be odd to say that a party committing an intentional tort purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of harming the plaintiff in the forum state. That is
why the Court spoke in terms of effects in California, although this contrasted with
World-Wide’s conclusion that the felt effects of the car dealer and distributor’s
unintentional tort in Oklahoma was insufficient to confer jurisdiction. See Parry,
supra note 82, at 837 n.44 (“[I]n Calder . . . , a unanimous court further threatened
the rule of World-Wide Volkswagen. The Court rejected the defendants’ reliance
on that case in the course of crafting the plaintiff-centered ‘effects test’ as an
alternative to purposeful availment in intentional tort cases. The Court cited
World-Wide for the proposition that the defendant must reasonably anticipate
being haled into the courts of the forum state, but it did not refer to purposeful
availment.”) (citations omitted).
151
The Court did not actually undertake a full examination of how closely related
the contacts had to be to the cause of action for the jurisdictional argument to be
considered specific as opposed to general—and thereby subject to a lesser degree
of contacts under International Shoe. See discussion supra note 16. The court had
previously said that a cause of action must arise out of the contacts for specific
jurisdiction, Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319. Justice Brennan, in dissent, argued that
even a claim that did not arise out of the defendants contacts, if the dispute was
related to those contacts, the Court should apply a specific jurisdiction analysis.
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 425 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority, concluded,
however that the plaintiff had conceded that her claims did not arise out of and
were not related to defendant’s contacts with Texas. Id. at 415.
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plays a secondary role to specific jurisdiction, the case did not have
major implications for the evolution of personal jurisdiction
doctrine.152 In finding general jurisdiction lacking, the Court cited
general language from Shoe and its progeny, and distinguished the
facts from Perkins where it had found general jurisdiction, in order
to reach it’s holding.153 It did not explain how the outcome furthered
the goals of fairness, sovereignty, or any other interest wrapped upon
the personal jurisdiction skein.
(d)

Burger King

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz154 represents the only contract
case that the Court has analyzed purely in terms of minimum
contacts.155 As Justice Brennan was finally able to garner a
majority, the Court did make a partial shift towards fairness, but still
made contacts the primary jurisdictional test.156
The case arose out of a franchise agreement for a Burger King
restaurant between two Michigan businessmen and Florida-based
152

See Stravitz, supra note 104, at 771 (“General jurisdiction raises fundamentally
different concerns than does specific jurisdiction.”). The present article’s
prescription would eliminate the distinction between specific and general
jurisdiction. See discussion infra Part IV.
153
See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 413–19.
154
471 U.S. 462 (1985).
155
See Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 695 (examining the case purely in terms of whether
a trial court could conclude that personal jurisdiction existed as a sanction for
discovery violations, and not asking whether the contract itself created sufficient
contacts between the defendant and the forum state for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction). The Court has also examined personal jurisdiction in cases involving
contractual choice of forum clauses. In those cases the Court has required some
relationship between the litigation and the chosen forum before allowing
enforcement of the clause, but has not examined minimum contacts between the
defendant and the forum state using the International Shoe standard. See, e.g.,
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
156
Brennan’s overall fairness approach had failed to gain a majority in his prior
attempts, and he apparently had come to accept that defendant contacts would
continue to play the primary role in Supreme Court personal jurisdiction decisions.
Of the personal jurisdiction cases on which Brennan sat (twelve in all), it is ironic
that in the case in which he finally was able to write a majority opinion that there
was good reason to think that it would be unfair to subject the defendant to suit in
the plaintiff’s chosen forum.
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Burger King Corporation.157 Rudzewicz and his partner, who did
not bring his jurisdictional challenge to the Supreme Court,
negotiated for a Burger King franchise in Michigan.158 The
contracts were negotiated with Burger King’s Florida headquarters,
although Burger King’s Michigan office also had some
involvement.159 Rudzewicz himself did not travel to Florida.160 The
contract contained a clause that said all disputes were to be decided
under Florida law, but lacked a forum selection clause.161
Soon afterward, the relationship between the parties soured, as
each side apparently insisted on having things its way.162 Burger
King brought suit against both defendants in Florida federal court,
invoking diversity jurisdiction.163 Rudzewicz challenged personal
jurisdiction in Florida.164
The Court, per Justice Brennan, concluded that the Florida
federal court could exercise personal jurisdiction.165 One senses that
Justice Brennan wanted to determine the outcome purely on fairness
concerns, but given the Court’s jurisdictional framework, which
emphasized contacts as an end in themselves and not simply a proxy
for fairness, he could not do so.166 Instead, he engaged in an
extensive rehearsal of the Court’s personal jurisdiction cases from
International Shoe onward in six pages.167 This portion of the
opinion serves as a compendium of personal jurisdiction catch
phrases, like “purposeful direction,” “foreseeability,” “fair play,”
157

See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 464, 466.
Id. at 466–67.
159
Id. at 467.
160
Id. at 479.
161
Id. at 482 n.24.
162
Id. at 467–68.
163
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 468.
164
See id. at 469–70.
165
Id. at 487.
166
Interestingly, Brennan did not rely upon Insurance Corp., whose emphasis that
personal jurisdiction served solely to protect the defendant’s due process rights
would seem to provide an opening, highlighted by Justice Powell’s concurrence in
that case, for a pure fairness based analysis.
167
See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471–78; see also Condlin, supra note 115, at
106–07 (“Burger King is perhaps best known for its exhaustive summary of
personal jurisdiction case law. . . . [But] the discussion also often loops back on
itself, taking up issues that were disposed of earlier, so that it sometimes looks a
little like the memos of several law clerks stuck together, end-to-end.”).
158
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and “litigation arising out of the defendant’s in-state activities.”168
The opinion then attempts to explain these in terms of a series of
policy justifications such as fair warning to the defendant,
predictability in the legal system, fairness both to the defendant and
plaintiff by not allowing the defendant to escape legal liabilities
created in the forum state, and the forum state’s interest in affording
resolution of disputes to its residents.169
Brennan stated that although protecting the defendant and other
interests are important to personal jurisdiction, minimum contacts
themselves provide the touchstone as to whether jurisdiction will
lie.170 This argument brought him back to the conundrum that the
Court faced the Insurance Corp. Court: minimum contacts did not
square entirely with the defendant’s due process rights, yet the due
process clause seemed to be the sole constitutional limitation on the
geographic range of a court’s power.171 Brennan therefore combined
these factors. Instead of presenting a unifying theory as he and
Black had in sundry dissents, Brennan split the criteria into two
parts, similar to what Justice White had done in waiting for the Court
in World-Wide.172
Applying its test, the Court upheld jurisdiction in Florida.173 In
terms of contacts, Brennan’s opinion seemed to be most driven by
the fact that the franchisee defendant chose to enter into an
arrangement with a Florida corporation.174 The defendant therefore
received some benefit from contracting with a Florida corporation
and/or allegedly caused harm in Florida when he breached the

168

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471–78.
See id.
170
See id. at 476.
171
See discussion supra Part II.B.3.b.
172
See Stravitz, supra note 104, at 775 (“Justice Brennan created not a synthesis or
merger of prior doctrine into a unified conceptual sphere, but rather a forced
linkage of two very separate doctrines that are not easily harmonized.”).
173
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 487.
174
See id. at 479–80 (“Eschewing the option of operating an independent local
enterprise, Rudzewicz deliberately [reached] out beyond Michigan and negotiated
with a Florida corporation for the purchase of a long-term franchise and the
manifold benefits that would derive from affiliation with a nationwide
organization.” (quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)).
169
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contract.175 To be sure, Rudzewicz sought some benefit from a
transaction with a company that was located in Florida, but it is hard
to see how this alone implicates Florida’s interest. In any contract
between two parties, each party will seek benefit from the other
party, and if the contract is breached or one party commits a tort,
then there is potential harm to the other party in the other party’s
home state.
Followed to its logical conclusion, Brennan’s reasoning would
satisfy the contacts prong of the test in almost any contract case and
in almost all tort cases.176 Since Brennan took a diminished view of
contacts, perhaps this was his stealth intent. Even so, it is surprising
that he was able to garner a six-justice majority from a Court chary
about extending jurisdiction, 177 particularly in a case where the
surface appeal for finding jurisdiction was weak.
Ultimately, the outcome in Burger King is probably sensible,
assuming that the defendant really could litigate in Florida without

175

See id. at 480 (“In light of Rudzewicz’ voluntary acceptance of the long-term
and exacting regulation of his business from Burger King’s Miami
headquarters . . . Rudzewicz’ refusal to make the contractually required payments
in Miami, and his continued use of Burger King’s trademarks and confidential
business information after his termination, caused foreseeable injury to the
corporation in Florida. For these reasons it was, at the very least, presumptively
reasonable for Rudzewicz to be called to account there for such injuries.” (citing
Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774; World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 299; Hanson, 357 U.S, at 253)).
176
See Stravitz, supra note 104, at 782 (“Notwithstanding the grudging
acknowledgement that jurisdiction may be divested by the fairness branch, the
opinion seems deliberately crafted to expand rather than restrict the ambit of state
court personal jurisdiction. Certainly, Justice Brennan’s first observation
concerning the relationship between the two branches suggested that he envisaged
the fairness branch as increasing opportunities for jurisdiction by a McGee-like,
multiple-interest balance process. . . . This . . . is not surprising considering that
the author of the Burger King opinion has consistently been the Court’s leading
advocate of jurisdiction expansion.”); Condlin, supra note 115, at 105 (“Taken
literally, [Burger King’s analysis] seemed to create a presumption in favor of
extra-territorial jurisdiction.”).
177
See McFarland, supra note 7, at 774–75 (2003) (“[It] is [not] surprising that
Justice Brennan creates what amounts to a two-step test: he advocated such a sharp
change in personal jurisdiction standards in earlier dissents. What is surprising is
that he gathered the votes of five other Justices to sign on to his previously
idiosyncratic view that the test should be fractured into two parts.” (footnote
omitted)).
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unfair disadvantage.178 Precedent and the apparent unwillingness of
a sufficient number of justices to get on board from using the overall
fairness approach that he had advocated in prior cases, foreclosed
Brennan. Hemmed in as he was, he had to push the facts of this case
through the doctrinal strainer that jurisdictional jurisprudence had
become.179
If McGee represented the high point of an overall fairness-based
expansive view of jurisdiction, Burger King looks like McGee’s
little brother in retrospect. While not going as far as the earlier case,
Burger King brought in fairness factors such as a counter-balance to
contacts, even if only as a secondary consideration. Moreover, the
Court, more so in any case since McGee, seemed to be in favor of
finding jurisdiction valid absent a strong showing to the contrary.
This was the last gasp for this type of approach, and strangely, the
next case would use the fairness factors to cut against finding
jurisdiction, an issue that Brennan noted was possible but probably
did not expect to happen.180
(e)

Asahi

Two years after Burger King, the Court decided Asahi Metal
Indus. v. Superior Ct.181 In Asahi, an allegedly defective tire sold by
a Taiwanese manufacture, Chein Shin, containing a valve made by a
Japanese company, Asahi, blew out, seriously injuring a man and
killing his wife, while the two were riding a motorcycle in
178

See Stravitz, supra note 104, at 772 (“Although the result in Burger King . . .
was understandable, the manner in which the Court reached its decision was
decidedly unexpected.” (footnote omitted)).
179
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice White, issued a brief dissent, focusing on the
unfairness of requiring a franchisee with little bargaining power to litigate against
its much stronger contractual counterparty in the latter’s state, especially where the
franchisee dealt directly with Burger King’s local office in his home state. Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 487–90 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is odd that Justice White
joined this opinion, given the disdain that he expressed for fairness in his WordWide opinion.
180
See Stravitz, supra note 104, at 782 (“Undoubtedly, Burger King was intended
to expand jurisdiction. It is therefore ironic that in Asahi, the Court’s first postBurger King jurisdictional case, Brennan’s two-branch due process analysis was
invoked to overturn the assertion of jurisdiction. . . . Even more ironic, perhaps,
was the Court’s reliance on the fairness branch to reach its decision.”).
181
480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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California.182 The injured man sued Chien Shin in California.183
The company cross-claimed against Asahi.184 All the plaintiff’s
claims were disposed of early on, leaving an unusual situation: a
Taiwanese company essentially suing—technically seeking
contribution from—a Japanese company in a California state
court.185 Asahi objected to jurisdiction.186
The two-part World-Wide/Burger King personal jurisdiction test
would come into full relief in this dispute. The contacts here were
through the sale of a product.187 World-Wide had addressed, but not
resolved, the extent to which a defendant could be haled into court
based upon contacts between its product and the state.188 Even if
contacts were established, the strange posture of the case, a
Taiwanese company seeking contribution from a Japanese company
with no American party left in the litigation, required an assessment
of considerations beyond contacts.
The case for finding contacts sufficient was stronger here than in
World-Wide. Asahi regularly sold valves to the Taiwanese tire
manufacturer with the knowledge that some of those tires would end
up in California.189 World-Wide stated that a seller of a product may
not be subject to jurisdiction in a given state merely because the
consumer-purchaser of the product brings the product to that state,
even if the seller could have foreseen this happening.190 The WorldWide Court theorized that it would be improper for sellers to be
subject to jurisdiction in a forum without having intentionally
directed its product there.191 But World-Wide had suggested that a
defendant who delivers goods into the stream-of-commerce, a phrase
borrowed from the famous and influential state court case,192 Gray v.

182

Id. at 105–06.
Id.
184
Id. at 106.
185
Id.
186
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106.
187
Id. at 105.
188
See discussion supra Part II.B.3.a.
189
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 107.
190
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 298.
191
See id. at 297.
192
See Stravitz, supra note 104, at 790–91 (“Although only an Illinois Supreme
Court decision, Gray, which upheld jurisdiction over a domestic component part
183
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Am. Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp.,193 with the expectation that
they will end up in a given state, can be subject to jurisdiction there
if the product causes injury. Therefore, the Court was required to
determine just how powerful the flow of goods into a given state
must be before the good is considered to be part of the stream-ofcommerce.
Justice O’Connor authored a plurality opinion for herself and
three other justices that concluded that the fact that Asahi sold tire
valves to Cheng Shin, knowing that Chen Shin would sell some of
those tires in California, was insufficient to confer jurisdiction.194 In
reaching that conclusion, O’Connor stated that “a defendant’s
awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the
product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing
the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward
the forum State.”195 Additional conduct would be required whereby
the defendant directed its activities toward the forum state, like
designing its product for the forum state or advertising there.196
O’Connor’s opinion does not explain why due process would
require acts particular to the forum state like advertising or
incorporating state-specific design. Those acts might show a greater
interest in the state’s market, but also would depend on factors
unrelated to the defendant’s desire to serve the state. For some
products there may be no need for state specific design as uniform
specifications might be adequate for the entire country.
Furthermore, tire valves are not the type of product that would be
advertised to the end user. Even without California specific activity,
Asahi both clearly benefitted from the California market and took
affirmative steps that would necessarily cause its valves to end up
there.197

manufacturer, has on at least two occasions been cited with approval by the
Supreme Court [in Calder and World-Wide].”).
193
176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).
194
See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105, 107; id. at 114 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
195
Id. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
196
Id.
197
Cf. Stravitz, supra note 104, at 790–91 (“The O’Connor plurality view is . . . at
odds with [Gray,] the seminal stream-of-commerce case of the post-International
Shoe era . . . . Significantly, Justice O’Connor failed even to mention Gray.”).
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Justice Brennan, also wrote an opinion for four justices.198 He
argued that additional activity beyond placement of the product into
the stream of commerce should not be required because “[t]he
stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies,
but to the regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture
to distribution to retail sale. As long as a participant in this process
is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State,
the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.”199
Justice Stevens200 concurrence, however, best demonstrated,
maybe unintentionally, that the Court’s entire personal jurisdiction
approach did not really make sense in terms of firm concepts like
due process and sovereignty, instead consisting of arbitrary line
drawing. He noted that “[t]he plurality seems to assume that an
unwavering line can be drawn between ‘mere awareness’ that a
component will find its way into the forum State and ‘purposeful
availment’ of the forum’s market.”201 Indeed, whether a defendant
has purposefully availed itself of a market does not depend upon the
volume or nature of its product, as those factors would only affect
the degree of the defendant’s availment. Moreover, volume would
be highly dependent upon the nature of the products, with certain
items, like tire valves probably being sold in higher volume than, for
example, a custom designed swimming pool. These variations do
not vary the fairness of requiring the defendant to litigate in a
particular forum, or affect whether a given state has sovereign
authority to adjudicate a particular claim.
A second aspect of Asahi was a majority opinion (8-0) also
written by Justice O’Connor. In that opinion, joined by all the
justices except Scalia, the Court concluded that even if minimum
contacts existed in this case, it would be unreasonable to allow
California to exercise jurisdiction.202 In this section, the Court
198

Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring the
judgment).
199
Id. at 117.
200
Stevens concurred in part and in the judgment in an opinion joined by Justices
White and Blackmun. Id. at 116.
201
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
202
See id. at 114 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (“A consideration of [several]
factors [apart from minimum contacts] in the present case clearly reveals the
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examined the so-called second-leg factors originally discussed in
World Wide203 and emphasized in Burger King:204 “[T]he burden on
the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff’s
interest in obtaining relief. . . . [as well as] ‘the interstate judicial
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”205
Both parts of Asahi are notable. The Court’s failure to reach a
majority on whether Asahi had put its valve in the stream of
commerce is telling and important because products liability claims
often lead to fights over personal jurisdiction when the product was
manufactured or distributed by an out-of-state defendant. The
failure of the Court to reach a majority here, and twenty-three years
later in J. McIntyre,206 presents lower courts with a challenge in
deciding products liability cases, and limits parties’ ability to plan
either their pre-litigation or post-litigation affairs.
The Court’s split demonstrates the lack of coherence of the
minimum contacts analysis. The two pluralities split on whether
selling goods, knowing that they would end up in the forum,
qualified as purposeful availment, thereby allowing the defendant to
anticipate being haled into court there—which both opinions agreed
was the relevant minimum contacts standard.207 This failure to agree
on a fundamental point indicates a lack of coherence as to the goals

unreasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi, even apart from the
question of the placement of goods in the stream of commerce.”).
203
See discussion supra Part II.B.3.a.
204
See discussion supra Part II.B.3.d.
205
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102; id. at 113 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (quoting
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292) (citations omitted in original).
206
See Koppel, supra note 17, at 960 (“The plurality and dissenting opinions in
Asahi parallel the plurality and dissenting opinions in Nicastro.”); see also
discussion infra Part II.B.3.g.
207
Compare Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality) (“The placement of a
product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant
purposefully directed toward the forum State.”), with id. at 117 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“The stream of commerce refers
not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of
products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale. As long as a participant in
this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State,
the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.”).
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of minimum contacts test.208 Yes, the justices agreed upon the
verbiage of the standard: “minimum contacts manifested by
purposeful availment” but this agreement was illusory.209
O’Connor’s opinion focuses on targeting the state, and reads
“purposeful availment” as manifesting the defendant’s intention to
submit to a sovereign, which is quite Pennoyer-like.210 Brennan’s
focus on the defendant’s awareness of its product entering the state
and the fact that it causes harm there, harkens back to McGee with
assuring fairness to all concerned. His emphasis was on the fact that
the product ended up in the forum and caused harm there, not with
whether the defendant chose to subject itself to that state’s authority.
The 8-0 agreement on the secondary factors is also interesting,
even though the Court has since generally ignored this part of the
test.211 That a defendant who would not be subject to jurisdiction in
a given state despite contacts because of overall fairness factors,
begs the question “why not?”. If contacts are a proxy for fairness,
208

See Stravitz, supra note 104, at 793 (“The two power branch pluralities are
irreconcilable.”). The failure to reach a majority is particularly unfortunate here
because a central component of the Court’s enunciated doctrine is the defendant’s
reasonable expectations, something that is hard to gauge when there is no
consistent majority rule.
209
See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108–09 (O’Connor, J., plurality) (“‘[T]he Constitutional
touchstone’ of the determination whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction
comports with due process ‘remains whether the defendant purposefully
established minimum contacts’ in the forum state.’”) (quoting Burger King, 471
U.S. at 474 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316)); id. at 117–18 (Brennan, J.
concurring) (although not using the words “purposeful availment,” finding that
contacts were met based on criteria equivalent to that concept by noting that “[a]
defendant who has placed goods in the stream of commerce benefits economically
from the retail sale of the final product in the form state,” while favorably citing
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 295, a case in which the purposeful availment standard
played a central role).
210
See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 77 (“Asahi . . .
demonstrated the incredible durability of the notion that ‘federalism’ plays a role
in evaluating the constitutionality of state court assertions of jurisdiction.”). Judge
McIntyre’s plurality would continue to emphasize this sovereignty theme. See
discussion infra Part II.B.3.g.
211
Cf. Freer, supra note 32, at 576 (“Because of the unusual facts and international
wrinkle, it is not clear that Asahi gives much, if any, solace to a defendant trying to
defeat jurisdiction in the domestic context . . . .”). Justice Sotomayor has revived
this portion of personal jurisdiction doctrine in her solo concurring opinion in last
term’s Daimler AG case. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.g.
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then why is there a separate fairness leg? If the whole matter is an
issue of state sovereignty, then how can secondary factors weaken
that sovereign authority? The Court did not explain.212 Personal
jurisdiction had become even more uncertain and confusing.213
(f)

Burnham

By 1990, personal jurisdiction law had evolved, even if that
evolution was not good. Not only had the Court not reached a
consensus on how to apply minimum contacts in all circumstances, it
was unclear exactly what understanding the justices’ had about the
essence of personal jurisdiction. The Court had been very clear that
due process was the only constitutional limit on personal
jurisdiction.214 It had been just as clear that state lines remained
relevant, and that a lack of burden on the defendant to litigate in the
forum was not alone sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction.215
The tension thus remained as to whether jurisdiction was proper in
cases where the defendant was not found physically in the forum but
easily could defend there in a regime where sovereignty-driven
jurisdiction still had life.
Also left unanswered was the question of whether jurisdiction
could be exercised over a defendant who might find it burdensome
to litigate in the forum, but for whom the sovereignty element was
met because the service was effected upon the defendant while
fortuitously within the state. Pennoyer itself said that jurisdiction
under these circumstances was fine. In fact, this was pretty much the
only basis for jurisdiction in Pennoyer’s view.216 But after
International Shoe, with its homage to fair play, one might question
whether the defendant’s presence in the forum at the time of service
alone would be sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction.

212

See Stravitz, supra note 104, at 794 (“Part II-B of [Justice O’Connor’s
majority] opinion, containing [her] fairness analysis, is wooden and overly
conclusory.”).
213
Id. at 803 (lamenting that “[t]he confusion emanating from the splintering of
the Court in Asahi leaves the state of personal jurisdiction seriously unsettled.”).
214
See Ins. Corp, 456 U.S. 694.
215
See World-Wide, 444 U.S. 286.
216
See discussion supra Part I.
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Famously, at least for law school hypotheticals, after
International Shoe had been decided, a federal district court held in
Grace v. McArthur that jurisdiction could still be exercised in this
Pennoyer-like way, so-called “tag service,” even if the defendant’s
only connection with the state was service upon him during a short
time when he was in the state’s airspace.217 In 1990 in Burnham v.
Superior Ct.,218 the Supreme Court would be forced to address the
question of whether International Shoe’s holding that in-state service
was not necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction so long as other
contacts and fairness factors were present, meant that in-state service
was no longer alone sufficient for finding the existence of personal
jurisdiction.
Burnham represents a baffling case that so divided the Court that
no majority opinion was reached, even though all the justices agreed
upon the conclusion that jurisdiction existed.219 The case involved
in-state service of process, and in that regard fell squarely within the
rule of Pennoyer. Beyond that, the facts were almost identical to
Kulko, a California wife suing her husband, who lived in New Jersey
for divorce (in Kulko the husband lived in New York, and the suit
was solely over child support, the parties already being divorced).220
One would think that with these straightforward facts, the Supreme
Court, which had decided over a dozen cases under the International
Shoe framework, would at least be able to garner a majority on the
basic analytical approach to the case, especially where there was
unanimous agreement on the outcome.
Burnham, a New Jersey resident, was served process during a
three-day visit to California.221 The suit was brought by his wife
who was living in California after the couple had separated and
sought a divorce.222 All the justices agreed that if Burnham had not
217

170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
495 U.S. 604 (1990).
219
See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 79 (“Like
Asahi, Burnham produced a unanimous result with splintered reasoning.”).
220
See Condlin, supra note 115, at 116 (“It is . . . surprising that Burnham did not
make more use of Kulko. The two cases were close factually and implicated many
of the same policy concerns, yet there is only one ‘cf’ reference to Kulko in the
Burnham opinion, and it was used simply to illustrate a factual point rather than
support a legal conclusion.”).
221
See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion).
222
Id.
218
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been served while he was visiting the state, he lacked the requisite
contacts with California to be forced to defend there.223 This tag
service,224 however, would be clearly sufficient to subject Burnham
to jurisdiction in California under Pennoyer.
The issue thus became whether Pennoyer survived International
Shoe. This was not important so much for deciding cases where tag
service was involved, although folks like Burnham would disagree.
Rather, the decision would say much about what the minimum
contacts test represented in terms of personal jurisdiction; as an
expansion of the range of state court jurisdictional reach yet still
effecting sovereignty principles, or rather an entirely new look at
jurisdiction, with sovereignty having been scrapped.225
The way that Burnham divided the Court underscored the
dysfunctional nature of the Court’s personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence. The attempts of the primary Burnham opinions—
Scalia’s plurality and Brennan’s concurrence in judgment—to situate
the facts of that case within International Shoe’s personal
jurisdiction paradigm demonstrated the fallacy and uncertainty of the
minimum contacts test. Specifically, the Justices attempt to explain
223

See id. The case generated four opinions. Justice Scalia wrote the plurality,
which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice White
in part; Justice White wrote his own opinion, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment; Justice Brennan wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, which
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O’Connor joined. Justice Stevens wrote his
own opinion, concurring in the judgment. This opinion was two sentences long,
saying that he concurred because the defendant was served while in California.
Therefore, one cannot know what his reasoning was, but presumably it did not
agree with any of the other opinions, none of which he joined.
224
Tag service involves serving (or tagging) an out-of-state defendant while he or
she is in the forum state and basing jurisdiction purely on the fact that service was
obtained while the defendant was within the state. This practice was seemingly
approved by Pennoyer in discussing why service outside the forum state would not
confer jurisdiction and had a long pedigree.
225
In Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186, the Court had indicated that International Shoe’s
minimum contacts did not just add an alternate way to find jurisdiction, but rather
replaced the test regarding in-state attachment of property when it came to quasiin-rem jurisdiction. That exercise of adjudicatory power affected a person’s
property rights, and therefore required a due process (i.e. minimum contacts)
analysis. Now the question was whether a defendant who was served in the state
too could argue that jurisdiction was improper because he or she lacked minimum
contacts therewith and/or whether or not the in-state service alone constituted
sufficient contacts.
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how the test would apply to a defendant who was served within a
state, but had very little contact, and therefore lacked minimum
contacts. These attempts actually demonstrated that the Court’s
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence neither effected the goals of
fairness reflected in due process nor supported a jurisdictional
standard rooted in notions of state sovereignty and federalism.
Writing for a plurality consisting of four justices—although one
of these, Justice White, only joined part of his opinion—Justice
Scalia concluded that tag service requires no minimum contacts
analysis.226 Instead, he concluded that because this form of
obtaining jurisdiction was both of ancient origin and remained
widely practiced in the decades after International Shoe, those facts
alone satisfied the Due Process Clause.227 There was no additional
inquiry into the logic or effect of forcing a defendant to litigate in the
state’s courts that he was passing through when served with
process.228
Justice Scalia’s opinion most clearly demonstrates that the
problem with the approach in International Shoe is that personal
jurisdiction really does not concern due process. He specifically
criticized Justice Brennan’s concurrence for concluding the longstanding practice made tag jurisdiction fair. Scalia stated that what

226

Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (“The short of the
matter is that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process
because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due
process standard of ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”).
That is, Scalia concluded not that tagging the defendant establishes that the
defendant had minimum contacts. Id. Instead, where a defendant is tagged within
the state, minimum contacts simply have no relevance. Id.
227
Id. Scalia noted that almost all—if not all—states did, and continued to allow
tag jurisdiction at the time Burnham was decided. Id. at 613–15.
228
Id. Justice Scalia’s opinion tacitly admits that the answer to this question
would be that it was not fair using the International Shoe criteria. See id. at 623
(stating that, regarding Justice Brennan’s argument that the defendant benefitted
by being in California for three days, “[t]hree days’ worth of these benefits strike
us as powerfully inadequate to establish, as an abstract matter, that it is ‘fair’ for
California to decree the ownership of all Mr. Burnham’s worldly goods acquired
during the 10 years of marriage, and the custody over his children. We daresay a
contractual exchange swapping those benefits for that power would not survive the
‘unconscionability’ provision of the Uniform Commercial Code.”).
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Brennan called fairness, was really just tradition.229 But, that
something is long-standing and commonly practiced does not
necessarily make it fair.230 Due process implies the process that one
ought to get, not merely what one has traditionally been afforded.
Thus, Scalia, while not explicitly saying so, was implicitly endorsing
the view of Hanson, that personal jurisdiction primarily concerns
notions of federalism, territoriality, and power, not due process or
fairness.
Moreover, Justice Scalia’s opinion not only shows that personal
jurisdiction and due process are an uneasy fit, it elucidates—albeit
unintentionally—a fundamental flaw in the minimum contacts
standard. If the bounds of a court’s geographic reach are to be
determined based on rigid conceptions rooted in long-standing
practice divorced from fairness, then how could the Court in
International Shoe authorize expanding jurisdiction merely because
it comports with fair play. Combining the Burnham plurality with
International Shoe yields the following unwieldy doctrine: due
process requires that personal jurisdiction be exercised only when
the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state sufficient
to make the exercise of jurisdiction comport with fair play and
substantial justice, or if the defendant happens to be served within
the state, irrespective of how burdensome or fair it is to require the
defendant to litigate there.
The problem is that Scalia does not go far enough. What he says
about tag service not ensuring fairness is true about minimum
contacts generally. His critique should not be limited to criticizing
Justice Brennan for finding jurisdiction fair through the act of
tagging the defendant in the forum. Minimum contacts might in
some cases indicate that it is fair to require the defendant to litigate
in the forum, just as tag jurisdiction might, but neither tag
jurisdiction nor contacts alone ensures fairness to the defendant.
And, as has been demonstrated from almost seventy years of
229

See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 624 (“By formulating it as a ‘reasonable expectation’
Justice Brennan makes that seem like a ‘fairness’ factor; but in reality, of course, it
is just tradition masquerading as ‘fairness.’”).
230
The practice in Shaffer allowing jurisdiction solely on the presence of property
in the forum state, which the plurality opinion unsuccessfully tried to distinguish,
also had a long-standing history and was still used in several states when Shaffer
pruned that form of jurisdiction.

108

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 13, No. 2

personal jurisdiction cases under the International Shoe regime,
determinations as to whether minimum contacts have been satisfied
to an extent that the exercise of jurisdiction is fair in a given case is
tricky. Neither tagging nor contacts has a meaningful connection to
what is typically thought of as due process.
Justice Brennan, whose approach to personal jurisdiction in most
cases represents the most logically sound application of the
minimum contacts test in the International Shoe era, actually took a
more illogical approach than Scalia.231 Brennan concluded that
International Shoe’s minimum contacts test did apply to tag service
the same as it would to out-of-state service, but the fact that the
defendant was tagged within the state would alone almost always
satisfy the minimum contacts requirements.232 That Brennan and
Scalia so strenuously disagreed on this theory while agreeing on the
outcome is notable. In a sense, it is not entirely clear whether they
actually disagree about anything, or whether the minimum contacts
test is so difficult to understand that they are simply arguing over
language that lacks inherent meaning.233
Justice Scalia believed that in-state service meant that nominimum contacts analysis was required, thereby maintaining a
central portion of Pennoyer.234 Justice Brennan believed that a
tagged defendant still had to be shown to have minimum contacts,
but that the tagging itself would almost always satisfy the contacts.
What are the differences between Scalia and Brennan’s Burnham
opinions? How is finding that in-state service requires the
dispending of any analysis of contacts (Scalia) different from
concluding that the in-state service requires and satisfies the contacts
(Brennan)? In reality, this spat demonstrates that the Court does not
really know what purpose the minimum contacts test serves. Scalia
thinks that it serves as a de facto expansion of the state’s territory, so
231

See Condlin, supra note 115, at 117 (“In many ways, Justice Brennan’s opinion
consisted of adding up zeroes to get one.”).
232
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 629, 637–38 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
233
Cf. E.B. WHITE, MY DAY, ONE MAN’S MEAT (1944) (“There is nothing more
likely to start disagreement among people or countries than an agreement.”);
GEORGE R.R. MARTIN, A GAME OF THRONES 98 (1996) (“Different roads
sometimes lead to the same castle.”).
234
See Koppel, supra note 17, at 958 (“Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion . . .
breathed life into Pennoyer by affirming the continued viability of Pennoyer’s
‘presence’ principle.”).
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that someone served outside the state may, with sufficient contacts,
be treated as being served within the state. Brennan sees contacts as
ensuring that the defendant’s rights be protected, although strangely
he thinks that the sole contact of being handed papers within the
state, instead of without, meaningfully protects the defendant.
Looking more closely at Brennan’s Burnham opinion further
underscores the weakness of the minimum contacts approach, at
least as understood by Justice Brennan. In arguing that that tag
service generally satisfies minimum contacts, Brennan stresses three
points. First, because tag service is so widely used, potential parties
have notice that they will be subject to suit if they are served within
a state.235 Second, by being in the state in which they are tagged,
defendants are necessarily enjoying some benefits of the state,
however briefly they are there, like police protection, use of roads
etc.236 Third, the burden on Burnham to defend in California was
slight due to modern transportation and as evidenced as the fact that
he had traveled there before.237
The first and third points prove too much. So long as a state
clearly announced that it had a given long-arm statute, then that
would give a potential parties notice of the types of activities that
might subject it to suit in that state.238 This argument does not

235

Burnham, 495 U.S. at 635–37 (“I find the historical background relevant
because . . . the fact that American courts have announced the rule for perhaps a
century . . . provides a defendant voluntarily present in a particular State today
‘clear notice that [he] is subject to suit’ in the forum.” (quoting World-Wide, 444
U.S. at 297) (alteration in original)).
236
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 637–38 (“By visiting the forum State, a transient
defendant actually ‘avail[s]’ himself of significant benefits provided by the State.
His health and safety are guaranteed by the State’s police, fire, and emergency
medical services; he is free to travel on the State’s roads and waterways; he likely
enjoys the fruits of the State’s economy as well.” (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at
476) (alteration in original)).
237
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 638.
238
See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 624–25 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (“The only
reason for charging Mr. Burnham with the reasonable expectation of being subject
to suit is that the States of the Union assert adjudicatory jurisdiction over the
person, and have always asserted adjudicatory jurisdiction over the person, by
serving him with process during his temporary physical presence in their
territory.”); see also Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at
91 (“If a defendant can be charged with knowing the history of jurisdictional
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specifically support tag jurisdiction so much as almost any exercise
of jurisdiction that is widely known. As far as the ease of travel and
lack of burden, that would be true of many, if not most, defendants
in the twentieth (now twenty-first) century. If one were to take
Justice Brennan at his word, it would “justify the exercise of
jurisdiction over everyone, whether or not he ever comes to
California.”239
The second point depends only upon the defendant’s having been
within the state at some point, not on his having been served process
there. A defendant who is served one minute or six months after
leaving the state has enjoyed the benefits of the state as surely as one
who was tagged while present therein.240 Almost all the personal
jurisdiction cases in the Supreme Court and elsewhere involve
defendants who derived some benefit from a state, whether from
being there at some point, or having sold a product to, or contracted
with, a party within that state. Also, Justice Brennan does not seem
to root his opinion in the fact that Burnham had been in California
for three days when he was served as opposed to three minutes – the
latter would also seem to suffice for Justice Brennan, even though
Mr. Burnham would likely have incurred no benefit in that
situation.241
Burnham had upheld the type of service allowed in Pennoyer.
But the Justices could not agree why. Personal jurisdiction was in a
sorry state, with a confusing doctrine and a badly divided court
practice in the United States for the last century or so, however, he can be charged
with knowledge of a state’s long-arm statute.”).
239
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added); see
also Condlin, supra note 115, at 118–19 (“On Justice Brennan’s view, it is hard to
know what kind of claim Mr. Burnham could not be sued on in California, or who
could not be sued in California.”).
240
See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (“[E]ven if one
agreed with Justice Brennan’s conception of an equitable bargain, the ‘benefits’
we have been discussing would explain why it is ‘fair’ to assert general
jurisdiction over Burnham-returned-to-New-Jersey-after-service only at the
expense of proving that it is also ‘fair’ to assert general jurisdiction over Burnhamreturned-to-New-Jersey-without-service—which we know does not conform with
‘contemporary notions of due process.’” (emphasis in original)).
241
See id. at 625 (“Suppose, for example, that a defendant in Mr. Burnham’s
situation enjoys not three days’ worth of California ‘benefits,’ but 15 minutes’
worth.”); see also Condlin, supra note 115, at 117 (“The argument based on the
benefits and protections of California law are equally unavailing.”).
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leaving lower courts, litigants, and anyone planning personal or
business affairs in the dark.242 The Court would allow things to
worsen by not addressing and cleaning up this mess for the next two
decades. Then the Court would make things even worse by trying to
clean up their mess.
(g)

J. McIntyre

In 2010, the Court granted certiorari in J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd. V. Nicastro,243 and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v.
Brown.244 Despite the fact that at this time the Court still examined
the defendant’s contacts as ends in themselves, the Court’s decisions
in the mid to late 1980s had seemingly tempered the most rigid
aspects of the sovereignty-based approach apparent in Hanson and
World-Wide.245
These grants of certiorari therefore raised
expectations that the Court would revisit and simplify the most
problematic aspects of the minimum contacts doctrine.246 These
hopes were dashed.247
242

See Condlin, supra note 115, at 119 (“What started as an uncomplicated twofactor, four-permutation test, designed to deal with the relatively simple telephoneand-automobile connected world of the 1950s, has grown exponentially into an
elaborate, multi-factor, pseudo algorithmic, balancing test, designed to deal with
the electronically linked world of the twenty-first century. Unfortunately, the
development of the doctrine has not always been linear, cumulative, consistent, or
clear.”).
243
131 S.Ct. 2780 (2011).
244
131 S.Ct. 2846 (2011).
245
See Parry, supra note 82, at 840 (“[B]efore [J. McIntyre], and with the
exception of Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Burnham, which dealt with
presence in the forum, it seemed settled that personal jurisdiction questions turned
on the two-part analysis derived from International Shoe. [World-Wide’s]
endorsement of purposeful availment was the closest thing the Court had to a
controlling precedent on the question of how to apply the International Shoe test,
but Burger King and Asahi had thrown the precise definition of that term into
doubt. The Court had also rejected the federalism/state sovereignty rationale
advanced by [World-Wide] as justification for the minimum contacts test, in favor
of the claim that the focus of the personal jurisdiction inquiry is on the due process
liberty interests of the defendant who contests personal jurisdiction.”); Freer,
supra note 32, at 579 (“At the end of the century, then, the two-step approach from
[World-Wide] seemed to be in place.”).
246
See Patrick J. Borchers, Symposium, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and
the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1245
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J. McIntyre, the more important of the two cases to jurisdictional
jurisprudence, involved a suit against the U.K. manufacturer,
McIntyre (UK), of a scrap metal machine that injured Nicastro, the
employee of a New Jersey company (Curcio), which bought the
device.248 McIntyre (UK) sold the machine to its exclusive
American distributor, McIntyre (US), which was based in Ohio.249
Nicastro’s employer bought the machine from McIntyre (US) at a
Las Vegas trade show, and it was shipped from Ohio to Curcio’s
New Jersey location.250 McIntyre (UK) and McIntyre (US) were
entirely separate companies.251 Moreover, McIntyre (UK) had no
offices or employees in New Jersey, did not directly sell into or
(2011) [hereinafter “Borchers, Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test”] (“[J.
McIntyre and Goodyear] marked for the first time in almost a quarter of a century
that the United States Supreme Court engaged in an extended discussion of the
minimum contacts test. . . . Law professors who teach Civil Procedure and related
subjects waited eagerly for the new cases. . . . Of more practical significance, the
bench and bar were hoping for guidance on . . . difficult issues that have bedeviled
the subject.”).
247
Robin J. Effron, Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The
Relatedness Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 867,
868 (2012) (“The Supreme Court’s recent decision in [J. McIntyre] had the
potential to resolve nearly two decades of confusion in personal jurisdiction
doctrine. . . . [But] the Court produced a fractured 4-2-3 opinion that resolved
little . . . . The academic community met the [J. McIntyre] decision with almost
unanimous disapproval, decrying the Court’s inability to resolve the stream of
commerce theory in particular and to articulate a coherent theory of personal
jurisdiction in general.”); Koppel, supra note 17, at 916 (“The Supreme Court’s
grant of certiorari in [J. McIntyre] gave it the opportunity to finally resolve the
confusion over the Asahi Court’s ‘four to four division on the proper scope of the
stream of commerce principle [that] has left matters somewhat of a muddle.’
Missing this opportunity, the Court splintered along formalist-functionalist lines,
as it did in Asahi.” (quoting 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067.4, at 497 (3d ed. 2002))); id. at 958
(“[The] doctrinal split [which has existed since Hanson] would appear once again
in [J. McIntyre], which would fail to resolve the question whether the minimum
contacts principle is primarily a sovereign limitation of the power of States or a
standard of reason and fairness.” (quotation omitted)); Parry, supra note 82, at 841
(“[J. McIntyre] compounds the uncertainty that Asahi and Burnham fostered.”).
248
Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010).
249
Id. at 578. McIntyre Machinery of America, Inc. was not part of the case as it
was insolvent.
250
Id.
251
Id. at 579.
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solicit business in that state, and had no physical presence there.252
The record indicates that this was the only product of McIntyre (UK)
that was sold to a resident of, or made its way into, New Jersey.253
In October 2001, the machine severed several of Nicastro’s
fingers.254 In 2003, he sued in New Jersey state court.255 The case
then made its way through the courts for years on the personal
jurisdiction issue. The trial court granted McIntyre (UK)’s motion to
dismiss for a lack of personal jurisdiction.256 Then New Jersey’s
appellate court reversed and remanded for jurisdictional
discovery.257 Following discovery, the trial court again granted
McIntyre (UK)’s motion to dismiss for a lack of jurisdiction, which
the intermediate appellate court again reversed.258 The matter was
then appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court, which, in a divided
opinion affirmed the lower appellate Court’s ruling that New Jersey
had jurisdiction over McIntyre (UK).259
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that by selling its
machine to an exclusive distributor who was given the mission of
selling throughout the United States, McIntyre (UK) could
reasonably anticipate that this product might end up in New Jersey,
and cause injury there if defective.260 Under those circumstances,
jurisdiction would be exercised absent the defendant’s showing an
undue burden,261 thereby invoking the second-branch fairness
considerations that the Court had implemented in Burger King.262
252

Id.
See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct at 2786. The record indicates the possibility, but not
the certainty, that three additional machines made their way into New Jersey. This
discrepancy had no effect on any of the various opinions issued in this case, and it
is of no significance.
254
Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 577.
255
Id.
256
Id. at 578.
257
Id.
258
Id. at 579–80.
259
Id. at 577.
260
Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 593.
261
Id.
262
Id.; see also Koppel, supra note 17, at 915 (“The New Jersey Supreme Court’s
opinion also reflects Justice Brennan’s shift of emphasis, expressed in his [WorldWide] dissent, from the majority’s threshold purposeful availment requirement,
which, in Brennan’s view, ‘focuses tightly on the existence of contacts between
the forum and the defendant,’ to the fairness prong of the minimum contacts
253
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Given that various high-level employees of McIntyre (UK) had
traveled to the United States for various reasons, the company could
not make that showing.263
Notably, the New Jersey Supreme Court misunderstood the
stream-of-commerce test as a substitute for minimum contacts,
rather than a means of establishing them.264 This observation is not
a swipe at this highly respected State high court.265 Instead, it is
evidence of how abstruse personal jurisdiction doctrine has
become.266
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and on the last day of the
2010-2011 term, ten years after the accident and eight years after the
initial suit, reversed and held that McIntyre (UK) was not subject to
jurisdiction in New Jersey.267
This decision was a major
disappointment. The outcome was as illogical and unfair as any
previous Supreme Court personal jurisdiction decision. Despite a
doctrine, which focuses on the forum state’s interest in providing a convenient
forum for local residents.” (quoting World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 299)).
263
Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 593.
264
See id. at 582 (“We do not find that J. McIntyre had a presence or minimum
contacts in this State—in any jurisprudential sense—that would justify a New
Jersey court to exercise jurisdiction in this case. Plaintiff’s claim that J. McIntyre
may be sued in this State must sink or swim with the stream-of-commerce theory
of jurisdiction.”); see also J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2790–91 (“It is notable that the
New Jersey Supreme Court appear[ed] to agree, for it could not find that J.
McIntyre had a presence or minimum contacts in this State—in any jurisprudential
sense—that would justify a New Jersey court to exercise jurisdiction in this case.
The court nonetheless held that petitioner could be sued in New Jersey based on a
stream-of-commerce theory of jurisdiction. As discussed, however, the stream-ofcommerce metaphor cannot supersede either the mandate of the Due Process
Clause or the limits on judicial authority that Clause ensures.” (quotations
omitted)). Of course, minimum contacts itself is a metaphor, so it is piling
metaphor upon metaphor to insist that stream-of-commerce is a form of minimum
contacts as opposed to an independent way for establishing personal jurisdiction.
265
See Colleen O’Dea, Have Politics, Power Struggles Tarnished the Reputation
of NJ’s Judiciary, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Apr. 4, 2014),
http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/14/04/04/have-politics-power-strugglestarnished-reputation-of-nj-s-judiciary/ (“New Jersey’s judiciary [is] nationally
recognized for its independence and important legal precedents.”).
266
See Borchers, Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, supra note 246, at
1247 (“The fundamental doctrinal confusion is evident in the Supreme Court’s
most recent efforts, particularly J. McIntyre[’s] . . . splintered and muddled
opinion.”).
267
J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (plurality opinion).
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major change in personnel from the Asahi and Burnham decisions,268
the Court remained as fractured as in those cases, with no majority.
And the opinions that were issued continued to strain logic, with the
plurality’s analysis and reasoning being particularly frustrating.269
J. McIntyre suffered from the process and inefficiency infirmities
that characterize so much of personal jurisdiction disputes. The suit
wound through four courts—two of them twice—over eight years,
just to decide that jurisdiction did not exist, thereby draining time
and resources in this procedural dispute. Not only did this leave the
parties to restart the litigation elsewhere, but the defendant who
claimed to be immune from suit in New Jersey, paradoxically spent
years in New Jersey—and in Washington D.C.—arguing that it
should not have to litigate in that State.270
Justice Kennedy’s plurality decision, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas, was the worst of the
three opinions issued by the justices in this case. Kennedy
emphasized that jurisdiction depended upon whether a defendant had
freely chosen to submit to a sovereign. He used the term
“sovereignty,” or a variation of the word, seventeen times271 and
gave state lines a level of importance that had not been enjoyed since
at least Hanson, and perhaps Pennoyer.272 Yet, relying on Insurance
268

Only two justices, Scalia and Kennedy, remained from Burnham, with only
Scalia remaining from the Asahi case.
269
See Borchers, Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, supra note 246, at
1245–46 (“The Supreme Court performed miserably. Its opinion in J.
McIntyre . . . is a disaster. As in its 1987 Asahi decision, the Court produced no
majority opinion, but the plurality opinion attempted to roll back the clock by a
century or more and re-ground personal jurisdiction in a dubious sovereignty
theory that the Court had apparently rejected several times before.”).
270
But see Parry, supra note 82, at 844 (“The new approach [in J. McIntyre] would
lower the cost of litigation, apparently because it would allow a low-cost dismissal
of suits against defendants of this kind in other states, or deter the filing of such
suits altogether.”).
271
See Koppel, supra note 17, at 917 (“To make the primary role of sovereignty in
limiting state-court jurisdiction unmistakably clear, the plurality opinion
mentioned the word ‘sovereign’ or ‘sovereignty’ seventeen times, and referred
eight times to the requirement that the defendant submit to the power of a
sovereign.”).
272
See, e.g., J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2787 (plurality opinion) (“A court may
subject a defendant to judgment only when the defendant has sufficient contacts
with the sovereign.”); id. at 2788 (“The principal inquiry in cases of this sort is
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Corp., Justice Kennedy maintained that the Due Process Clause
remained the sole limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction.273 This
illogic persisted through much of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence,
as far back as Hanson, and certainly since Insurance Corp.
However, following that case, the Court had finessed the issue.
Never had an opinion served as such a paean to sovereignty, while
simultaneously insisting that in so doing it was fulfilling the
demands of due process as did Kennedy’s McIntyre plurality.274
whether the defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a
sovereign.”); id. at 2789 (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum, or
sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis. The question is whether a defendant has
followed a course of conduct directed at the society or economy existing within
the jurisdiction of a given sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject
the defendant to judgment concerning that conduct.”); see also Freer, supra note
32, at 581 (“Professor Rhodes points out [that] the Court had never employed the
term [submission] for personal jurisdiction under International Shoe, and had
limited it to cases of consent to jurisdiction.”); Koppel, supra note 17, at 916
(“Two-thirds of [the] six-justice majority was comprised of a plurality opinion that
is solidly grounded in the concept of state sovereignty, the formalist pedigree of
which dates back to Pennoyer and the agrarian economy of the mid-nineteenth
century.”); Parry, supra note 82, at 860 (“By characterizing the defendant’s
relationship to a court as submission to a sovereign, Justice Kennedy asserts, first,
the formality of judicial power as something not invoked lightly or accidentally
and, second, its majesty as a manifestation of sovereignty.”); cf. Freer, supra note
32, at 580 (“[Kennedy’s plurality opinion] seems to signal a return to the assertion
in [World-Wide] that personal jurisdiction operates to guard interstate
federalism.”).
273
J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (“Personal jurisdiction, of course, restricts
“judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual
liberty,” for due process protects the individual’s right to be subject only to lawful
power.” (quoting Insurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 702)).
274
In fact, in the sentence right after Kennedy states that personal jurisdiction
depends upon whether the defendant had “followed a course of conduct” that
would allow a “sovereign . . . to subject the defendant to the judgment concerning
that conduct,” he states: “Personal jurisdiction, of course, restricts ‘judicial power
not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty,’ for due
process protects the individual’s right to be subject only to lawful power.” J.
McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (quoting Insurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 702).
Kennedy then shifts back to discussing sovereignty. Cf. Parry, supra note 82, at
848–49 (“Justice White’s reliance on sovereignty [in World-Wide] arose from
constitutional structure and the concrete facts of federalism. Justice Kennedy’s
use of sovereignty, by contrast, arises from traditional ideas of judicial power that
may be consistent, but are not necessarily interwoven with the structure of the
Constitution or the federal system more generally. . . . Justice Kennedy’s approach
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Kennedy’s opinion laid bare the flaws of linking personal
jurisdiction, due process, sovereignty, and contacts as comprising a
neat package. Clearly, McIntyre (UK) did not affirmatively choose
to submit itself to New Jersey’s adjudicatory authority. Then again,
the same could be said of pretty much all of the defendants since
International Shoe over whom the Court found personal jurisdiction.
Can one say that the magazine writer and editor located in Florida
who wrote about California resident Shirley Jones in Calder, or the
Michigan franchisee who entered into a contract with a company that
happened to be located in Florida, Burger King, chose to submit to
the jurisdiction of the states in which they were sued any more than
McIntyre (UK) did with New Jersey?275
The problematic nature of treating personal jurisdiction as only
appropriate when a defendant has freely submitted to the sovereign
authority of a state is further reinforced by the fact that the defendant
here was from the U.K. Sovereignty in personal jurisdiction had
previously been discussed in terms of interstate federalism, not in
allowing one state to impinge on another state’s area of authority.276
To be sure, one might think in terms of New Jersey’s authority not
overreaching into the U.K.’s realm. But here it was conceded that
McIntyre (UK) was subject to jurisdiction in the United States,
including, if allowed by federal statute, a New Jersey federal
court.277 From the standpoint of U.K. sovereignty, how could it
therefore lays itself open to the charge that it serves no particular material or
constitutional interests and instead represents formalism for its own sake or, at
best, for the sake of tradition.”).
275
See discussion supra Parts II.B.3.c–II.B.3.d.
276
See Koppel, supra note 17, at 959 (“The key issue confronting the Court in [J.
McIntyre]—and unresolved since Asahi—is whether state sovereignty within the
federal system makes sense in the international context.” (footnote omitted)).
277
See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (“Because
the United States is a distinct sovereign, a defendant may in principle be subject to
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States but not of any particular state.”).
Not that Kennedy was limiting his overall analysis to international defendants. Id.
at 2790 (“It must be remembered, however, that although this case and Asahi both
involve foreign manufacturers, the undesirable consequence of Justice Brennan’s
approach in World-Wide are no less significant for domestic producers.”); see id.
at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“New Jersey’s exercise of personal jurisdiction
over a foreign manufacturer whose dangerous product caused a workplace injury
in New Jersey does not tread on the domain, or diminish the sovereignty, of any
sister State. Indeed, among the States of the United States, the State in which the
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make any difference if it was a New Jersey state court, an Ohio state
court, or a New Jersey federal court that sought to adjudicate the
rights of a corporation located in the UK? They would either all
violate or all not violate UK sovereignty. As the latter two courts
concededly could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction, it is hard to
understand how sovereignty concerns would come into play only
with the New Jersey state court. This posture demonstrates that
Kennedy was not merely incorrect on how things played out in J.
McIntyre. Rather, it shows the problem of thinking of personal
jurisdiction in terms of sovereignty at all, because even the most
extensive jurisdictional reach would implicate only the rights of the
defendant, and not the sovereign concerns of another state or
country.
Justice Kennedy also proffered hypothetical cases in which
allowing jurisdiction over McIntyre (UK) might allow jurisdiction to
be extended to distant defendants in cases where doing so would
result in unfair burden. The examples he gave were situations where
one might validly argue that due process would compel finding
jurisdiction lacking like “a small Florida farm [that] sell[s] crops to a
large nearby distributor . . . . [the farmer could then] be sued in
Alaska or any number of other States’ courts without ever leaving
town.”278 But the standard for deciding jurisdictional issues that
Kennedy indorsed does not provide a meaningful device for
distinguishing fair from unfair exercises of jurisdiction. A small
business owner or farmer might sell one or a handful of items
directly to someone located in a distant state, through mail order or,
more likely in the 21st century, a website. That would establish
jurisdiction under the contacts/sovereignty approach that Kennedy
approved. In fact, an overall fairness/burden approach is more likely
to protect the small farmer or business person from distant litigation
than Kennedy’s sovereignty approach, while allowing it go forward
in an appropriate case, like one against a major international
corporation like McIntyre (UK).
All of the problems with Kennedy’s opinions can be said to be
by-products of his—and the Court’s—longstanding attempt to link
injury occurred would seem most suitable for litigation of a products liability tort
claim.”).
278
Id. at 2790.
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personal jurisdiction with both sovereignty and due process. As
Kennedy’s opinion notes, McIntyre (UK) did not choose to submit
or did not even implicitly submit to New Jersey’s sovereignty.279
Yet, in what sense would its due process rights be violated by
allowing the case to proceed there? If one accepts the conclusion
that a lack of submission to a sovereign means that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction violates the defendant’s due process rights, then
by means of circular reasoning, that assertion appears to stand up
because the conclusion is assumed to be correct. But this case
demonstrates in spades the flaw of that assumption. There would be
nothing unfair or particularly burdensome about requiring McIntyre
(UK) to adjudicate in New Jersey, wherein the plaintiff and much of
the evidence was located.280 It was essentially conceded that
McIntyre (UK) could be required to litigate in Ohio, although that
would presumably be harder. Ohio is further away, though only
slightly. But because little or no evidence or witnesses were there,
adjudication there would make it harder for McIntyre (UK) to mount
a meritorious defense.281 Yet for Kennedy, sovereignty trumps all,
even while he claimed that his approach furthers due process
concerns.282
279

See id. (“Respondent has not established that J. McIntyre engaged in conduct
purposefully directed at New Jersey.”).
280
Justice Kennedy’s opinion said that fairness was beside the point and that it was
incorrect to look at that factor, even though he also urged that the Due Process
Clause was the sole criteria on which personal jurisdiction was to be judged.
Compare J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion) (“The conclusion that
jurisdiction is in the first instance a question of authority rather than fairness
explains [cases like] Burnham.”), with id. (“Personal jurisdiction, of course,
restricts ‘judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of
individual liberty’ . . . . ) (quoting Insurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 702). How can
personal jurisdiction both be a matter of authority and not fairness, while also
being a matter of due process and not sovereignty?
281
Of course, if the evidence did not help J. McIntyre, then it might have a better
chance of winning in Ohio, but surely that is not an interest that due process law
should protect.
282
Parry, supra note 82, at 844–45 (“Justice Kennedy . . . suggested scenarios that
confirm his intention to create a relatively restrictive rule for personal
jurisdiction. . . . [U]nder Justice Kennedy’s approach, there is no fairness inquiry
at all. . . . [H]e relied heavily on Justice Scalia’s opinion in Burnham and never
suggested that ideas of fair play and substantial justice have any meaningful and
separate role in personal jurisdiction.” (footnote omitted)).
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In particular, the attempt to meld due process and sovereignty
shows that the approach in Kennedy’s opinion and much of personal
jurisdiction law since the mid-20th century misapprehends the nature
of what is at stake in civil litigation: an allocation of property
between two private parties, not state action vis-à-vis the defendant.
Nicastro claimed he was hurt, that it was McIntyre (UK)’s fault, and
that therefore the company should pay him money. McIntyre (UK)
disagreed. Some adjudicatory body must decide. Requiring that
decision to be undertaken by a New Jersey court, where McIntyre’s
machine found its way, however indirectly, no more violates its due
process rights or undermines sovereignty concerns, than to require
plaintiff Nicastro to have to travel to Ohio, Nevada or the UK for
adjudication. 283
In short, it makes no sense to say that personal jurisdiction is
limited only by the strictures of the Due Process Clause while
simultaneous maintaining that jurisdiction also requires a finding
that the defendant freely submitted itself to the sovereignty of the
forum state, and should not turn upon fairness considerations. The
problem of course is not of Kennedy’s making, but a result of his
attempt to hold onto the myriad fragments of three-quarters of a
century of strained personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. The most
generous thing that one might say about Kennedy’s opinion was
offered by Justice Ginsburg’s dissent: “I take heart that the plurality
opinion does not speak for the Court, for that opinion would take a

283

See Koppel, supra note 17, at 962–63 (“As a result of the majority’s ruling that
due process requires an alien manufacturer’s contacts to target specifically the
forum state’s market to justify subjecting the manufacturer to the jurisdiction of
the state’s courts, Nicastro, injured in his home state of New Jersey by a machine
targeted by the British manufacturer at the U.S. market, may have to seek redress
in Ohio, where the McIntyre UK’s American distributor did business, or in
Nevada, the site of the trade convention attended by the manufacturer. . . . [A]s
noted by the New Jersey Supreme Court, ‘defending the product-liability action in
Ohio . . . or in Nevada . . . would be no more convenient, [to McIntyre (UK)] than
in New Jersey’ which, of course, is closer to Britain.” (quoting Nicastro, 987 A.2d
at 593)); Borchers, Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, supra note 246, at
1247 (“[Kennedy’s opinion] overlooked the obvious point that fairness to the
plaintiff in providing a realistic forum is at least as important as protecting a
foreign defendant.”).
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giant step away from the ‘notions of fair play and substantial justice’
underlying International Shoe.”284
Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Justice Alito, concurred
in the judgment that jurisdiction should not be found, but believed
that this case could easily be decided under existing precedent,
because in his view on the facts of this case jurisdiction could not be
found under either of the two plurality opinions in Asahi.285 In
Breyer’s view, the fact that this involved a single, isolated sale
compelled the result under existing case law that jurisdiction did not
exist over McIntyre (UK).286 He felt that the plurality went too far in
reaching a result that might apply to a different set of facts. By
citing the fact that a single sale was insufficient, Breyer implied that
a larger volume of similar type sales might merit the extension of
jurisdiction.287 Moreover, the plurality’s requirement that the
defendant “target” the forum state before being required to submit to
its jurisdiction presents an analytically suspect approach when
applied to modern forms of marketing and sales, such as web-based
sales and consignments to online intermediaries like
Amazon.com.288
While Breyer identifies a problem with the plurality’s approach,
his argument misunderstands Kennedy’s opinion as being primarily
284

J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Parry, supra
note 82, at 830 (“[The] failure [to achieve a majority] may turn out to be the best
thing about [J. McIntyre]. . . . [B]ecause the [J. McIntyre] opinions collectively
undermine more personal jurisdiction doctrine than they create, the door is open
for rethinking the scope of and reasons for constitutional limitations on personal
jurisdiction.”).
285
J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing both Justice
O’Connor’s Asahi opinion and Justice Brennan’s Asahi concurrence).
286
Id. at 2792. In making this argument, “Breyer overlooked McGee [which
upheld jurisdiction based upon one contact by the defendant].” Freer, supra note
32, at 582. “Moreover, the Court has upheld jurisdiction in tort cases based on a
single contact at least three times: in Hess v. Palowski, Calder, and Keeton.” See
id.
287
See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that basing
jurisdiction on a stream of commerce required a finding of a “regular flow or
regular course of sales” in the forum state) (quotation omitted).
288
See id. at 2793 (“But what do [the plurality’s] standards mean when a company
targets the world by selling products from its Web site? And does it matter if,
instead of shipping the products directly, a company consigns the products through
an intermediary (say, Amazon.com) who then receives and fulfills the orders?).
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incoherent only because it is overly broad in possible application.
Breyer aptly recognizes that targeting, or submission to, a sovereign
as the touchstone of jurisdiction makes little sense when applied to
modern marketing arrangement, or when involving a single sale.
But he fails to recognize that the plurality’s approach, much like the
jurisprudence it is based on, is problematic, period.289
Like Kennedy, Breyer presents hypotheticals involving
defendants who might be burdened if summoned to a distant state.
He cites an “Appalachian potter”; “a small Egyptian shirt maker”;
and a “Kenyan coffee farmer, selling [their] products through
international distributors.”290 Like Kennedy, Breyer misapprehends
the problems presented as rooted in the plurality’s narrow approach.
He overlooks that personal jurisdictional law itself has so lost sight
of its basic purpose of determining an appropriate location for
resolution of a dispute between two private parties, that it cannot
appropriately distinguish between allowing suit over a major
international corporation, with frequent and strong connections to
the United States—even if lacking formal presence—and a distant
bit player, whose product finds its way here through intermediate
channels, and who could not properly defend in a particular
forum.291
Justice Ginsburg, with Justices Sotomayor and Kagan on board,
dissented. She believed that the overriding concern of due process
289

See Parry, supra note 82, at 851 (“[A]lthough Justice Breyer’s approach to the
case may be defensible on pragmatic grounds, as a kind of muddling through
within the existing doctrinal structure, it does nothing to solve the problems of
personal jurisdiction doctrine that were created by the very cases that he embraces.
Although he reached a result and made assertions about fairness and connections
with the forum, those claims were not grounded in any specific theory of the
interests that personal jurisdiction serves.”).
290
J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793–94 (Breyer, J., concurring).
291
See Freer, supra note 32, at 583–84 (“The most remarkable thing about the
opinion by Kennedy and Breyer is the lengths to which each justice goes to
conclude that there was no relevant contact. Each supports his conclusions with
hypotheticals worthy of a classroom. . . . The answer to these hypotheticals is not
to strain to find that there is no contact. By finding no contact, the Justices rule
out jurisdiction even in convenient venues. When Kennedy concludes that the
Florida farmer selling through a distributor has no contact with Alaska, he must
also conclude that the farmer has no contact with Alabama. And Breyer’s
Appalachian potter who has no contact with Hawaii also must have no contact
with the state next door to his Appalachian home.” (footnote omitted)).
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was fairness, and that it was clearly fair to require McIntyre (UK) to
litigate in New Jersey, since it targeted the entire United States and
caused injury in New Jersey.292 Moreover, she concluded, in
contrast to Justice Breyer, that jurisdiction was proper under existing
precedent, whether either Justice Brennan’s or Justice O’Connor’s
views of stream-of-commerce, as expressed in their competing Asahi
pluralities, controlled.293 In sharp contrast to Kennedy’s plurality,
Ginsburg said that personal jurisdiction under International Shoe
“gave prime place to reason and fairness” and not sovereignty.294
Justice Ginsburg had thus taken up where Justice Brennan left
off in Burger King and Asahi.295 She clearly thought that a fairnesstype assessment more properly comports with the goals of due
process than does the Court’s fetish with contacts and state lines, and
that in a modern economy the latter approach foils important fairness
considerations.296 Even so, she did not feel the need to advocate for
a complete rework of the personal jurisdiction standard to return it to
a pre-Hanson, McGee-like approach. Instead, the basic current
structure of the doctrine could fulfill her visions, as Brennan had
292

See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2803.
294
Id. at 2800; see also id. at 2799 (“[T]he plurality’s notion that consent is the
animating concept draws no support from controlling decisions of this Court.
Quite the contrary, the Court has explained, a forum can exercise jurisdiction
when its contacts with the controversy are sufficient; invocation of a fictitious
consent, the Court has repeatedly said, is unnecessary and unhelpful.”); Id. at 2795
(“[The plurality’s approach] turn[s] the clock back to the days before modern
long-arm statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into court where a
user is injured, need only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having
independent distributors market it.” (quoting Weintraub, supra note 98, at 555)).
295
See Koppel, supra note 17, at 913 (“[The New Jersey Supreme Court’s]
flexible application of the minimum contacts standard, echoed in Justice
Ginsburg’s [J. McIntyre] dissent, derived doctrinally from Justice Brennan’s
version of [World-Wide’s] stream-of-commerce test [that was also] articulated in
his Asahi concurrence.” (footnote omitted)).
296
See id. at 916 (“The dissenting justices countered with a functionalist approach
that gave prime place to reason and fairness, rather than state sovereignty.”
(quotation omitted)); Parry, supra note 82, at 849 (“Justice Ginsburg’s dissent . . .
comes very close to the fairness-based approach to jurisdiction that Justice
Brennan outlined in his [World-Wide] dissent. She insisted that the personal
jurisdiction inquiry is entirely about reasonableness, and she made no separate,
free-standing inquiry into contacts.”); id. at 847 (“Justice Ginsburg never used the
phrase ‘minimum contacts.’”).
293
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demonstrated in his Burger King opinion for the Court, even though
Ginsburg also endorsed Brennan’s view that International Shoe’s
defendant-focus might be outdated.297
Once again the Court left behind a fractured opinion. Although
the Court has since issued additional opinions, including one decided
on the same day as McIntyre, which have garnered near unanimity,
those cases dealt with unusual facts. Lower courts remain prisoner
to a jurisprudence that lacks a coherent approach when having to
decide commonly occurring personal jurisdiction disputes.298
(h)

Goodyear

This case was issued on the same day as Nicastro.299 The suit
was brought against the foreign manufacturers of tires that were
allegedly defective and resulted in injury and death to several
Americans traveling in France.300 The plaintiffs were all residents of
North Carolina.301 They brought suit in that state based on the fact
that defendants sold several hundred thousand tires there, even
though that activity had nothing to do with the bus crash.302 Thus,
this case was based upon so-called general jurisdiction. The North
Carolina courts agreed with the plaintiff that jurisdiction was
proper.303

297

See Koppel, supra note 17, at 918 (“[Ginsburg’s] dissenting opinion’s emphasis
on second-prong fairness also evokes Justice Brennan’s functionalist observation
that International Shoe’s ‘almost exclusive focus on the rights of defendants, may
be outdated’ and that ‘the model of society on which the International Shoe Court
based its opinion is no longer accurate’ in light of the ‘nationalization of
commerce.’” (quoting World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 307–09)).
298
See Parry, supra note 82, at 851 (“The two principal opinions reject [the] twopart [Burger King] analysis that has been crumbling for years and perhaps
deserves demolition. . . . The justices may have torn down the two-part test, but
they left behind only the incomplete foundations of incompatible structures. . . .
Nor is there any obvious way to combine [the various J. McIntyre approaches] . . .
for compromise is inconsistent with the positions that Justice Kennedy and Justice
Ginsburg have marked out.”).
299
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850.
300
Id. at 2851–52.
301
Id. at 2850.
302
Id. at 2852.
303
Id.
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The Supreme Court, per Justice Ginsburg, unanimously reversed
in only the third general jurisdiction case that it ever decided. The
outcome was uncontroversial under existing precedent.304
(i)

Walden v. Fiore

During the 2013-2014 session, the Supreme Court returned to the
personal jurisdiction arena with two cases, Walden v. Fiore305 and
Daimler AG v. Bauman.306 Walden has the greater relevance for this
article.
Walden arose when a Covington, Georgia police officer, Walden,
who was deputized as a federal DEA agent, stopped two Nevada
residents at an Atlanta airport.307 Walden’s search uncovered a large
amount of cash, which he seized, believing that it represented the
proceeds of drug sales.308 The Nevada residents sued in federal
court in Nevada, claiming that this seizure violated the Fourth
Amendment.309 They argued that jurisdiction was proper in Nevada
because Walden knew that the plaintiffs were Nevada residents
when he seized the cash, thereby allowing Nevada jurisdiction under
Calder.310
The Supreme Court reversed. To do so it had to distinguish the
seemingly directly-on-point Calder decision, where the Court held
that Florida-based defendants could be subject to jurisdiction in
California when they intentionally defamed a California resident.311
The theory in Calder was that the defendants purposely directed
their activity toward that state when they wrote false things about
304

See Borchers, Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, supra note 246, at
1246 (“[Although it is not] nearly as bad as J. McIntyre . . . . [i]t remains to be
seen whether [Goodyear presents] a workable test . . . but at least it is a test, of
sorts, supported by a majority of the Court.”). See discussion infra Part II.B.3.j.
This description is included here for the sake of completeness because the article
ultimately takes the view that a proper personal jurisdiction jurisprudence will not
distinguish between general and specific jurisdiction.
305
134 S. Ct. 1115.
306
134 S. Ct. 746.
307
Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1119.
308
Id.
309
Id. at 1120.
310
Id. at 1124.
311
See Calder, 456 U.S. 783.
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one of its residents, thereby causing her to suffer harm there.
According to Justice Thomas’s majority opinion, in contrast, the
harm in Walden that the defendant allegedly caused the plaintiffs by
depriving them of their money while they were travelling to and
living in Nevada was only fortuitously connected with that state.312
This appears to be a distinction without a difference.
The fact that this case was brought in federal court on a federal
claim also demonstrates the major flaws in the minimum contacts
standard from both a due process/fairness standpoint, as well as in
terms of the reach of state power. Purely in terms of fairness,
wherever the suit was brought it would be within the same judicial
system—i.e., federal court—and decided under federal law. So, the
only relevant fairness or traditional due process issue would be
whether it would be unduly burdensome for Walden to have to
litigate in Nevada, a factor that the Court never considered.
Moreover, the federal system allows the transfer of cases to an
appropriate district for the purposes of convenience, efficiency, and
other relevant considerations, thereby allowing court flexibility to
ensure the best location for all concerned, a point emphasized in
Burger King.313
To be sure, even though the Supreme Court has consistently
discussed personal jurisdiction in terms of due process, it has always
considered state lines to have a special place in this analysis to one
degree or another. That is, the Court has gone to great lengths to
hold that somehow the relationship between the defendant and the
state is important in deciding whether due process will allow the
personal jurisdiction in a given forum—that somehow by requiring
the defendant to litigate in a state with which the defendant lacks
contacts thwarts meaningful rights irrespective of how easy or hard it
would be for the defendant to litigate there.314
This case shows that this focus on state lines is misguided, even
if one omits traditional due process analysis. Whether in Nevada or
in Florida, Walden would be litigating a federal law issue in federal
court. That those courts happen to be located in those states has
nothing to do with the source of those courts’ authority. Congress
312

See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123.
See discussion supra Part II.B.3.d; see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 486.
314
See Hanson, 357 U.S. 235; World-Wide, 444 U.S. 286.
313

2015

A 21ST CENTURY APPROACH TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION

127

could have authorized suit anywhere in the United States.315 That it
has not chosen to do so does not mean that this choice represents a
constitutional limitation. Specifically, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)
provides that in a suit in federal court personal jurisdiction exists so
long as the defendant would be subject to personal jurisdiction in the
courts of the state where the federal court is located.316 And the
Nevada long-arm statute allows jurisdiction to the extent allowed by
the United States Constitution.317
By circular reasoning, the Supreme Court has concluded that the
constitutional limit of the federal court is determined by Nevada
state lines because a federal rule instructs federal courts to limit their
personal jurisdictional reach—except as otherwise allowed by rule or
statue—to the reach of the courts of the state in which it sits.
Nevada’s long arm statute says that jurisdiction may be exercise to
the full extent allowed by the United States Constitution. The Court
concluded that a constitutional standard should be determined by
looking to a federal rule that looks to a state rule that itself then
looks to the Constitution. Even though it is hard to understand what
this approach actually means, it is easy to recognize that it is
illogical.
Not only does the Court’s analysis make no sense as a
constitutional (as opposed to a statutory) limit on federal court
power, but it also demonstrates the problem of applying state lines
and minimum contacts in any case in our federalist system, whether
in state or federal court. In a system where federal and state courts
often have concurrent jurisdiction, each mandated to apply
consistent substantive law,318 the limits on the sovereignty of either
court system being defined by state lines strains both logic and
reason.
315

See Andrews, supra note 16, at 1375 (“Since the early nineteenth century, the
Supreme Court has suggested that a different standard governs personal
jurisdiction in federal court than in state court, and that Congress may authorize
federal courts to serve process anywhere in the United States.” (citing Toland v.
Sprague, 37 U.S. 300, 328 (1838))).
316
It also authorizes jurisdiction as authorized by federal statute. No federal
statute governs a Bivens suit, the type of claim that the plaintiff brought in Walden.
317
See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121.
318
See Erie, 304 U.S. 64 (requiring federal courts in diversity to apply state
substantive laws in diversity cases).
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Daimler AG v. Bauman

Daimler AG v. Bauman319 presents facts sufficiently exotic that
only brief mention is necessary. Several Argentines brought suit in
federal court in California against the German-based automaker,
Daimler AG, seeking recovery under federal, state, and Argentine
law for the automaker’s Argentine subsidiary’s alleged support for
Argentina’s dirty war.320 The plaintiffs conceded that the suit did
not arise out of the defendant’s contacts with California, but argued
that general jurisdiction was valid based upon the extensive contacts
of the German automaker’s American subsidiary under an agency
theory.321 The Court, in an 8-0 opinion written by Justice Ginsburg,
found jurisdiction lacking, relying primarily on Goodyear.322
III. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE
Having discussed some of the shortcomings of personal
jurisdiction in the historical record above, this section organizes and
critiques those shortcomings in terms of several important criteria.
The shortcomings in the personal jurisdiction have both practical and
theoretical components. Although problems in either area alone
would be troublesome, that the Court’s approach fails on both
accounts truly justifies change. A doctrine that fails in practice and
also lacks a sound theoretical basis, has little to recommend it. This
section traces the practical and theoretical problems inherent in the
319

134 S. Ct. 746.
Id. at 751.
321
Id. at 752.
322
Justice Sotomayor concurred. In her view, the facts as accepted by the
Supreme Court were sufficient for the exercise of general jurisdiction in California
federal court. She chided the majority for not simply limiting itself to examining
the extent of contacts between defendant and the forum state, rather than
concluding that the defendant was not home in the forum because it had more
extensive contacts elsewhere. See id. at 763–73 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). She
makes a good point. If personal jurisdiction depends on forum contacts
sufficiently extensive that it is fair to require defendant to answer to suit there, that
the defendant has other, even more extensive contacts elsewhere, should not
change the calculus from either a sovereignty or due process perspective. Clearly,
the connection between personal jurisdiction doctrine, and policy and theory,
remains strained.
320
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Court’s due process and minimum contacts rooted approach to
personal jurisdiction.
A.

Practical Shortcomings
While often discussed in terms of deep theory and frequently the
subject of scholarship, personal jurisdiction doctrine also has
important consequences for litigants, and is not just the stuff of
abstract concern and meaningless tactical forays.323 The practical
flaws of personal jurisdiction doctrine can be separated into two
baskets. First, the outcomes of personal jurisdiction cases are often
troubling on several fronts. Second, the manner in which decisions
are reached is often wasteful of judicial and party resources and
time.324 I shall call these “outcome flaws” and “process flaws,”
respectively.
1. Outcome Flaws
The flaws in the outcome of personal jurisdiction disputes fit into
three categories. First, defendants are often able to duck jurisdiction
in states where they would face no unfairness to defend, even when
doing so works unfair advantage to the plaintiff, while raising
inconvenience and costs due to the location of witnesses and
evidence. Second, plaintiffs can hale defendants into particular fora
based upon arbitrary criteria, where the defendants may well suffer
inconvenience. Third, there are sets of cases where although it is not
323

See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 101 (“A suit at
law is not a children’s game, but a serious effort on the part of adult human beings
to administer justice.” (quoting United States v. A.H. Fischer Lumber Co., 162
F.2d 872, 873 (4th Cir. 1947))); Rex R. Persbacher, Fifty Years of International
Shoe: The Past and Future of Personal Jurisdiction, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 513,
521–11 (1995) (“[T]he effect of jurisdictional rules is not restricted to academic
debate; the rules appear to have real consequences, especially when a litigant is
standing at the courthouse door deciding whether to enter.”).
324
Other commentators have noted the fact that the practical problems with the
current personal jurisdiction approach that the Supreme Court employs creates
problems in terms of both outcomes and the time-consuming, and expensive
manner in which those outcomes are reached. For example, Borchers has referred
to these two types of problems as internal costs and external costs. See Borchers,
Jurisdictional Pragmatism, supra note 43, at 584–89.
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apparent that any single case was incorrectly decided in terms of the
interests that attend personal jurisdiction, taken collectively the
outcomes cannot be squared with each other.325 That is, if one or
some of the cases in this group is deemed to be correctly decided, the
outcomes of other cases cannot withstand logical and policy
scrutiny.326
The first set, those cases in which the unfairness and illogic of
defendants avoiding personal jurisdiction is most apparent in
Hanson, World-Wide, and J. McIntyre. Each of those cases denied
personal jurisdiction while conceding that the defendant would
suffer no hardship in being required to adjudicate in the forum in
question.327
The Hanson defendants were trustees of two Delaware trusts that
stood neither to lose nor gain any beneficial interest in property.328
The real dispute was between two sets of parties who themselves had
no objection to jurisdiction in the Florida forum.329 Moreover, there
would have been very little burden on two trust companies sending
representatives from Delaware to Florida.330 The outcome simply
cannot withstand practical scrutiny.331
World-Wide and J. McIntyre each involved suits brought by
injured plaintiffs in the place where they were injured and/or
lived.332 In the former, the plaintiffs had suffered serious injury, and
therefore would have been hard-pressed to travel elsewhere, at least
325

See McFarland, supra note 7, at 779 (“Not only has the Court over the past
half-century been unable to create a consistent, coherent law of personal
jurisdiction, but also it has issued some opinions that are flatly inconsistent with
others. . . . The situation is not . . . one of differing views of what the law should
be. The rub is that opinions appear to be inconsistent from inadvertence and
confusion, not crafty analysis and writing.”).
326
See, e.g., Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 102
(“Certainly, [the results of personal jurisdiction cases] are nothing that one would
seek to emulate if creating jurisdictional rules from scratch.”); see generally
Weintraub, supra note 98, at 531–32, 540–45.
327
See Weintraub, supra note 98, at 531–32 (“[D]eference to the convenience of
nonresident defendants has frustrated the reasonable interests of plaintiffs and their
home states.”).
328
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
329
See id.
330
See id.
331
See id. (discussing Hanson in more detail).
332
See discussion supra Part II.B.3.a; discussion supra Part II.B.2.g.
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at the time suit was filed.333 In J. McIntyre, the injured plaintiff
lived and was injured in New Jersey, where he sued.334
In both cases, much of the evidence, physical and witnesses,
were located in the forum state, meaning that the defendants would
have had to travel there to examine evidence and to take depositions,
no matter where the trial was held.335 The defendants themselves
certainly had the resources to litigate in these fora, demonstrated by
the fact that they each spent more time litigating the personal
jurisdiction issue in the objectionable forum than they would have
spent litigating the merits there.336 In neither case would litigation
elsewhere been easier for anyone.337 In World-Wide, two of the
defendants had dropped any opposition to litigation in Oklahoma,
and some of the parties would have had to travel to a state not their
own, no matter where the litigation was held.338 Therefore,
prohibiting jurisdiction in Oklahoma, where the evidence and
plaintiff was located, made no sense.339
In J. McIntyre, New Jersey made more sense than Ohio for
adjudication, where the defendant was almost surely subject to
jurisdiction under the Court’s approach.340 Neither party was located
in Ohio, and most of the evidence was probably in New Jersey.341
Moreover, even if the plaintiff could have traveled to the UK to
litigate, why would that make more sense than requiring the
defendant to come to New Jersey? As a logical and practical matter,
it is hard to defend prohibiting the case from going forward in the
plaintiff’s chosen forum of New Jersey. More generally, the current
minimum contacts approach, advertised as a means to protect a
defendant’s due process rights, often allows defendants to avoid
adjudication even in a forum where the defendant would suffer no
unfairness or inconvenience, while leaving only jurisdictions that
would be illogical and often unfair to others as possible fora. J.
333

See discussion supra Part II.B.3.a.
See discussion supra Part II.B.3.g.
335
See id.
336
See id.
337
See id.
338
See id.
339
See discussion supra Part II.B.3.a (discussing World-Wide in greater detail).
340
See discussion supra Part II.B.3.g.
341
New Jersey was actually was slightly closer to the defendant’s UK home than
Ohio.
334
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McIntyre, like World-Wide, provides an example of this type of
outcome in which real fairness and logic is sacrificed for illusory
fairness for the defendant. Perhaps, at least, J. McIntyre’s outcome
is sufficiently troublesome that it will increase the pressure on the
Court to reevaluate the minimum contacts approach to personal
jurisdiction.342
The second group of outcome problems involves cases where
defendants have had to defend in places where it is arguably
burdensome or unfair to require them to do so. The current regime
has been less problematic in terms of allowing jurisdiction where it
should not—i.e., this second group of cases—than it has in
excluding jurisdiction where it should allow jurisdiction. Even so,
some cases in this category bear mention. Most noteworthy is
Burger King.343 There, the individual defendant lacked any
meaningful connection with the forum state that was several
thousand miles away.344 Yet the Court found jurisdiction in that
case without truly analyzing whether the defendant would be
burdened by having to litigate in Florida, instead focusing on the
formality of the defendant’s contacts through the contract with a
Florida-based company.345
The third set of outcome flaws can be seen by comparing some
of the Court’s personal jurisdiction cases. Doing so, demonstrates
how illogical the results of the current approach are. First, consider

342

See Borchers, Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, supra note 246, at
1247 (“[J. McIntyre is] further, and unfortunate, evidence that the Court should
abandon the idea that the Constitution limits state-court jurisdiction, except in the
most extreme of circumstances in which the defendant’s opportunity to mount a
defense is realistically compromised.”). Some commentators had previously been
less than sanguine that the Court would engage in a major reworking of its focus
on contacts, which has proven true so far. See Linda J. Silberman, “Two Cheers”
for International Shoe (and None for Asahi): an Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary
of International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 755, 766 (1995) (“Obviously, the
Supreme Court is not going to unravel its long history of constitutional jurisdiction
jurisprudence. But some shift is possible.”); see also discussion supra Part
II.B.3.g (discussing J. McIntyre in greater detail).
343
Burger King, 471 U.S. 462; see also discussion supra Part II.B.3.d (further
discussing Burger King).
344
See generally Burger King, 471 U.S. 462.
345
See id.; see also discussion supra Part II.B.3.d.
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Mullane346 in contrast to Hanson.347 Both involved trusts. In the
former, because the trust was located in New York, the Court held
that the meaningful rights of beneficiaries throughout the United
States could be determined there even without those parties
consenting to that state’s jurisdiction.348 That outcome can probably
be defended. But then how can a Florida court be deprived of
jurisdiction to adjudicate the status of a trust whose settler lived and
died in Florida, and where all parties who stood to benefit or lose by
a Florida court’s ruling lived there, or were otherwise subject to
jurisdiction in Florida, merely because nominal parties had not
purposefully directed their activities toward the state, as the Supreme
Court held in Hanson?349 The cases cannot be reconciled.
Next compare Kulko350 and Burnham.351 Both involved East
Coast husbands being sued by their wives in California.352 Both
cases concerned domestic relation issues such as child support.353
Yet jurisdiction was found proper only in the latter case merely
because the defendant was handed papers while he happened to be
within California’s borders.354 How do the outcomes in these cases
comport with any sense of logic, fairness, or other practical concern?
Even in terms of sovereignty, it is hard to understand how California
could have sovereign authority over one defendant but not the other,
where the only difference between the two was where they were
handed process papers.355 These groups of cases should all come out
the same way, save if there was some showing of burden of fairness
that would compel a different result.
2. Process Flaws
346

339 U.S. 306; see also discussion supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Mullane in
greater detail).
347
357 U.S. 235; see also discussion supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Hanson in
greater detail).
348
See Mullane, 339 U.S. 306.
349
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
350
See discussion supra Part II.B.3.f (discussing Kulko in greater detail).
351
See discussion supra Part II.B.3.f (discussing Burnham in greater detail).
352
In Kulko, the spouses were already divorced, although that was immaterial to
the cases.
353
See generally Burnham, 495 U.S. 604; Kulko, 436 U.S. 84.
354
See discussion supra Part II.B.3 and Part II.B.3.f.
355
See discussion supra Part II.B.3.f.
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Beyond the ultimate dispositions in personal jurisdiction cases,
the inefficiency, cost,356 and unpredictability357 of how those
dispositions are reached also creates major problems. The Court’s
doctrines are overly complex.358 The Court has also often changed
course, making it difficult to predict how a given case will turn out if
it does reach the Supreme Court.359 Moreover, the fact that the
Court has been unable to muster a majority on major personal
jurisdiction cases, combined with the fact that its major opinions rest
on shifting justifications, makes it difficult for lower courts to
implement the doctrine.360 In addition, the Supreme Court’s
ungainly personal jurisdiction jurisprudence361 has resulted in case
outcomes turning upon minute factual differences as each new case
obscures rather than clarifies,362 and has also caused division among
356

See McFarland, supra note 7, at 795 n.181 (“The transaction costs of the
current minimum contacts/fair play test are high.”).
357
See Effron, supra note 247, at 868 (“The critiques leveled against the Supreme
Court’s jurisdictional jurisprudence are well-known: that the doctrine is fuzzy,
malleable, and highly case specific, and that the Court has been either unable or
unwilling to provide comprehensive and coherent legal and political theory
underlying the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants in a forum state.”).
358
See Weintraub, supra note 98, at 531 (“[T]he Supreme Court has added layer
upon layer of complexity to the due process test for personal jurisdiction.”).
359
See Wendy Collins Purdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32
B.C. L. REV. 529, 530 (1991) (“[E]very few years, the Court’s description of
personal jurisdiction is inconsistent with its recent prior precedent.”).
360
See Parry, supra note 82, at 828 (“[T]he Supreme Court allowed the law of
personal jurisdiction to fester as lower courts and commentators struggled to make
sense of cases such as Asahi [and] Burnham.”); id. at 852 (“Various majorities and
pluralities of the Court have advanced ever more complicated variations on the
theme of purposeful availment. . . . But the specific results of the search for clarity
and limits do not add up to a sensible doctrine.”); Weintraub, supra note 98, at 545
(“[T]he issue of the due process limits of state-court jurisdiction not only is one of
the most frequently litigated issues on the civil side of the docket, but also
repeated litigation of the same fact pattern does not increase predictability. Courts
cannot agree on how specific facts should influence the result.”).
361
See Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a
Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 189 (1998)
(“Ambiguity and incoherence have plagued the minimum contacts test.”).
362
See Parry, supra note 82, at 851–52 (“Tension may be inherent in personal
jurisdiction doctrine. But doctrinal tensions ought to grow out of the effort to
accommodate or balance interests that are actually present in specific cases.
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different lower federal and state courts, thereby adding to the
jumble.363
That personal jurisdiction should muck up litigation is
unfortunate. Personal jurisdiction should not be as important as it
has become.364 It does not involve inherently contentious issues,
like abortion, racial preferences, or the death penalty, matters about
which jurists and individuals in general have deeply held beliefs that
merit drawn out debate.365 Rather, personal jurisdiction generally
involves which courtroom within the United States a case is to be
tried in,366 which should be a relatively straightforward
determination given the philosophy the modern of American justice
system.367 Personal jurisdiction should be secondary to the main
event—substantively resolving the dispute—rather than a central
Current doctrine fails to meet this standard.”); Weintraub, supra note 98, at 558
(“[L]itigating the same situations over and over does not increase predictability.”).
363
See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction
Doctrine in a Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387, 411 (“Lower
courts have struggled in their attempt to apply the Supreme Court’s
pronouncements, especially to new forms of conducting business such as the
Internet.” (footnote omitted)).
364
See Weintraub, supra note 98, at 558 (“It is a disgrace that we have made what
should be a matter of interstate venue a constitutional issue and then have
micromanaged state-court jurisdiction to adjudicate so that this threshold issue is
one of the most litigated.”).
365
See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 102–03
(“Intense judicial supervision, complicated doctrine, and unpredictable results are
a necessary cost if the social consequences are extremely important. Personal
jurisdiction, however, is not one of those areas in the law in which the stakes are
so high.” (footnote omitted)).
366
True, technically a court in one state is part of a different sovereign than a court
in another state. Even so, the states are not completely independent sovereigns in
the sense that the United States and China are, procedures are generally uniform,
and courts are now adept at being able to determine the content of the law of
another jurisdiction. Travel across state lines requires no special effort. And, in
many cases, a single system, the federal system, is available to parties, so that
often one is not even talking about different sovereigns, but merely location.
367
See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and
Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 286, 288 (2013) (“When the Federal Rules were promulgated, in
1938, they embodied a justice-seeking ethos. As has been recognized repeatedly
by the Supreme Court, [the people who wrote them] believed in citizen access to
the courts and in the resolution of disputes on their merits, not by tricks or traps or
obfuscation.”).
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matter that wastes time and other valuable resources.368
Unfortunately, personal jurisdiction often relegates the underlying
litigation to the undercard.369
The process flaws can be grouped into two categories. First, the
unpredictability in personal jurisdiction doctrine create barriers to
parties’ ability to plan their affairs in general, and also after litigation
is contemplated, in terms of deciding where to sue, or whether they
have a sound personal jurisdiction defense. Second, the current
complexity invites tactical maneuvers, thereby draining resources
from the parties and courts, and allows cases to be decided based on
clever lawyering rather than merit.
As a result of the doctrinal disarray in personal jurisdiction
parties have difficulty planning their affairs prior to and at the outset
of litigation.370 The current complex standard makes it difficult for
parties who suspect a future suit to predict where they may be
subject to suit. When a dispute arises, the complexity of current
doctrine means that plaintiffs cannot be sure where they can bring a
suit, and defendants will not know whether they will have legitimate
jurisdictional arguments.

368

See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 102 (“Worse
than the strange results, however, is the lack of predictability and the resources
consumed litigating the most elementary of questions: Where can I file suit?”).
Between 1960 and 1983 that there were at least 3900 reported personal
jurisdiction cases in the United States, and presumably many more unreported
ones. See id. at 102–03.
369
See Weintraub, supra note 98, at 531 (“As a result [of the Court’s complex
minimum contacts jurisprudence], the threshold determination of personal
jurisdiction has become one of the most litigated issues in state and federal
courts.”).
370
See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1179 (1989) (“[A]nother obvious advantage of establishing as soon as
possible a clear, general principle of decision: predictability. Even in simpler
times uncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with the Rule of Law.”);
Weintraub, supra note 98, at 540 (“It is a commonplace that the results of [the
minimum contacts] analysis are fact driven; minor changes in circumstances can
change the result. That alone would make prediction in a particular case difficult,
but the task is even more formidable because courts cannot agree on which facts
matter. A court surveying decisions on a specific recurring jurisdictional issue is
likely to find ‘the case law in a muddle.’” (quoting Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v.
Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 208 (1st Cir. 1994) (footnote omitted)).
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Second, once a plaintiff decides to sue, the complexity of the
doctrine leads to prolix litigation. Cases often wind through several
levels of courts over the better part of a decade purely on the
jurisdictional issue. This may be the result of tactical attempts by
parties, but may happen even if both parties are simply pursuing
what they think is the proper jurisdictional approach.371 This postlitigation turmoil itself will absorb litigation and judicial resources,
and delay resolution of the merits.372
The waste of resources due to tactics and delay is nicely
demonstrated by both World-Wide and J. McIntyre, where
defendants objected to personal jurisdiction in states where it
probably would have been easier for them to litigate than where suit
would otherwise be brought.373 Moreover, these defendants spent
time and money litigating the personal jurisdiction issue through
multiple rounds in the very locations where they sought to avoid
litigation on the merits.374 These personal jurisdiction squabbles
371

See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 103 (“The real
social costs are a consequence of the convoluted doctrine that engenders expensive
litigation before the parties even get to the starting gate.”); cf. Parry, supra note
82, at 852 (“[M]any considerations play a role in [a plaintiff’s] choice of forum.
They range from such things as a simple desire to sue either in the plaintiff’s home
jurisdiction or where the harm took place, to obtain the benefit of favorable law,
all the way to the desire to burden or prejudice the defendant. Defendants
understandably seek to frustrate plaintiff’s choice and to substitute a more
favorable forum.”).
372
See Bruce Posnak, The Court Doesn’t Know Its Asahi from Its Wortman: A
Critical View of the Constitutional Constraints on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law,
41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 875, 896 (1990) (“[T]he trial of the jurisdictional issue
[will] often consume more time and resources than the trial on the merits.”).
373
To be fair, in World-Wide the plaintiff was also seeking a tactical advantage by
naming defendants who would destroy federal subject matter jurisdiction. See
Adams, supra note 58, at 1139 (“World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen were
merely “straw defendants” joined by the Robinsons’ attorney to prevent removal
from Creek County state court to the federal court in Tulsa.”).
374
In World-Wide, the personal jurisdictional issue was litigated through two
levels within Oklahoma in addition to the United States Supreme Court over a
three-year period. See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 288–91. In J. McIntyre, three
levels of courts in New Jersey—two of the courts twice—plus the U.S. Supreme
Court were involved in the personal jurisdiction dispute over an eight-year span.
See J McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2786 (plurality opinion). Regarding World-Wide,
Borchers commented on the harm that this delay caused: “It is bad enough to tell
the [plaintiffs in World-Wide] that their suit cannot be brought in the most logical
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drain attorney and judicial resources. They also delay adjudication
on the merits, which reduces the likelihood of the correct outcome,
as memories fade, witnesses die or otherwise become unavailable,
and evidence is lost. Moreover, the resources used to resolve these
personal jurisdiction matters are diverted from other cases in an
already overworked American judicial system. From a practical and
utilitarian standpoint, the Court’s current approach to personal
jurisdiction falls short in many ways.
B.

Doctrinal/Theoretical Shortcomings
Practical problems alone might not be a sufficient impetus for a
major doctrinal shift. Certain constitutionally compelled standards
may result in outcomes that are frustrating in particular cases.375 But
if those outcomes do not follow from sound constitutional theory,
and in fact are contrary to it there is reason to rethink the Court’s
current approach. Moreover, the utilitarian failures of personal
jurisdiction very much result from the theoretical flaws in the
Court’s approach,376 rather than merely being the detritus of a welland sensible forum; it is worse yet to tell them so only after three levels of
appellate review, with the result of flipping back and forth as each new court
reviews the case.” Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at
102; see id. at 96–97 (“Often, the asserted ‘inconvenience’ is a Trojan horse. . . .
[I]n World-Wide the real reason for the defense motion to dismiss the dealer and
the retailer was to create complete diversity.”).
375
For example, the broad protections that the First Amendment provides to
freedom of expression means that society often must tolerate speech that most
people would rather not hear. See, e.g., Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of
Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 204, 213 (1972) (“There are certain harms,
although they would not occur but for certain acts of expression, nonetheless
cannot be taken as part of a justification for legal restrictions on [such
expressions].”). The Fourth Amendment’s requirement that most searches be
supported by probable cause thwarts authorities in certain cases to the benefit of
those engaged in criminal wrongdoing. See e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,
328 (1987) (“[T]here is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution
sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us
all.”). Because these constitutional protections further larger goals, the tradeoffs
are accepted as the price of living in a representative democracy that takes rights
seriously.
376
See Effron, supra note 247, at 868–69 (“[The problems with the minimum
contacts approach] can be attributed to a lack of a coherent theory underlying the
exercise of personal jurisdiction at all.”).
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reasoned model. In short, having already argued that the minimum
contacts approach fails in practice, the article now posits that this
doctrine is also a theoretical failure.
The personal jurisdiction doctrine and its underlying theory has
many modes of expression. Cases mention nebulous concepts like
“substantial justice and fair play”377 and purposeful availment.378
They consider various factors like “the interstate judicial system’s
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies;
and the shared interest of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.”379 These factors might
defeat jurisdiction even if minimum contacts were satisfied, or,
conversely, might allow the exercise of jurisdiction on a lesser
showing of contact.380 In addition, the Court has mentioned
tradition,381 foreseeability,382 submission to the sovereign,383 and the
Due Process Clause serving as a vehicle of interstate federalism.384
The Court has thus applied a medley of terms and concepts to this
area of law.385 One might think that the inability to even identify the
Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine and its underlying theory(ies)
presents a considerable barrier to providing a meaningful critique.386
But once one plows through the thicket of formulae and metaphors,
377

See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
379
See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292.
380
See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477–78.
381
See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
382
See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297.
383
See J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion).
384
See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 294.
385
See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 78 (“The
Court has listed a huge number of factors in its modern jurisdictional cases, but
without ascribing any particular weight to any of the factors. . . . [As an example],
[i]n the space of twenty-nine years the Court has accepted, then rejected, then
accepted, then rejected, and then accepted the ‘federalism’ or ‘sovereignty’ factor
in the jurisdictional calculus.” (footnotes omitted)).
386
See Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism, supra note 43, at 583
(“Constitutionalized personal jurisdiction . . . is a doctrine created by implication
and accident, as opposed to, for instance, the Court’s deliberate effort to
constitutionalize defamation law. Lacking any clear foundation, the Court has
constantly reversed itself on such fundamental questions as whether personal
jurisdiction is a personal right or whether it implicates federalism and sovereignty
concerns.” (footnotes omitted)).
378

140

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 13, No. 2

the core of the problem in the Court’s approach can be easily
identified.
The above noted panoply is the symptom, not the root, of the
doctrinal wreck.
Terms like “purposeful availment” or
“foreseeability” are used in personal jurisdiction disputes to
concretize the nebulous minimum contacts standard within the due
process framework.
The problem however is not with the
implementation, but rather the underlying attempt to ground personal
jurisdiction in the Due Process Clause, and to then to use minimum
contacts to midwife the doctrine to the facts of particular cases.
The Court has linked personal jurisdiction, due process, and
minimum contacts for so long that it sounds correct to merge these
three concepts—although some commentators have challenged
this.387 But these concepts are incompatible. Specifically: 1) due
process does not make sense as the primary source of limitation on
the geographic reach of state courts; 2) even if due process were to
play that role, minimum contacts would not be the appropriate
vehicle for furthering due process goals; and 3) even if due process
is the wrong agent for defining personal jurisdiction limits,
minimum contacts would not be an appropriate standard for limiting
personal jurisdiction under any other theory either.
1. The (lack of) Connection Between Personal Jurisdiction and
Due Process
Due process is not entirely irrelevant to personal jurisdiction
matters. The problematic use of due process in personal jurisdiction
cases involves the use of that clause as the primary geographic
determinant of a state court’s personal jurisdiction reach, something
that the Court has taken for granted since at least the time of
Pennoyer.388
387

See, e.g., Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 20 (“For
over a century American procedural law has labored under the suggestion that the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the jurisdictional reach of
state courts. Although the Court, and most commentators, have not questioned the
correctness of this major premise, I believe it is time to re-examine seriously the
supposed fountainhead of our jurisdictional jurisprudence.” (footnote omitted)).
388
See id. at 100 (“Due Process has been an unwelcome stranger to personal
jurisdiction. The Court did not explain in Pennoyer why it was invoking due
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Apart from that above-noted incorrect use, however, the Due
Process Clause does have two less central roles in personal
jurisdiction doctrine. First, irrespective of the source of geographic
limitations on a court’s personal jurisdiction, a defendant can utilize
the Due Process Clause to challenge an adjudication made without
jurisdiction—what I will call the “facilitation role.” Second,
although not a primary definer of the geographic scope of personal
jurisdiction, in a particular case a defendant might be able to
demonstrate that adjudication in a particular forum is so burdensome
that to allow the case to go forward there would violate the
defendant’s due process rights—what I will call the “backstopping
role.”389 These themes will be developed in the proposal section of
this article.390
Two problems undermine due process as a primary limitation on
personal jurisdiction. First, examining due process doctrine as
developed and applied in circumstances other than personal
jurisdiction involving the deprivation of property demonstrates that
those standards do not justify general limitation on the geographic
scope of a State’s geographic reach. Second, the Due Process
Clause, like other constitutional provisions that protect individual
rights should operate as a basis for arguing that a particular practice
in a given case violates one’s rights under that provision, which is
how due process issues are generally evaluated. It is inappropriate to
use a rights-protecting provision as a starting point for affirmatively
crafting a set of procedures, which is exactly how the Supreme Court
has (mis)used the clause in developing and implementing the
process.”); Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 101, 101 (2010) (“[The Court has been unable] to enunciate a
coherent theory of precisely why the Due Process Clause imposes limitations on
the states’ exercises of personal jurisdiction.”).
389
See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 100 (“I am not
arguing that state long-arm statues should be insulated from constitutional
review[.] [But] [a]bsent such a bizarre statute, however, . . . long-arm jurisdiction
is not unconstitutional.”); cf. Parry, supra note 82, at 853–54 (“Under [traditional
procedural due process standards], a court should be able to exercise jurisdiction
over a defendant if (1) there is a legitimate or rational basis—such as a forum state
interest—for suing the defendant in the chosen forum, and (2) the course of
proceedings—including the burden of litigating in that forum—will be
fundamentally fair.” (footnote omitted)).
390
See discussion infra Part IV.
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minimum contacts test. These two defects are discussed in the next
two subsections.
(a)

Traditional Due Process Standards and the Lack of
Connection to General Geographic Limits on State
Adjudicatory Power

Due process falls into two categories, procedural and substantive.
Given that personal jurisdiction is essentially a procedural issue—
involving what rights a defendant has prior to adjudication of
property rights—substantive due process has no role in personal
jurisdiction, and the Court has not relied on it its minimum contacts
analysis. Therefore only a brief discussion of substantive due
process is in order here.
Substantive due process is not only oxymoronic,391 it is a
misnomer. The Court’s decisions in this area involve only substance
and not process. Specifically, the Court has prohibited both state
and federal government from implementing certain laws whose
substance it deems constitutionally problematic. Most of the limits
involve prohibiting the Court from infringing on certain fundamental
rights in a narrow set of circumstances.392 Other limits come into
play when a State seeks to enact a legislative provision that lacks any
rational basis.393 Private civil adjudication over property rights does
not implicate the narrow set of fundamental interests that the Court
has indicated are usually necessary before a substantive due process
argument will succeed. Moreover, none of the Court’s personal

391

See John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83
VA. L. REV. 493, 494 (1997) (“In fact, the whole idea that the Due Process Clauses
have anything to do with the substance of legislation, as opposed to the procedures
that are used by the government, is subject to the standard objection that because
‘process’ means procedure, substantive due process is not just an error but a
contradiction in terms.”).
392
See id. at 501 (“[Substantive Due Process prohibits] governmental actions that
impinge on interests the Court regards as fundamental.”).
393
See id. at 500–01 (“Substantive Due Process . . . requires that most
governmental actions bear a rational relationship to a permissible governmental
objective.”).
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jurisdiction cases have ever indicated that a State has no rational
basis for asserting jurisdiction over defendants sued in its courts.394
Procedural due process has a greater relationship to the private
civil adjudication of property rights than does substantive due
process. It requires that a person, including entities like corporations
and partnerships, be afforded sufficient protections before the
government deprives that person of property, as well as life or
liberty.395 Although personal jurisdiction generally arises in disputes
between private parties, meaning the government itself is not directly
depriving anyone of property, it is generally agreed that before a
civil judgment may be rendered against a party, that the party be
afforded the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause—
namely procedural due process.
Procedural due process is thus a protection that gives defendants
the fair opportunity to defend themselves in a suit that might dispose
of their property rights.396 Personal jurisdiction, in contrast, involves
the court’s authority over a particular defendant. To be sure, a
defendant’s due process rights would be violated by adjudication in a
Court which does not have authority to adjudicate that defendant’s
rights, as would adjudication by a court lacking subject matter
jurisdiction, even though subject matter jurisdiction itself is not a
function of fairness.397 But, whether it is fair to allow adjudication is
394

Cf. id. at 501 (“[The] rationality requirement is extremely lenient.”); Parry,
supra note 82, at 853 (“For substantive due process, the test is reasonableness—
that is, a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest—unless a fundamental
right is involved (and the Court has never indicated that personal jurisdiction
implicates a fundamental right.”). Perhaps in unusual circumstances an exercise of
jurisdiction could be so irrational that it would violate a defendant’s substantive
due process rights. Actually, tag jurisdiction seems the most likely candidate for
this.
395
See Craig W. Hillwig, Giving Property all the Process that’s Due: A
‘Fundamental’ Misunderstanding about Due Process, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 703,
707 (1992) (“The procedural component of the Due Process Clause guarantees that
the state shall not deprive a person of property without ‘constitutionally adequate’
process.” (footnote omitted)); Parry, supra note 82, at 853 (“For procedural due
process the basic test is fundamental fairness.”).
396
As civil adjudication disposes of property rights between two parties (or among
three or more parties in some cases), due process protections should also protect
plaintiffs.
397
See Hillwig, supra note 395, at 708 (“Once a court determines that an interest
constitutes property, the state may not deprive a person of the interest without
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generally a separate issue from whether a particular court has
authority in a particular case.
More specifically, due process guarantees that a defendant
receives a fair adjudication of his or her property rights. This
generally means that the defendant must be given notice and a
hearing,398 an adequate opportunity to present evidence, and an
opportunity to call and cross-examine witnesses.399 For example, a
person facing the loss of welfare benefits must be afforded “timely
and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination,
and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse
witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence

providing constitutionally adequate procedural safeguards to prevent erroneous
deprivations.”). Note, as discussed here, the disconnect between due process, a
protection of the defendant’s rights to fair adjudication, and personal jurisdiction;
the power of a court over the defendant is separate from the issue of whether an
adjudication lacking personal jurisdiction violates the defendant’s rights. It
certainly does under the facilitation role of due process. See discussion infra Part
IV. But to say that adjudication where the court lacks personal jurisdiction
violates due process is not incompatible with the argument that the Due Process
Clause should not be the primary source in determining whether personal
jurisdiction exists as an initial matter. By way of analogy, consider the following.
Adjudication by a court where the judge is not qualified to serve, either because
not properly appointed or elected to office, or because lacking the statutory
requirements to be a judge, would almost certainly violate the due process rights
of parties whose rights were adjudicated. But that would not mean that the Due
Process Clause should be the primary source to determine whether a particular
person was in fact qualified to be a judge in a particular court. In a sense, to say
that the Due Process Clause provides the source of a court’s jurisdictional power
would also be circular. A court’s adjudication without personal jurisdiction
deprives a defendant of due process. Thus, if due process were the source of
personal jurisdiction authority and a limit thereon, then in essence the personal
jurisdiction test would amount to saying that if the Due Process Clause does not
allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction in a particular case, then the exercise of
jurisdiction in that case would deprive the defendant of due process.
398
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (“The fundamental requisite
of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” (quoting Grannis v. Ordean,
234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914))); see also Hillwig, supra note 395, at 708 (“The
Supreme Court has usually held that due process requires the state to afford predeprivation process in the form of some notice and opportunity to be heard.”).
399
See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267 (“The hearing must be ‘at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner.’” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965)).

2015

A 21ST CENTURY APPROACH TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION

145

orally.”400 The purpose for these protections is to minimize the risk
that a party will be deprived of property incorrectly in the sense that
the facts or law do not support deprivation.
In terms of the location of the forum, unless the location of a
particular court is so distant that it would interfere with this right—
which concern is addressed by the backstopping role for due process
in the proposed model401—where an adjudication takes place does
not generally implicate due process concerns, whereas personal
jurisdiction is entirely about the location of an adjudication. Thus,
the two concepts—personal jurisdiction and due process—involve
two separate concerns, rather than being separate flavors of the same
concept, which is how the Supreme Court has treated them.402 That
very treatment is central to the ills of personal jurisdiction doctrine.
Two other aspects of due process demonstrate that attempts to
make it the center of personal jurisdiction law are quixotic. First,
personal jurisdiction in the United States predated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by almost a century. Even the
underlying personal jurisdiction dispute in Pennoyer itself predated
the effective date of that provision.403 Neither Pennoyer itself nor
subsequent cases have argued that personal jurisdiction limits only
came into play with the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Indeed, since that enactment, personal jurisdiction authority has
generally expanded. Therefore, although the Court has argued
otherwise, strictures on the scope of geographic adjudicatory
authority must spring primarily from a source other than the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, civil adjudication involves determining property rights
between plaintiff and defendant.404 If due process prohibits a
defendant from having to have his or her rights adjudicated in a
400

Id. at 267–68.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
402
See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 78 (“The
suggestion in Pennoyer that due process has anything to do with the territorial
reach of the state courts was ill-considered.”).
403
See Kogan, supra note 19, at 302 (“In [Pennoyer] Justice Field invoked the
fourteenth amendment due process clause, not in effect at the time of the events in
issue in the lawsuit.”).
404
This is not to say that allowing a court to unfairly decide a case between two
parties would not implicate due process merely because the state itself is not going
to obtain the property.
401
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particular forum because of the defendant’s lack of relationship with
the forum, then logic would dictate that plaintiffs would be denied
due process if they had to have the case adjudicated in a forum with
which they had no connection. Of course, the Court has not held,
nor has anyone seriously argued, that a plaintiff’s due process rights
are violated when a plaintiff must go elsewhere to adjudicate against
the defendant. Due process requires fairness of adjudication, not
adjudication in a particular location.
(b)

The Due Process Clause Protects Rights and
Therefore is Appropriately Raised as a Defense and
Should not Serve as a Starting Point for Formulating
a Particular Procedure

Another flaw in the Court’s personal jurisdiction with due
process approach arises from the fact that the Due Process Clause is
not a source of authority that a proponent of a practice need satisfy.
Rather, it is a protection that a party claiming a property deprivation
would cite to argue that a particular procedure employed in a
particular matter violated his rights. Put differently, the odd, but
often unnoticed, aspect of the Court’s modern-day due process
jurisprudence is that in each case the court starts with the Due
Process Clause to construct a rigid and specific test to determine
whether personal jurisdiction is present rather than simply consulting
typical due process standards to evaluate a given exercise of personal
jurisdiction.405
The Court’s approach to due process in this way is backwards.
A provision that protects one’s rights against the government cannot
be the source for the government to exercise authority. No one
would claim that the First Amendment gives the government the
authority to enact a particular provision that may or may not hamper
protected speech. The authority must come from elsewhere, with the
constitutional amendment limiting that authority. So too the
authority of a state court to adjudicate the rights of a defendant must
derive from some fount other than the Due Process Clause.

405

See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 101 (“The due
process clause does not give the Court the final word on personal jurisdiction.”).
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Certainly, as discussed in Section IV below, the exercise of
personal jurisdiction in a given case may violate the rights of a
defendant because the defendant may not be able to adequately
defend in a particular forum—i.e., the backstopping function of the
Due Process Clause as applied to personal jurisdiction. This is
analogous to how due process protects defendants against unfair
procedures in other circumstance, yet does not itself serve as the
source of authority, or the starting point, for crafting a particular
procedure. That approach is correct and should be used in
evaluating whether a given exercise of personal jurisdiction violates
the Due Process Clause.
An example will help sharpen the above point. In a civil matter,
a defendant might argue that his due process rights were violated
because he was not informed about a key witness for the plaintiff
until that witness was called to testify: so too with personal
jurisdiction. In a given case a defendant might argue that the
location of the court in which the plaintiff sued was so distant and
hard for the defendant to litigate in that to allow the suit to proceed
there would violate the defendant’s due process rights.406 But as
things now stand in personal jurisdiction disputes, the Court has
made due process the starting point and a very specific standard for
evaluating personal jurisdiction emerges.
In the witness example above, using the Court’s current approach
to due process in the personal jurisdiction doctrine would be akin to
saying that the Due Process Clause requires anyone calling a witness
to satisfy a very specific standard in terms of notice. By extension,
this would be the same for every other procedural matter if the
personal jurisdiction approach were followed. Of course, this is not
how courts proceed in civil adjudication. Nor could they. If every
procedural issue were subject to the lengthy crimped screening
standard as personal jurisdiction issues are, cases would take decades
to conclude. Just by itself, personal jurisdiction stretches out
litigations.407 Due process thus has a role in personal jurisdiction,
but that role is more limited and qualitatively different than the one
that the Court has been assigning it for the last seventy years.
406

See discussion infra Part IV (addressing this role of due process in the personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence).
407
See discussion infra Part IV (discussing this shortcoming).

148

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 13, No. 2

2. Minimum Contacts Do Not Follow from Due Process
Just as the generally unquestioned connection between due
process and personal jurisdiction fails to withstand close
examination, so too does the connection between due process and
minimum contacts, which courts and commentators often
uncritically accept as correct.408 Thus, even if this article were
incorrect in the argument just made that due process should not play
a central role in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence; minimum
contacts would nonetheless not the proper test for effecting due
process goals.409
The prior subsection already discussed that due process is
generally about ensuring that a party receive fair procedures before
being deprived of property. But a lack of minimum contacts does
not necessarily deny this protection to a defendant this, just as the
presence of those contacts would not ensure fairness of
adjudication.410 In some cases, to be sure, minimum contacts will
correlate with convenience or fairness, because the location of the
forum vis-à-vis the defendant may make it burdensome for the
defendant to litigate there.411 Perhaps that is what International
408

This section discussion necessarily accepts arguendo that due process provides
content to the personal jurisdiction standard even though the article has just
rejected that connection. See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process
Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 89 (1980) (“By
prohibiting unreasonable deprivations [of property] and requiring a justification
for state imposition of legal burdens, the Due Process Clause seems to require that
the person who would suffer the deprivation have some contact with the State by
which he has subjected himself to its power.” (emphasis added)).
409
See Harold L. Korn, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in
Multistate Mass Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2183, 2183–84 (1997) (“[T]he
Supreme Court must with all deliberate speed disavow the doctrine that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or anything else in the United
States Constitution, requires a territorial nexus between forum and defendant as a
sine qua non for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction.”).
410
See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 90 (“[T]he
Court has reviewed most assertions of state authority deferentially . . . . The
minimum contacts test, however, developed independently, and has turned out to
be a far more searching inquiry.”).
411
See id. at 99 (“Perhaps there are some cases in which a defendant is put to the
test of defending or defaulting, and it is economically rational for the defendant to
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Shoe was aiming at in linking minimum contacts with substantial
justice and fair play. And some court members have attempted to
interpret International Shoe in a way that focused on fairness and
burden on the defendant rather than on minimum contacts as an end
in itself.412 This approach, however, has been a losing argument in
the Court since the Hanson decision in 1958. Instead, from the late
1950s through the present term, the Court has been treating
jurisdiction as if it involved subjecting the defendant to State
regulation of the defendant’s behavior—i.e., almost as though the
issue were the choice to allow the application of the forum state’s
law—something that would seem to require a meaningful
relationship between defendant and the state.413
Moreover, even though the minimum contacts test would be less
problematic if used as a proxy for burden and fairness, it would at
best be an approximation.414 The contacts that the courts look to are
those between the defendant and the forum state prior to and during
the dispute, rather than the physical relationship between the
defendant and the state at the time of the suit.415 In addition, the
make a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. . . . [But] if there are
such cases, they are few and far between.”).
412
See, e.g., Hanson, 357 U.S. at 258–59 (Black, J., dissenting); World-Wide, 444
U.S. at 299–300 (Brennan, J., dissenting); discussion supra Parts II.B.2 and
II.B.3.a.
413
See Weintraub, supra note 98, at 536 (“Hanson also proclaimed a proposition
that defied common sense—that a contact with a state sufficient to make it
reasonable for that state to apply its laws to the defendant was not necessarily
sufficient to permit exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. In future
decisions, repetition of this concept invariably signaled the least cogent passage in
the opinion.” (footnote omitted)).
414
See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 94–95 (“The
Court has suggested, [and several academics] have advanced with some force, the
right to have access to process as a rationale for using the due process clause to
analyze jurisdiction. . . . All of those proposals are much more palatable
alternatives than the Court’s approach of the last several years. Certainly the
formula resulting from such an approach would have no resemblance to ‘minimum
contacts.’ Even this clipped back and more sensible role for due process,
however, does not justify a constitutional law of personal jurisdiction.” (footnote
omitted)).
415
Of course if the defendant has actually moved to or is present in the state when
suit is commenced, that would be sufficient for jurisdiction under Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), and Burnham. But a defendant who had little contact
with the suit at the time of the events leading to litigation, who thereafter increased
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minimum contacts analysis focuses purely on state lines, rather than
geographic proximity or other factors that correlate with the fairness
of requiring the defendant to litigate in a particular state.416 A
defendant may live just over the line outside of the state where he or
she is sued, and yet have no contacts with the state that would satisfy
due process. Another defendant may live in one corner of a large
state, and yet the Court’s minimum contacts test would afford no
protection against a suit brought over 1,000 miles away, at the other
edge of the state.417 For this reason, to the extent that a particular
adjudication would be unfair or burdensome, the due process issue
should be evaluated with an eye towards those factors themselves,
rather than through an intermediary concept like minimum contacts,
which is not only vague, but also necessarily over-inclusive in some
cases and under-inclusive in others.418

its contacts, would not thereby be subject to jurisdiction in the forum absent
contacts sufficient to create the rarely invoked doctrine of general jurisdiction. See
discussion supra Part II.A.
416
See Juenger, supra note 80, at 1029 (“[Pennoyer] lump[ed] together the two
disparate ideas of sovereignty and fairness, but ever since the two have coexisted
uneasily in the realm of jurisdiction.”).
417
Consider states like California, Texas, Florida, Montana, Alaska, and even New
York, where parts of those States are quite distant from other parts. A defendant
living near one border of the State might find it quite easy if sued just over the
border in the next State—say a defendant living on the California side of the
California/Oregon border sued in southern Oregon. Yet, if sued at the far end of
the defendant’s own state, the defendant might be quite burdened—and it might be
unfair—to require that defendant to defend in that distant courthouse. Although
State venue rules might limit this, to the extent that they did not, the Supreme
Court’s strange interpretation of due process with a focus on state boundaries
would provide no relief. See Parry, supra note 82, at 855 (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction
is not a constitutional issue when the defendant is a resident of the forum, no
matter how inconvenient the specific in-state venue may be. Personal jurisdiction
is a due process issue only when a person is required to litigate in the courts of a
state with which he or she claims to have no meaningful connection.”).
418
In cases like Hanson, World-Wide, and Nicastro, where minimum contacts
were in fact lacking, adjudication was almost certainly less burdensome (and no
more unfair) for the defendants than in cases like Burger King and Calder, where
contacts were established. This probably explains why these cases have lead to
such a great divide on the Court. See discussion supra Part II. Minimum contacts
is clearly the test, but it also is supposedly driven by due process concerns. In
these cases, like many others, the two concepts do not line up.

2015

A 21ST CENTURY APPROACH TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION

151

The poor match between contacts and fairness/burden may
explain why many of the Court’s opinions have relied on minimum
contacts for some purposes other than fairness. Moreover, the lack
of fit is the best explanation for the Court’s making the odd
assertions that due process is the sole limit on the exercise of
personal jurisdiction, while simultaneously maintaining that personal
jurisdiction requires contacts even if fairness considerations
counseled in favor of finding jurisdiction.419
The inadequacy of the minimum contacts test as an agent of due
process comes into sharper focus by looking at the manner in which
it arrived in the personal jurisdiction lexicon in the first place.
International Shoe promulgated minimum contacts as the personal
jurisdiction touchstone without giving a reason that that particular
language or test made more sense than another standard, like strong
contacts, presence, slightest contacts, reasonable contacts, etc. In
asserting that the permissibility of jurisdiction over a particular
defendant depended upon sufficient minimum contacts that did not
offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,”
International Shoe cited Miliken.420 But Milliken itself, a case
involving jurisdiction over a resident of a state, did not refer to
minimum contacts. Instead, it discussed the due process concepts of
fair play and substantial justice in connection with the issue of
whether the form of service of process gave the defendant notice of
suit and an adequate opportunity to be heard,421 criteria that are
central to traditional due process analysis.422 That International
Shoe substituted minimum contacts for notice of suit and an
opportunity to be heard indicates that it stretched due process beyond
419

See discussion supra Part II.B.3.g (discussing J. McIntyre).
See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (“[I]n order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of suit does not
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” (quoting Milliken,
311 U.S. at 463)).
421
See Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463 (“Its adequacy so far as due process is concerned
is dependent on whether or not the form of substituted service provided for such
cases and employed is reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the
proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. If it is, the traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice implicit in due process are satisfied.” (citation
omitted)).
422
See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
420
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its logical and theoretical boundaries, or that it was primarily
concerned with true due process concerns, and used minimum
contacts only casually to indicate that idea. Whatever International
Shoe intended, ever since Hanson the Court has relied upon
minimum contacts as an end in themselves, and has not decided
personal jurisdiction disputes primarily with an eye toward fairness.
In addition, the Court turned to minimum contacts in
International Shoe based on a series of cases decided in the decades
prior to International Shoe that essentially reached outcomes that
could be explained by minimum contacts even though they used
legal fictions like consent and presence to justify their results rather
than that actual language.423 Believing the outcomes of those cases
correct and that personal jurisdiction over International Shoe should
be found, but unsatisfied with the legal fictions as a rationale, the
International Shoe Court groped for an alternative legal theory and
settled on the minimum contacts language used in a different context
in Milliken.
International Shoe’s logic was thus: Pennoyer required presence
or consent; these other cases conclude that defendants were present
or had consented but in reality that was incorrect because the
defendants were not actually present and did not consent; we believe
that the outcomes are correct but that the reasoning is wrong; the
only other way to justify those outcomes then is that those
defendants had minimum contacts; ergo, minimum contacts will
replace the legal fictions of presence and consent for out-of-state
defendants.
This logic brings to mind the statement: “This isn’t right! This
isn’t even wrong.”424 The reasoning that inheres in the Court’s
position is that prior case outcomes cannot be squared with the
reasoning in those cases or the underlying doctrine—elucidated in
Pennoyer—that those cases purport to rely on; therefore the Court
will adopt a standard that explains those outcomes. The Court
apparently reasoned in International Shoe that even if the tests relied
upon in those cases are wrong, the case outcomes must be right
under some standard, even though they were not decided under a
423

See discussion supra Part II.A.
STEVEN GEORGE KRANTZ, MATHEMATICAL APOCRYPHA REDUX: MORE
STORIES AND ANECDOTES OF MATHEMATICIANS AND THE MATHEMATICAL 194
(2005) (attributing the statement to physicist Wolfgang Pauli).
424
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standard that the Court was now endorsing. The problem is that if
some or all of those outcomes are wrong, then a standard that
justifies all of them as though they were all correct is bound to be
flawed. Moreover, even if all of those cases were correctly decided,
the fact that the standard explains them does not necessarily mean it
will be a sound approach to future cases. For this reason, not
surprisingly, the Court has continued make various revisions to the
minimum contacts test in an attempt to make it work upon the facts
of each particular case. This continued attempt to force minimum
contacts to work has made personal jurisdiction doctrine difficult to
apply.
3. Beyond Due Process, No Other Theory or Rational Supports
Minimum Contacts as a Component of Personal Jurisdiction
Jurisprudence
As noted, since International Shoe, the Court has united three
concepts: 1) personal jurisdiction; 2) due process; and 3) minimum
contacts. It has already been argued—hopefully persuasively—that
the links between personal jurisdiction and due process, and between
due process and minimum contacts are weak and illogical.425 Even
so, perhaps the appropriate test of personal jurisdiction remains
minimum contacts.
Perhaps the primary error involved the
introduction of due process into the mix, and if that idea were
dismissed then minimum contacts would make sense as an
appropriate test under a different theory for defining the scope of
personal jurisdiction.
The Court itself assumed this posture in World-Wide where it
said that minimum contacts do not only protect the defendant’s
liberty interest, but also further goals of state sovereignty and
interstate federalism.426 Of course, it had to retreat from that
position two years later in Insurance Corp. by indicating that due
process was the only limit on personal jurisdiction.427 Justice
Powell’s separate opinion in that case argued that the Court was
mistaken in its decision to put all its personal jurisdiction eggs in the
425

See discussion supra Parts III.B.1 and III.B.2.
See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292; discussion supra Part II.B.3.a.
427
Insurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 703 n.10; discussion supra Part II.B.3.b.
426
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due process basket, maintaining that important sovereignty interests
beyond due process were furthered by the minimum contacts test.428
He was saying that minimum contacts were important, and that they
did flow from something other than due process. Minimum contacts
do not make any sense as a central component of personal
jurisdiction based on any theory.
Justice Powell was correct that at times the Court has suggested
that interstate federalism and/or sovereignty puts limits on a court’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction and requires minimum contacts.429
Even the Court’s current approach—at least the current plurality
approach as articulated in J. McIntyre—which emphasizes due
process as the sole source of limitation, has spoken in terms of state
power and the defendant’s submission to sovereign authority.430
Some commentators are sympathetic to this view.431 The Court now
428

See Insurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 709–716 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
Powell predicted that this change in direction would signal the end of contacts,
which the Court had previously indicated in both Hanson and World-Wide was
inappropriate. Powell was incorrect. The Court has continued to hold on to the
centrality of contacts while simultaneously maintaining that this is purely a matter
of due process. The incompatibility of due process and minimum contacts is most
pronounced in Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in J. McIntyre. See discussion
supra Part II.B.3.g.
429
See Weintraub, supra note 98, at 536 (“The United States Supreme Court has
alternately embraced and rejected [the] notion that states’ rights play a significant
role in interstate jurisdiction to adjudicate.”).
430
J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2789.
431
See Freer, supra note 32, at 580 (“The liberty interest is more than a right to be
free from litigation in an onerous venue. . . . [I]t is the right to be free from the
imposition of authority by a sovereign with which the defendant lacks sufficient
ties. Limitations on personal jurisdiction reflect not a matter of transgressing other
states’ authority, but of political legitimacy.” (footnote omitted)); Parry, supra
note 82, at 854–55 (“[The] divergence of result[s] between standard due process
analysis and the actual outcomes of Supreme Court personal jurisdiction cases
leads to three possible conclusions: (1) personal jurisdiction doctrine requires
radical change that would remove most obstacles to state court jurisdiction over
out-of-state defendants; (2) due process has additional content in personal
jurisdiction cases that generates further restrictions on personal jurisdiction; or (3)
some other constitutional principle is also at work. Although I sympathize with
the first option, I suspect that the third is most likely to be correct. Something else
in the Constitution, other than due process, provides a basis for further restrictions
on personal jurisdiction. The most obvious principle is federalism.”); id. at 855–
56 (“The question is whether the consequences of crossing state borders are
sufficiently important to require additional federalism safeguards. The Supreme
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may be simply hanging onto the language of due process, while
actually implementing a sovereignty-based standard that would
otherwise make sense if due process were abandoned as a central
component of personal jurisdiction. In addition to sovereignty and
federalism, some have treated the exercise of jurisdiction as akin to
the State’s regulating a defendant’s behavior, something that would
understandably require some connection between the defendant and
the forum.
Minimum contacts, however, does not withstand scrutiny as a
agent of sovereignty, interstate federalism, or any other apparent
theory, even if due process is put to one side, something that a few
commentators have recognized.432 Prior to International Shoe, the
Court’s continued search for restrictions that go beyond those of minimal due
process indicates a collective judgment that more is necessary.”).
432
See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 58 (“I am . . .
more concerned with the fundamental question of why the Court employs the
minimum contacts test, or any test for that matter, to limit state court jurisdiction,
and less concerned with the nuances of that test.”); Koppel, supra note 17, at 949
(“Several writers have counseled [for] . . . the elimination of sovereignty and state
lines from the due process analysis or the removal of due process from ‘the
equation’ altogether.”) (footnote omitted); cf. Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders:
On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational Law, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 65, 90
(1996) (“Borders are no longer as significant as they once were. From the
economic standpoint at least, they are hardly impenetrable frontiers, but rather
flimsy and insubstantial curtains of gauze, through which goods, ideas, and people
flow rather easily.”); Judith Resnick, Afterword, Federalism’s Options, 14 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 465, 492–93 (1996) (“Given cyberspace and globalization, the
coherence of physicality as the basis of jurisdiction diminishes, with variation
depending on the context.”). Some have tried to see minimum contacts as
protecting the individual’s due process rights through its allocation of adjudicatory
authority into separate States. See Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and
Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 689,
711 (1987) (“The federalism-individual rights debate thus poses a false dichotomy.
Due process protects the sovereign interests of other states, but only incidentally,
through its protection of the individual from illegitimate assertions of state
authority. Legitimacy, though, is defined by reference to the state’s allocated
authority within the federal system.”). Many commentators, moreover, believe
that the minimum contacts test is workable, and simply needs to be reworked. See,
e.g., John B. Oakley, The Pitfalls of “Hint and Run” History: A Critique of
Professor Borchers’s “Limited View” of Pennoyer v. Neff, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
591, 752 (arguing for “a reformulation of the ‘minimum contacts’ theory in which
the concept of purposefulness is more carefully defined as the criterion for what
‘contacts’ count, and in which the intertwined concepts of the magnitude of the
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Court’s standard for personal jurisdiction was presence within the
state, even if courts resorted to fictions to find that a defendant was
present where realistically speaking the defendant was not.433 That
standard stood up to logic if a court literally could not exercise
power over those outside of its territories. If adjudication required
the ability of the rendering court itself to enforce its judgment with
no help from the Full Faith and Credit Clause or statute, then
understandably there would be a problem if the defendant were
located elsewhere.
Once one accepts that state courts have jurisdiction over some
defendants found outside of their state lines—which one must in a
country structured as the United States is and which the minimum
contacts tests clearly does—then sovereignty falls away as a possible
basis for limits on personal jurisdiction. To the extent that there are
sovereign limits on state power, those end at the state border. The
state logically cannot have sovereign authority over those outside the
border, whether those persons have contacts with the state or not. So
if personal jurisdiction were a matter of sovereignty, then minimum
contacts could not represent the appropriate test.434 That is why
between truly sovereign nations, jurisdiction over those outside a
country can only be exercised by way of comity or agreement. The
current approach at least since International Shoe, and in some cases
before then, has conceded that states have some authority to
adjudicate rights of those beyond their borders, ergo sovereignty
cannot be the source of a limit on personal jurisdiction reach or the
basis of the minimum contacts test.

contacts and their relationship to the claim in issue are more carefully defined as
criteria for whether the cognizable contacts meet the required ‘minimum’”).
433
See generally Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714; discussion supra Part II.A.
434
See Parry, supra note 82, at 852 (“Unless one is simply convinced that the
Constitution requires a particularly strict approach to jurisdiction—something
along the lines of Pennoyer v. Neff’s focus on territory, property, and domicile—it
is difficult to see why courts should do very much to limit personal jurisdiction.”);
cf. Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism, supra note 43, at 581 (“All of the
preoccupation with minimum contacts might just as well be preoccupation with
implied consent, because there is little practical difference between the two.”).
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Interstate federalism has been used to express a slightly different,
but related, basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.435 This
term is actually a misnomer since federalism concerns relations
between federal and state government. Essentially, what is meant
here is the relationship between states within a federalist system.
Posed this way, the issue is not so much that states are exercising
sovereign authority without their borders to the detriment of those
upon whom it is exercised. Rather, some have argued that the
overbroad extension of one state’s personal jurisdiction reach, would
upset the balance of authority among states in the American
constitutional federation.436
This formulation, too, falls apart upon closer scrutiny. The
forum state is adjudicating the rights of two private parties.437 By so
doing, it is not acting upon another state, but only upon someone
who is present within that state. Enforcement would either take
place within the adjudicating state, assuming that the defendant had
assets therein, or only with the cooperation of a state where the
defendant had assets, probably through the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Thus, the adjudicating state would in no way be taking any
action against, within, or affecting the sovereignty of any other
state.438
Sovereignty and interstate federalism also cannot support the
minimum contacts test for another reason: a defendant may waive or
435

See Koppel, supra note 17, at 910–11 (“More generally, the debate continues
over the relevance of state lines—the concrete manifestation of interstate
federalism—in state-court jurisprudence.”).
436
See Kogan, supra note 21, at 262–63 (“The existence of boundary lines
between states is a fact of our constitutional life. A central issue of federalism is
the significance of these boundaries. Personal jurisdiction doctrine addresses this
issue with respect to one feature of our federalist nation, the existence of separate
court systems in each of the fifty boundaried areas. It attempts to justify the
constitutional limits placed on the adjudicatory authority of each of these court
systems over nonresidents. In performing this seemingly narrow task, however,
the doctrine necessarily implicates a vision of the nature of American federalism.”
(footnote omitted)).
437
See Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism, supra note 43, at 582 (explaining that
personal jurisdiction is almost completely procedural, and it allocates business
between courts rather than involving primary rights and liabilities).
438
Indeed, it would be surprising if a state were deemed to have standing to object
to another state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over one of its residents.
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even forfeit its personal jurisdiction argument.439 Therefore, if
minimum contacts devolved from sovereignty or interstate
federalism, then the power of individuals and private companies to
forfeit, waive, or otherwise affect the sovereign rights of the states
where they were located, would clearly be incompatible with the
notion of sovereignty. Not surprisingly, it was when the Court had
to confront this contradiction that it abandoned the posture that the
minimum contacts test protected sovereign interests themselves
rather than merely the rights of the defendants.440
Another aspect of the federalist system that counsels against
minimum contacts as a function of sovereignty or minimum contacts
is that federal courts retain parallel diversity jurisdiction in many
cases arising under state law. Those cases could be brought in, or
removed to, federal court in the state where jurisdiction is objected
to.441 Most of these cases are decided using the same minimum
contacts test applied in state court, but only as a matter of federal
rule.442 Courts and commentators generally agree that Congress
could extend the personal jurisdiction of a federal court throughout
the entire country, and does not, in fact, have to organize federal
courts by state.443 If Congress did that, then state lines and
minimum contacts would only matter for cases brought in state
court. Since the same dispute between the same parties would be
decided under the same substantive law444 whether in state court, or
in a federal court located nearby—often across the street—then the
439

See Insurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 703 n.10.
See discussion supra Part II.B.3.b (discussing Insurance Corp).
441
Several of the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction cases were brought in
federal court under diversity jurisdiction, and one, Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1115, was
there based upon federal jurisdiction.
442
See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. 462; Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1115.
443
See U.S. v. Union P. R. Co., 98 U.S. 569 (1978) (suggesting that Congress has
the power to create a single federal trial court with nationwide personal
jurisdiction); Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(“[Because] due process requires only certain minimum contacts between the
defendant and the sovereign that has created the court. . . . suits against residents
of the United States in the courts of the Untied States [presents] [n]o due process
problem.”); Andrews, supra note 16, at 1375 (same).
444
Erie, 340 U.S. 64; Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)
(requiring federal courts sitting in diversity to follow the choice of law rules of the
state in which they are located). A case like Walden would be decided under the
same federal law whether in state court or federal court.
440
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relevance of state lines and minimum contacts therewith seems
illogical as a sovereignty-based criteria for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction.445
Yet another way that minimum contacts is defended is by means
of argument presenting a state’s adjudicatory authority as similar to
its power to regulate with regard to particular parties. There is some
surface appeal to this approach. After all, it would not only be odd,
but probably unconstitutional, for a state to create substantive
standards that would apply outside its boundaries.446 But as already
noted, the exercise of personal jurisdiction involves arbitrating
property rights between private individuals, rather than the state
regulating or sanctioning the defendant, or the plaintiff for that
matter.447 The application of state substantive law to the dispute
would involve some measure of after-the-fact regulation, and should
require some connection to a party who would be subject to it.448

445

Surely the United States remains sovereign throughout the country while states
do not. But ultimately the court, whether federal or state, is not acting outside the
boundaries of a state by engaging in an adjudication. Moreover, that the current
approach limits federal personal jurisdiction, in almost all cases, to the same extent
as state jurisdiction, sovereignty cannot be the driving force because the
sovereignty of the federal government obviously extends even to those outside the
forum state who lack minimum contacts therewith.
446
For example, the state of New York could not pass legislation requiring people
in New Jersey to drive a particular speed limit; Florida could not regulate
pharmacies located in Minnesota; and California could not promulgate fishing
license regulations for Maine.
447
See discussion supra Part III.B.1.a.
448
Notably, the Court has generally taken a laissez-faire approach to choice of law
matters. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 326 (1981) (Stevens, J.
concurring) (“The forum State’s interest . . . is . . . sufficient, in my judgment, to
attach a presumption of validity to a forum State’s decision to apply its own law to
a dispute over which it has jurisdiction.”); David P. Currie, THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY 1888–1986 581 (University of
Chicago Press 1990) (“Allstate v. Hague [449 U.S. 302 (1981)] . . . seemed to
carry the deferential attitude of earlier modern cases to extremes in 1981 by
permitting a State to apply its own law . . . for injuries inflicted by one or more
nonresident on another outside its borders.”). This is backwards, for a party would
seem to care much more about the governing law than where in the United States
the dispute is litigated, especially with federal court being an option in most
interstate cases.
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But state courts do not automatically apply their own substantive
laws to matters that they adjudicate.449
Other aspects of personal jurisdiction doctrine also undermine
the regulatory basis for personal jurisdiction and minimum contacts.
Whatever the basis for jurisdiction (consent, tag, minimum contacts),
the exercise of it has the same implications. So if the exercise of
jurisdiction equated with regulation as a basis for minimum contacts,
the jurisdiction would also amount to regulation when a defendant
was tagged in the state, or forfeited or waived its jurisdictional
argument. But clearly handing a defendant a piece of paper while he
happened to be in a given state (Burnham),450 or merely flying over
it (Grace),451 is not sufficient to subject him to state regulation. The
same could be said about a state applying its laws to a person who
simply failed to timely object thereto. Put differently, if jurisdiction
were equated with regulation, then many of the ways in which
jurisdiction is conferred would afford a state the ability to regulate
even his activities outside its borders, which would generally be
deemed improper. The exercise of jurisdiction necessarily involves
something other than regulation. State regulatory authority therefore
does not provide a justification for the minimum contacts test.
Leaving aside the particular theory on which one would base
minimum contacts, examining the nature of a civil suit—a battle
between two or more private parties—undermines minimum
contacts as a basis for personal jurisdiction. The parties to a civil
suit have a congruent relationship to the suit and the forum.
Reduced to the essentials, both plaintiffs and defendants seek to have

449

Even with the fairly lax constitutional strictures on choice-of-law, the Supreme
Court imposed some limits. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 326 (Stevens, J. concurring)
(“The forum State’s interest . . . is clearly not sufficient, however, to justify the
application of a rule of law that is fundamentally unfair to one of the litigants.”);
Currie, supra note 448, at 581 (“Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts made clear for
years after Hague that the Constitution still imposed limits on the authority of one
state to meddle with the affairs of another.”). If applicable law is the problem,
then the answer is not to use personal jurisdiction doctrine to direct matters to
another court where a different law may be applied, but provide stronger limits on
application of substantive law to those without a connection to the state whose law
is being applied.
450
495 U.S. 604; see supra Part II.B.3.f.
451
170 F. Supp. 442; see supra Part II.B.3.f.
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the court of a particular forum allocate disputed property rights.452
Since the parties are similarly situated, if minimum contacts were
constitutionally essential for a defendant to be subject to
adjudication, so too would contacts be required between plaintiff and
forum before the plaintiff’s rights could be adjudicated by a given
court.453 Of course that is not a requirement, nor should it be for
either plaintiff or defendant.
In sum, minimum contacts has no logical place in the personal
jurisdiction lexicon either as a function of due process or otherwise.
It has previously been shown that due process itself has only a
limited role. It is now necessary to formulate a new approach to
personal jurisdiction that does not include minimum contacts, and
involves due process only in the limited roles already suggested.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW APPROACH TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A major problem with the current personal jurisdiction approach
is its complexity.454 It would make little sense to replace it with
something else complex. As it has been argued that personal
jurisdiction need not be primarily a constitutional matter, the
groundwork has been established to create a straightforward
doctrine.
The approach being advocated calls for the Supreme Court to get
out of the way and allow states to be the primary arbiters of personal
jurisdiction. Around that state-law core, both the Constitution as
applied by the courts, including the Supreme Court, and Congress
have secondary roles to fill in gaps where necessary. The model
proposed here is primarily for use with defendants located in the
452

The term “property rights” is used here in a liberal fashion. The dispute may
not be about a particular piece of property. It may involve a suit for damages or
even an injunction. But even then, both sides are essentially beseeching the court
to give it something—and thereby take something from the other side—that has
the quality of property, be it money or the right to enjoin or not be enjoined.
453
A similar argument has been made already regarding the incongruity that arises
between a plaintiff’s rights and a defendant’s rights when due process is made a
central component of the personal jurisdiction analysis.
454
See Weintraub, supra note 98, at 558 (“It is a disgrace that we have made what
should be a matter of interstate venue a constitutional issue and then have
micromanaged state-court jurisdiction to adjudicate so that this threshold issue is
one of the most litigated.”).
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United States being sued in other states. Because policy concerns,
rather than high theory and constitutionalism, ought to drive personal
jurisdiction, the appropriate exercise of jurisdiction over defendants
located in foreign countries should be a matter of negotiation
through bi-lateral agreements and/or more comprehensive treaties, a
matter beyond the scope of this article. Even so, the model proposed
here, could still provide guidance for those types of negotiations.
A.

States as the Primary Arbiters of Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction over defendants located in the United States
should be primarily a matter of state law.455 States would decide, as
a matter of policy, to which parties and disputes to open their
courts.456 This state-focused approach would be supplemented by
limited constitutional protection and, as needed, congressional
legislation, as discussed in the next two subsections
As jurisdiction is being put forth as a policy decision, no specific
approach will be advocated here as to what personal jurisdiction
standards states ought to craft. Some states already have long-arm
statutes that provide specific limitations.457 But under the Supreme
455

Cf. Geoffery C. Hazard Jr., A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965
S. CT. REV. 241, 281–82 (1965) (“The long-arm statutes are settling into familiar
application in multistate tort and contract cases. If drafted to embrace multiparty
litigation . . . they would close the gap that has long existed.”).
456
Cf. Borchers, supra note 71, at 101 (“There are plenty of sound reasons for, and
sensible methods of, regulating jurisdiction. These choices, however, are
legislative, not constitutional, choices.”).
457
See, e.g., N. Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (Consol. 2014) (“Personal jurisdiction by acts of
nondomiciliaries. (a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. As to a cause of
action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary, or his executor or administrator,
who in person or through an agent: 1. transacts any business within the state or
contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state; or 2. commits a
tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of
character arising from the act; or 3. commits a tortious act without the state
causing injury to person or property within the state, except as to a cause of action
for defamation of character arising from the act, if he (i) regularly does or solicits
business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the
state, or (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in
the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international
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Court’s current approach most states have long-arm statutes that
explicitly—or as interpreted by their own courts—permit jurisdiction
to the full extent allowed under the Due Process Clause.458 The
current state statutes that provide specific limitations, or model
jurisdictional provisions, could provide models for drafting new
long-arm statutes in those states who statutes now extend to the full
extent of the Due Process Clause.
This description might seem open-ended, and some might
assume that it will lead to mischief and inappropriate and overextensive jurisdictional grabs. Section V below addresses this
concern. That section concludes that these fears will likely not come
about. And while it might seem strange to argue that states should
be the primary drivers of personal jurisdiction law, that peculiarity
results from the long-standing history of the current doctrine. In
fact, allowing states to take the lead in defining personal
jurisdictional reach is consistent with the traditional role of these
entities, especially as most of the disputes involving personal
jurisdiction arise under state substantive law.459 Moreover, defining
the boundaries of personal jurisdiction was primarily a state function
during portions of this country’s first one hundred plus years.460
B.

The Role of the Constitution in Personal Jurisdiction
Although states will be called on to lead in creating personal
jurisdiction standards, there is still some role for some mild
constitutional and federal legislative limits to supplement what will

commerce; or 4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the
state.”).
458
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (Deering 2015) (“A court of this state
may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of
this state or of the United States.”); Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz, LongArm Statutes: A Fifty-State Survey (2003)
http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/law/08-732/Jurisdiction/LongArmSurvey.pdf.
459
See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 101 (“I am not
arguing that jurisdiction should be a free-for-all, unregulated phenomenon. There
are plenty of sound reasons for, and sensible methods of, regulating jurisdiction.
These choices, however, are legislative, not constitutional, choices. ”).
460
See Kogan, supra note 19, at 279-97 (discussing pre-Pennoyer personal
jurisdiction cases in federal and state court).
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now be primarily a state-law policy matter.461 Due process should
not provide the starting point or play a prominent role in determining
the test for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, with the various
arbitrary criteria that the Court has created under the auspices of that
provision—minimum contacts, purposeful availment, state
sovereignty and the like.462 Instead, the Due Process Clause will
play two minor roles in personal jurisdiction, channeling and
backstopping, as alluded to above,463 and discussed more fully here.
First, under the channeling role, although the contours of
personal jurisdiction will generally spring from non-constitutional
sources, where personal jurisdiction is lacking, the defendant will
have an argument that adjudication will violate its due process
rights. This will allow defendants to directly challenge the improper
exercise of jurisdiction, as they do now, rather than raising a lack of
jurisdiction under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, in response to an
enforcement action.
Whenever a court lacks proper authority to adjudicate, a
deprivation of property rights by that tribunal denies the deprived
party due process. The lack of authority could be a lack of personal
jurisdiction, a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a lack of proper
appointment or qualification for the judge, or other irregularity that
divests a tribunal of appropriate adjudicatory power. The Due
Process Clause need not be the source of the standard for
determining whether the court may properly proceed. Certainly, due
process does not determine whether a court has subject matter
jurisdiction. So too, personal jurisdiction need not be—and ought
not be—primarily evaluated based upon due process considerations.
Rather, if personal jurisdiction in fact is missing in a given case, then
461

See Borchers, supra note 71, at 94 (“The Court has suggested, and [several
commentators] all have advanced with some force, the right to have access to
process as a rationale for using the due process clause to analyze
jurisdiction. . . . All of these proposals are much more palatable alternatives than
the Court's approach of the last several years.”) (collecting cases and
commentary). All of these proposals are much more palatable alternatives than the
Court’s approach of the last several years.
462
Cf. Koppel, supra note 17, at 949 (“Several writers have counseled . . . [in favor
of] the elimination of the reasonableness inquiry and, on the functionalist end, the
elimination of sovereignty and state lines from the due process analysis or the
removal of due process from ‘the equation’ altogether.”).
463
See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
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a defendant has the right to argue that the adjudication has deprived
him or her of property without due process of law. The language of
Pennoyer certainly suggests—even if it does not make absolutely
clear—that this is an appropriate role for due process. Several
commentators have read Pennoyer this way. Whether or not that is
what was actually intended in that case, it is nonetheless a role that
this procedural provision should play to prevent adjudication of
property rights by a tribunal lacking authority over the deprived
party.
Second, the Due Process Clause will have a backstopping role.
Unlike the current approach in which due process has a primary role
in shaping personal jurisdiction limits, the role would be more
limited. Irrespective of contacts or other criteria that has found its
way into post-International Shoe personal jurisdiction jurisprudence,
defendants’ due process challenges to personal jurisdiction would be
treated under the same standard as other procedural due process
challenges.
Due process generally requires that a party have notice and a fair
opportunity to defend.464 The procedures afforded should be ones
that minimize the risk that a party will lose property without a fair
assessment of the facts and law—that the likelihood of mistake be
minimized.465 As applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by a
particular court, the inquiry would focus on how difficult or
burdensome it would be for a defendant to litigate in that court. This
would involve an assessment of the distance to be traveled, the ease
of litigating from afar, and consideration of any other element that
could undermine the defendant’s ability to have his or her day in
court.466
464

See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267; Parry, supra note 82, at 853 (“For procedural
due process the basic test is fundamental fairness.”).
465
See Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism, supra note 43, at 577–79 (arguing for
applying the Matthews v. Eldridge due process standard to the personal
jurisdiction context); Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at
99 (“[To show that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitutionally invalid]
should require a defendant to show a practical inability to defend.”); cf. Russelll J.
Weintraub, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.8 A(1)(E), at 191 (6th
ed. 2010) (“[Courts should] permit a plaintiff to bring suit against a United States
defendant in any forum that has a reasonable interest in adjudicating the case.”).
466
See Borchers, supra note 71, at 99 (“Perhaps there are some cases in which a
defendant is put to the test of defending or defaulting, and it is economically
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This approach will be consistent with due process doctrine as
applied to other matters. It will thereby correct the overinclusiveness and under-inclusiveness of the current minimum
contacts standard as a proxy for due process. Due process will serve
to protect those defendants who are truly unduly burdened by the
exercise of jurisdiction, while affording no relief to those who are
not.467 No longer will due process protections help create legal
fictions like purposeful availment or in-state service that have little
relevance to whether it will be unfair to hale a particular party before
a tribunal.468 This will mean that those defendants like J. McIntyre
and World-Wide, parties who clearly would not have been burdened
by defending in the plaintiff’s chosen forum, will not escape on due
process grounds, while parties like those that both Kennedy and
Breyer were concerned about in each of their J. McIntyre opinions—
Appalachian potters, and Egyptian shirt-makers—will be protected if

rational for the defendant to make a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. This much, however, should be clear: if there are such cases, they are
few and far between. Such a motion should require a defendant to show a
practical inability to defend.”). Additionally, courts can employ other devices, like
a forum non conveniens dismissal to minimize inconvenience when burdens do not
rise to a constitutional level.
467
See Parry, supra note 82, at 854 (“[Due process evaluation in personal
jurisdiction is an] open–ended but also deferential inquiry into the likelihood that
the proceedings will be fundamentally fair to the defendant. At the core of this
inquiry is the inconvenience, if any, caused by crossing a border.”). Moreover,
because both plaintiff and defendant may suffer burdens in litigating in a distant
forum, there is no reason that the due process evaluation should focus purely on
the defendant. See id. (“[T]he fairness analysis can also include an assessment of
plaintiff’s interests.”); cf. id. at 857 (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction doctrine should reflect
basic due process doctrine supplemented by federalism values. An appropriate
standard is something like the following: a state court may presumptively exercise
jurisdiction over non-consenting defendants who know or ought to know that their
voluntary acts or omissions, and/or the effects of those acts or omissions, implicate
the legitimate regulatory interests of the forum state, unless the defendant
demonstrates that (1) the forum state’s interests in the litigation are minimal and
significantly outweighed by those of another state or (2) the burdens on the
defendant would make litigation in that forum significantly unfair in relation to
another available forum and the potential burdens on the plaintiff.”).
468
But see McFarland, supra note 7, at 794 (“[S]tate boundaries are meaningful.
This rules out a test based on convenience—similar to forum non conveniens—in
which state boundaries are irrelevant.” (footnotes omitted)).
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they can show that they cannot reasonably defend in the plaintiff’s
chosen forum.469
C.

The Role of Congress
Congress will also have a role as needed. If states, freed from
the minimum contacts diktat, enact problematic jurisdictional
statutes, Congress could intervene using its authority under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.470 That provision gives Congress the
authority to determine under what circumstances a judgment will be
entitled to recognition. It is generally agreed that Congress could
use this to create substantive jurisdictional rules.471 True, technically
this would not allow a direct attack on a court’s jurisdiction, but only
allow the defendant to raise a defense to collateral enforcement.472
Even so, where the defendant is not located within the forum state, a
469

See Arthur R. Miller, McIntyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63
S.C. L. REV. 465, 475–76 (2012) (“Despite the expressed concern of Justice
Kennedy for the small Florida farmer whose produce may be marketed nationally,
and of Justice Breyer for the Appalachian potter being sued in Alaska or Hawaii,
the obvious beneficiaries of McIntyre’s constriction on personal jurisdiction will
be manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies, and other significant economic
entities. In my view, the four plurality Justices should not have focused on formal
contacts and notions of sovereignty and the defendant’s intent to submit to the
forum, with no acknowledgement that the farmer and potter can be protected by
the principles of fair play and substantial justice recognized in International Shoe
and reprised in Asahi Metal.” (footnote omitted)).
470
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records,
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” (emphasis added)); see
Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A
Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due
Process Clauses (Part One), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499, 504 (1981) (“[T]he Full
Faith and Credit Clause . . . authorize[s] Congress to legislate on the topic [of
personal jurisdiction].”).
471
See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 105; cf.
Whitten, supra note 470, at 604 (“Congress may enact a set of nationwide longarm jurisdictional rules to govern the validity of the judgments of state courts in
sister state proceeding.”).
472
But see Whitten, supra note 470, at 604–05 ([T]his congressional power is not
limited to provision of jurisdictional rules available only on collateral attack of
state-court judgments in other states.” ).
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judgment that cannot be enforced elsewhere will likely be of little
value, so that plaintiffs would have no incentive to bring suits that
they could not enforce in sister states. At any rate, for reasons
discussed above and in the next section, states will probably be
sufficiently careful in crafting jurisdictional statutes that little, if any,
congressional intervention of the type discussed in this paragraph
will be necessary.473
Congress could also play a helpful role by amending the current
diversity statute to prevent clever ways for plaintiffs to thwart
federal jurisdiction.474 The purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to
protect plaintiffs and defendants from being disadvantaged by the
other party’s court system. And with regard to personal jurisdiction,
the federal court system, being one national system, has the
flexibility to take a holistic approach to where the trial and various
proceedings may be had.475 Whether the current transfer of venue
provisions are sufficient or require tweaking will require evaluation,
but certainly either under current or amended provisions, Congress
could create a fair, uniform, and common sense personal jurisdiction
regime. Transfer of venue—and its state-court cousin, forum non
conveniens—are better tools for determining on a case-by-case basis
the best location for a particular case, taking into account all relevant
interest than is the rigid doctrinal approach of constitutional personal
jurisdiction.476
473

Also, many current long-arm statutes say, or have been interpreted by state
courts, to extend jurisdiction to the full extent authorized by the due process, a
concept that would become meaningless under the proposed standard. For this
reason, Congress might have to create an interim statute until all states adopt
specific long-arm provision.
474
This does not mean that Congress need overly expand diversity jurisdiction, but
it could ensure a federal court in situations where adverse parties are truly in
different locales, irrespective of tactical joinders. See generally E. Farish Percy,
Defining the Contours of the Emerging Fraudulent Misjoinder Doctrine, 29 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569 (2006).
475
28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 already address this. To the extent that the federal
courts provide a refuge out of the personal jurisdiction trap, Congress could revise
these statutes to lessen the incentives for the use of tactics to take advantage of
personal jurisdiction doctrine, allowing judges to make a common sense
determination of where to allow litigation to take place.
476
See Parry, supra note 82, at 852 (“Venue doctrines, including removal, transfer,
and forum non conveniens, provide some help, and other ‘procedural devices’ are
also available to defendants.”); cf. Freer, supra note 32, at 572–73 (“[A case like]
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In sum, the proposed model calls for personal jurisdiction to be
primarily a state law, policy matter. The Constitution and Congress
will both have secondary roles. The system will be simpler, fairer,
and more likely to further the goals of both personal jurisdiction and
due process.
V. APPLYING THE PROPOSED APPROACH TO COMMON PERSONAL
JURISDICTION SCENARIOS
How will what was proposed in Section IV work in practice?
Will it result in absurd outcomes, or will personal jurisdiction make
more sense and be more efficient? Let us see by examining several
scenarios that make up the typical personal jurisdiction cases. First,
there are cases in which the plaintiff picks some state that has no
apparent connection to either party or to the dispute. Keeton477 is the
best example of this. Second, are cases in which the plaintiff sues
the defendant in the plaintiff’s home state, where that state has no
connection to the dispute, for example a Connecticut plaintiff suing a
New York defendant in Connecticut for a car accident that happened
in New York or New Jersey. Goodyear478 represents this type of
case, although the international aspect adds a wrinkle that raises
issues beyond the scope of this article. Third, there are unintentional
and intentional tort cases where at least the injury is suffered in the
plaintiff’s home state, where the plaintiff sues, like J. McIntyre,479
World-Wide,480 and Calder.481 Fourth, there are cases arising from
Burger King . . . filed in federal court [makes] transfer to federal court in
Michigan . . . at least possible; state court litigation cannot be transferred across
state lines. At best, a state-court defendant would have to rely on dismissal under
forum non conveniens, which as Dean Hay reminds us, ‘is an uncertain and
unreliable corrective mechanism.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Peter Hay,
Transient Jurisdiction, Especially over International Defendants: Critical
Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 593,
603 n.76 (1990))).
477
465 U.S. 770; see Part II.B.3.c.
478
1315 U.S. 2846; see discussion supra Part II.B.3.g.
479
131 S. Ct. 2780; see discussion supra Part II.B.3.g.
480
444 U.S. 286; see discussion supra Part II.B.3.a.
481
465 U.S. 783; see discussion supra Part II.B.3.c. Cases like World-Wide,
Calder, Walden, and Nicastro fit this pattern. In some of these tort cases, the tort
is actually committed within the plaintiff’s state (e.g. a car accident occurring in

170

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 13, No. 2

transactional disputes brought as either tort or contract suits by the
plaintiff in the plaintiff’s home state, like McGee and Burger
King.482 Fifth, there are various domestic relations, wills, trusts, and
other personal transaction cases, like Burnham, Kulko, Hanson, and
McGee.483 Sixth, there are cases involving tag jurisdiction like
Burnham and Grace.484
Consider the categories in turn, staring with plaintiffs picking
states have no connection to the parties or events. Left to make their
own policy, most states would probably craft long-arm statues that
exclude these types of suits. After all, states have little incentive to
clog their own courts with disputes where the events and the parties
have no connection to the state.
Moreover, plaintiffs will rarely bring a suit in a forum having no
connection to itself, the defendant, or the events of the case. The
only reason a plaintiff might do this, is to gain tactical advantage. In
Keeton, the plaintiff sought to take advantage of New Hampshire’s
extra-long statute of limitations. Conceivably, a plaintiff with
extensive resources might choose an arbitrary, distant forum to gain
an advantage over less well-healed plaintiff, such as a New Yorker
suing a fellow New Yorker in Alaska over a New York car accident.
Assuming that states even allowed these types of suits, which the
previous paragraph argued is not likely, the Due Process Clause, in
its backstopping role, would provide a vehicle for a defendant to
argue that he or she really would be denied a fair opportunity to
litigate.485
Actually, the proposed model with its focus on state driven
policy and fairness will be less subject to tactical abuse and sharp
practice than the current formalistic approach. For example, the
somewhat unsettling result in Keeton—a suit in New Hampshire as a
the plaintiff’s state). In others, some activity, like manufacturing or selling a
product occurs outside the plaintiff’s state but causes injury there.
482
471 U.S. 462; see discussion supra Part II.B.3.d. In some transaction cases, the
parties have included choice-of-forum clauses. The Court has taken a sound
approach to evaluating and applying these clauses, and no change is recommended
to that doctrine. See Carnival, 499 U.S. 595; The Bremen, 407 U.S. 1.
483
See Burnham, 495 U.S. 604; Kulko, 436 U.S. 84; Hanson, 357 U.S. 235;
McGee, 355 U.S. 220.
484
See Burnham, 495 U.S. 604; Grace, 170 F. Supp. 442.
485
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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result of forum shopping486—would probably be avoided under the
approach proposed here, even though on its surface my proposal
seems more permissive. Left to make policy, New Hampshire likely
would have crafted a narrower long-arm statute than the one it had
allowing the exercise of jurisdiction to the full extent of the due
process clause. Moreover, to the extent that due process arguments
in personal jurisdiction would focus on fairness, and not legal
fictions of contacts and purposeful availment, the Ohio-based
defendant’s argument that it should not be subject to suit in New
Hampshire in a suit by a New Yorker, for conduct that took place
primarily outside New Hampshire, would have more traction than it
did in Keeton itself.
The second category, plaintiffs suing at home for conduct
occurring elsewhere—e.g., the suit in New York by a New Yorker
against a New Jersey defendant for a New Jersey car accident—is
not that common. Most state long-arm statutes that actually place
limits on jurisdiction beyond the constitutional strictures, do not
allow this type of suit.487 And long-standing Supreme Court
doctrine clearly does not allow it. So plaintiffs generally know
better than to bring these types of suits, although they probably
would so if they were allowed to. Even so, even if left to make their
own policies, states probably may not allow jurisdiction over these
types of suits.
In crafting long-arm statutes, the interest of their own citizens
gives states incentives not to overreach to protect their own citizens
from overreaching by sister-states.
Moreover, to the extent
coordination problems between states do lead to overreaching, this
would be an ideal place for congressional intervention, if desired.
The latter modifier is added, because allowing one who is in an
accident with an out-of-state plaintiff to be sued in the plaintiff’s
home state is not necessarily a problematic result. Perhaps it is.
And for this reason, having a cogent, coordinated policy, rather than
piece-meal results based on legal fictions promulgated by various
courts will generally produced better, and more predictable results.
Goodyear488 itself, which is an example of a suit in this category,
486

465 U.S. 770; see discussion supra Part II.B.3.c.
See e.g., N. Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (Consol. 2014).
488
131 S. Ct. 2846; see discussion supra Part II.B.3.h.
487
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being a suit against a foreign defendant, raises issues that require
treatment beyond the bounds of this article. But suppose Goodyear
had involved the same facts happening in a U.S. state other than
North Carolina—the plaintiff’s home state—thereby making it an
example of this category of case. Under the circumstances whether
plaintiffs should be able to sue at home, in those circumstances, as
opposed to the defendant’s state should be a policy choice, not a
matter of Supreme Court doctrine.
The third category makes up an area of great dispute. The most
contentious and unsatisfying Supreme Court cases come from this
area—cases like World-Wide, Asahi, and J. McIntyre. Yet, these
should be easy cases. In most of Europe, defendants are answerable
in the jurisdiction in which they caused harm.489 And most states
would probably allow jurisdiction in this type of situation if given
the choice. In none of those three cases would the defendant have
faced any hardship or unfairness in litigating in the plaintiff’s chosen
forum, whereas the plaintiff, as well as the witnesses, and even the
defendants may have faced difficulties elsewhere, given the location
of evidence and witnesses.
Asahi and J. McIntyre both involved international defendants.
But in each, a plurality would not have allowed jurisdiction even if
they were domestic defendants, and those cases are discussed for
that reason.490 As for the small-time defendants that Justices
Kennedy and Breyer each cite in their respective J. McIntyre
opinions as potentially unfairly subject to suit in a distant forum over
a single, indirect sale, the current approach will benefit them. Their
burdens themselves could be examined as part of the due process
protection proposed here if the defendants argued that the exercise of
jurisdiction was unfair, as opposed to jurisdiction turning upon the
arbitrary nature of contacts.491 In this way, the proposed approach
489

See Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 (Art. 7(2)) (providing for tort jurisdiction
where a harmful event occurred).
490
The issue of jurisdiction over international defendants raises issues of foreign
relations that require separate treatment beyond the scope of this article. The
Court has taken account of this fact in passing, but for the most part it has
inappropriately used the same analysis for out-of-country defendants as it does for
out-of-state defendants.
491
Cf. Miller, supra note 469, at 475–76 (“Despite the expressed concern of Justice
Kennedy for the small Florida . . . and of Justice Breyer for the Appalachian
potter . . . the obvious beneficiaries of McIntyre’s constriction on personal
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would more likely protect those defendants who would suffer
unfairness if required to defend in a distant forum, while allowing
adjudication to proceed against those defendants who would not be
so disadvantaged.
The fourth category, transactional disputes, can often be
addressed by forum selection clauses. The Court has generally
enforced these clauses, so long as the party on whom it is imposed is
aware of and can understand the clause, and the chosen jurisdiction
makes sense.492 While a full analysis of the Court’s forum selection
clause jurisdiction is not undertaken here, this article’s basic
conclusion is that this represents one area where the Court has taken
the appropriate approach to personal jurisdiction. For cases lacking
a forum selection clause, the most common scenario likely to lead to
a dispute is the Burger King situation—one contracting party suing
the counterparty in the former’s home state. This situation can be
addressed much like the tort situation, and generally leave matters to
state law and federal housekeeping provisions like transfer of venue.
Constitutional court intervention would be limited to those cases in
which the defendant would truly suffer unfair burden by litigating in
the plaintiff’s home state.
The fifth category, domestic disputes, trusts and estates, and the
like, presents a particularly apt area for state-crafted jurisdiction law.
Law regarding marriage, divorce, child support, wills, and trusts
often vary greatly by state.493 Therefore, sensitivity to local
concerns is important, and this arena would benefit from the ability
jurisdiction will be manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies, and other
significant economic entities. In my view, the four plurality Justices should not
have focused on formal contacts and notions of sovereignty . . . no
acknowledgement that the farmer and potter can be protected by the principles of
fair play.”). Consider the Appalachian potter, who sells an urn via eBay.com to
someone in Hawaii. Under the current Supreme Court doctrine with its focus on
the defendant’s purposeful availment, the potter probably is subject to suit, even if
it would be hard for him to litigate thousands of miles away. Under the proposed
approach, the due process issue would come down to whether the defendant really
could fairly and without undue burden (truly elements of due process) litigate in
the Aloha State.
492
See, e.g., Carnival, 499 U.S. 585.
493
See generally Michael S. Finch, Choice-of-Law and Property, 26 STETSON L.
REV. 257 (1996); Adrienne H. Jules & Fernanda G. Nicola, The
Contractualization of Family Law in the United States, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 151
(2014).
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to states to coordinate jurisdictional policies that protect the
important interests involved. In many of these cases the designation
of parties as plaintiff and defendant is arbitrary, since they generally
involve resolving a matter in which both parties are seeking to obtain
something—and therefore where both are effectively petitioning the
court for relief—rather than one party seeking relief, while the other
party is merely seeking to avoid having to pay damages. For that
reason, the Court’s current approach, which treats plaintiffs and
defendants unevenly,494 is particularly inappropriate. Again, the due
process backstop can provide relief from unduly burdensome
litigation. But given that collectively states have an incentive to
protect each other’s laws in the domestic relations area, there is
reason to expect that they will coordinate both their jurisdictional
and their choice-of-law standards.495
Finally, there is tag jurisdiction. This will probably no longer
constitute a separate category. At the time Burnham was decided,
most states that addressed the matter still allowed tag jurisdiction.496
Yet, this was probably merely a relic from the centuries-old practice
that had not been addressed, rather than a conscious choice. Most
states now demure to the Due Process Clause in writing long-arm
statutes.497 If the Court no longer played the lead role in personal
jurisdiction, states would be forced to give serious consideration to
when they would open their courts. Just as states would have no
incentive to generally allow suits for matters not involving their state
or their citizens, those states would probably take a similar approach
494

Under the minimum contacts test, plaintiffs generally get to choose where to
litigate out of all possible fora with which defendants have sufficient contacts,
while defendants can avoid fora with which only the plaintiffs have contact. Thus,
the plaintiff generally will have the upper hand whenever the defendant has
minimum contacts with the plaintiff’s forum, while being disadvantaged (and
having to litigate away from home) whenever the defendant lacks contacts with
the plaintiff’s forum.
495
One reason that jurisdiction may take on so much importance in this area is that
domestic relations law is highly state specific, and where a case is litigated may
have important implications for the substantive law to be applied. Ideally, states
will seek to reach an approach that deters parties from bringing suit to gain tactical
advantage either in locale or governing law.
496
See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
497
Since Burnham held that tag jurisdiction comported with due process
requirements, these long-arm statutes that allow jurisdiction to the outer-reaches of
the Constitution tacitly condone tag jurisdiction.
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when a party was fortuitously served with process inside its borders.
So tag jurisdiction would probably be a non-issue. Moreover, even
if states allowed it, the proposed approach for constitutional
purposes, which eliminates contacts as well as sovereignty as factors
in personal jurisdiction, would not turn upon whether or not a
defendant was served within the boundaries of the state. All that
would matter is whether or not it was unfair or burdensome for the
defendant to litigate in the particular forum, which in no manner
would be affected by the location of service. Thus, this odd,
illogical, anachronistic form of jurisdiction would be effectively
eliminated, thereby making the personal jurisdiction doctrine more
cogent and reasonable.
Beyond the various categories, in most personal jurisdiction
scenarios there is an overriding dilemma which can be better
addressed by the proposed approach than the current doctrine. A suit
between parties from two different states requires either the plaintiff
or the defendant to travel to litigate.498 There is no solution that
treats each party equally, short of litigation on neutral turf, which is
no solution at all.499 The current approach does not resolve this
issue, and treats the parties unequally. So long as the defendant has
sufficient contacts with the plaintiff’s state, the plaintiff gets to
choose between home and away. On the other hand, if the defendant
lacks those contacts, the plaintiff will have to litigate on the
defendant’s turf, even if the plaintiff lacks contacts with that state.
The proposed approach will allow states to experiment through their
jurisdictional statutes and forum non conveniens rules so as to
further fairness concerns. Moreover, in cases that are removable,500
the federal transfer statute (28 U.S.C. § 1404) can be used. Freed
from the focus on state lines, courts would then be able to decide
between two possible states which location is best in terms of
fairness to the parties, as well as efficient use of litigation and
judicial resources.
498

Obviously the situation could be more complex with several parties from
different places on each side, but the two-party two-state solution will be used to
address this issue.
499
But the availability of diversity jurisdiction in federal court serves to lessen this
unfairness.
500
Since long-arm disputes generally arise between citizens of different states, in
many of these cases diversity jurisdiction will be available.
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The above discussion shows that the proposed approach is
superior with regard to outcomes. It will also be better than the
minimum contacts standard with regard to process. The proposed
model will likely be more predictable and more efficient to apply.
Legislation is prospective and therefore allows the creation of more
comprehensive law than reactive court decision.501 The advantage
here is jurisdiction law can be part of a complete package rather than
a series of discrete, but hard to mesh rules. Further, parties and
lower courts will benefit by better predictability to where suit may
be brought.502 In short, there will be a lesser drain on litigation and
judicial resources, which should benefit all involved other than those
who seek unfair tactical delay and lawyers who bill by the hour.503
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has suggested a seemingly radical change to personal
jurisdiction doctrine. In reality, however, the proposal is consistent
with the theoretical bases of personal jurisdiction, as well as the
views of commentators and quite a number—albeit a minority—of
justices that have served on the Court in the years since International
Shoe. Theoretically, the proposal is truer to notions of due process
as well as the concept of personal jurisdiction itself. Moreover, in
practice it will lead to results that are fairer, more logical, and easier
to apply.
501

See Borchers, supra note 43, at 583–84 (“Adjudication is inherently concerned
with past events. . . . This process simply does not lend itself well to announcing
broad, easy-to-apply rules.”); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, LEGAL REASONING AND
POLITICAL CONFLICT 106 (Oxford 1996) (“A great virtue of rules is that they limit
permissible grounds for both action and argument. I have said that in a
heterogeneous society, containing people of limited time and capacities, this is an
enormous advantage. It saves effort, times, and expense.”).
502
See Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism, supra note 43, at 583–84
(“Adjudication is inherently concerned with past events, and the Court necessarily
focuses on reaching a result based upon the specific facts of that case. This
process simply does not lend itself well to announcing broad, easy-to-apply rules.
Legislation, of course, is much better suited to prospective announcement of broad
rules[.] The Supreme Court’s exceedingly close attention to personal jurisdiction
has stunted legislative innovation.”).
503
This may not even be a detriment to lawyers. Law firms do not have unlimited
resources and time and money spent litigating jurisdictional disputes may limit
attorneys’ ability to address more important substantive matters.

